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Abstract 
Water and energy sectors encompass large infrastructural systems, face increased 
scarcities and have becn argued to have locked-in structures. Questions of how 
technological breakthroughs occur and how the underlying policies and 
institutional structures change are therefore important for responding to socio-
economic pressures and to improve environmental sustainability. This thesis aims 
to re-theorise the interplay of technology, policies and discourses within 
sociotechnical regimes and to examine the merits of these relations from an inter-
sectoral perspective. This dissertation combines insights from the literature on 
science and technology studies, policy dynamics and policy integration and uses 
the integrated approach to examine parallel and interrelated dynamics in the 
Israeli water and energy regimes, making usc of the interpretative policy analysis 
methodology and a range of qualitative methods. The dissertation makes three 
analytical contributions. 
Firstly, the dissertation highlights how the power of technology in shaping and 
transforming policy regimes has been underestimated in the current literature 
about policy dynamics. The dissertation exemplifies this by the case of 
desalination technology, which had the capacity to transform the Israeli water 
sector. I suggest that technological breakthroughs that rendered seawater 
desalination economically feasible, undermined long-lasting hydro-ideological 
support for agriculture, introduced new ideas about water abundance, and 
engendered changes in paradigms, institutional structures and constellation of 
actors. Desalination technology contributed to this shift by destabilizing the 
existing structure through re-framing and dis-placing important issues, such as 
environmental externalities, economic costs and hard political choices, to other 
policy sectors and levels of governance as well as reallocated them between 
politicians, bureaucrats and water professionals. 
Secondly, the dissertation argues that the focus of the sociotechnical transitions 
literature has been on structural changes with predefined objectives and suggests 
that a more fluid and agency-based ideas about discourses - as presented by 
discursive institutionalism - can provide contrast and complement. The 
dissertation exemplifies the usefulness of this cross-fertilisation by analysing the 
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rise of four technological altematives to current Israel's coal-based energy regime. 
I suggest that the regime is shi fting away fi'om the traditional scarcity discourse 
towards a new discourse on energy abundance. The ncw energy abundance 
discourse was creatcd by policy networks, who promote natural gas, oil shale, 
nuclear energy and solar energy as energy altematives although their 
mainstreaming still faces tonnidable uncertainties and various constraints. The 
findings also support the premise that a change from constructed scarcity of 
energy resources to their abundancc potentially reconstructs socio-technical 
transitions, future pathways or technological trajectories and institutional 
arrangements at large. 
Thirdly, the dissertation examines how sectoral transitions may be coupled and 
technological regimes may co-evolve. The dissertation demonstrates that while 
transition management literature examines how long-teon structural changes 
could be directed toward greater sustainability, it has, however, mostly taken a 
sectoral approach which ncglects the potential interdependencies between 
sociotechnical changes and policy dynamics in different sectors. The thesis 
examincs the water-energy nexus in Israel and suggests that transitions of the 
water and energy sectors in Israel are physically, spatially and financially coupled. 
Yet, inter-scctoral institutional structures, management apparatus and niche-
induced innovations were found to be lacking integrative capacities, driven by an 
inherent strategy of supply-side management and around the unaltered, implicit, 
core belief in the need to secure independent and ultimately unlimited sources of 
water and energy. 
In practice, integrated transitions management could therefore playa crucial role 
in re-orienting trajectories in the water and energy sectors, re-designing transition 
arenas and articulating transition pathways. This could cncourage technology-
mediated policy realignments on the basis of more comprchensive and longer-
tcon problem solving rather than on the opportunities technologies offer for 
problem avoidance or postponement. Further policy recommendations highlight 
the merits and pitfalls of greater cohesion in the policy arena, including the 
effectiveness of procedural tools such as the regulatory impact assessment. 
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1. Introduction: the key dimensions of the problem 
"Are choices trade-offs?" (Holland, 
2003:17) 
1.1. Introduction 
Socio-technical restructuring worldwide has been influential in advancing 
significant changes in social and natural environments_ Concurrently, 
environmental concerns have been increasingly incorporated into decision-
making processes_ Yet, as will be shown in this thesis, policy regime changes 
are advanced primarily through technological-pushes and shifting discourses, 
and less by a careful consideration of the long-term sustainability of policies 
and practices_ Additionally, while cross-regime dynamics - manifested as 
interdependencies of environmental, economic and socio-political problems -
present even greater challenge, they have been rarely acknowledged by 
policy-makers_ The analysis presented here is therefore taking an integrative 
outlook, specifically at the water and energy policy regimes. It will directly 
address the complex spaces and contexts where interdependent socio-
technical transitions are formulated or constrained. 
In studying socio-technical transitions, the focus in this research will be on 
developed countries, with Israel as a location based case-study_ Israel, a semi-
arid region, has had to battle water and other resources scarcity from its early 
days of formation_ It is a relatively small country with high population 
density_ While its democratic political culture and egalitarian society have 
enabled the creation of a modern state and western life-style for its citizens, 
its geopolitical continuous isolation, tensional borders and unstable status 
among parts of the international community, have posed many challenges on 
the state's ability to secure resources' availability, mainly water and energy. 
Moreover, there is a greater consent today that any attempt to address the 
acute water problem in Israel, cannot be made solely within an independent 
national system, as was the case for the last few decades, but will have to 
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include the needs of the surrounding countries, including the Palestinian 
Authority and to promote mutual collaborations. I will argue here that Israel's 
water and energy regimes present an optimal terrain for the study because 
they are simultaneously undergoing a complex, yet definite, transitional 
process. 
This introductory chapter covers the conceptual and empirical justifications 
for the research, the research aim and specific questions, and provides a road 
map for the rest of this thesis. The conceptual motivation for the research is 
based on identified gaps in the literature, which are discussed in chapter 2 in 
greater detail. From a policy perspective, the empirical justification for the 
research is rooted in a growing concern about what was termed the water-
energy nexus and the correlated problem of integration in national policy and 
decision-making processes. The theoretical background for the nexus and the 
particular context in which this phenomenon is examined are also spelled-out 
here. 
1.2. Integrated transitions toward sustainability: conceptual novelty 
From a conceptual perspective, there has been a good deal of work on how 
decisions are made in the policy arena. The study of environmental decision-
making or environmental governance, to use the more inclusive term, is 
particularly flourishing. However, while decision-making theories and 
dominant models can significantly contribute to our understanding of existing 
structures and patterns of policymaking, they are limited in their explanation 
of policy dynamics (i.e. continuation and change) under growing 
environmental uncertainty and complexity (Kemp et aI., 2005). This 
limitation partially stems from the prevalence of various social perceptions 
about the capacity of technology to solve or at least mitigate the most 
permanent environmental problems communities are facing worldwide, and it 
is one dimension of what was conceptualised as "ecological modernization" 
or "technological optimism", which "identified modem science and 
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technology as central institutions for ecological reform" (Mol, 1996:313; 
llucscmann, 2003). 
Technologies and technological systems are therefore the focus of much 
research, as are their interactions with politics, policy-making, and 
governance. Technological intake is a key-interest also in studies on socio-
technical transitions, which are largely occupied by questions regarding 
structural, co-evolving changes in societal and natural constitutes (i.e. 
actors/agents, institutions, policy, science, technology, economy, discourse, 
culture and ecology) in distinctive sectors - water, energy, transportation -
visualised by cogwheels in Figure 1. A question remains open to whether 
socio-technical constitutes always take the same size and role in this complex 
socia-technical system. An instinctive answer would most probably be that 
no, as every transition is necessarily a context, location and time-based 
phenomenon. Yet, I argue in this thesis that current conceptualisation of 
socia-technical transitions assumes fixed, circular relations between different 
constitutes, where in fact some forces are ignored or downsized. I hope to 
present in this thesis a threefold contribution to the socio-technical transitions 
literature and to the refinement and characterisation of the relationships 
between major sociotechnical components: policy, technology and discourse. 
I will highlight the interchangeable role of technologies, discourses and 
interdependent transitions in policy dynamics, by challenging three voids in 
the literature: 
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Figure 1: Cogwheels in transition. Image from: van der Brugge (2005: 166) 
First, many studies about either policy or technology, usually conceive policy 
a lever that is shaped and manipulated in order to influence technological 
trajectories and escape unsustainable paths. A reverse causal relationship, in 
which technology has the potential of transforming decisions and policies, 
had been advocated, for example, in the work of Latour (e.g. 2000l I would 
also build on Sabatier (1988), who claimed early on as well, that technology 
plays as an external pressure on policies and institutions and Lovell (2007), 
who emphasised the importance of materials and technologies. The water 
policy regime case-study in chapter 4, therefore prepares the way for 
unfolding the transitions management approach so as to consider a wide 
range of interdependencies. I will take the understanding of technology as an 
actant in the policy arena forward, and ask here how does technology 
influence policy and institutions under conditions of interdependent change 
and how negative consequences can be mitigated? 
1B. Latour is talking about systems broader than policy and on the "capacity of artefacts to 
constmct, literally and not metaphorically, social order" (Latour, 2000: 113). 
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Second, I will usc in this thesis the socio-technical transitions theory in 
conjunction with discursive institutionalism theory. In chapter 2, I will make 
the point that the focus of socio technical transitions literature is on structural 
changes with predetined objectives, whereas more fluid and agency-based 
ideas about discourses - as presented by Discursive Institutionalism - can 
provide contrast and complement. Discourses will therefore be found to 
influence not only policies and technological trajectories but also more 
general social arrangements. In chapter 5 I therefore look at the energy 
regime, in order to find out how the socio-technicalliterature can be enriched 
by refreshing its largely structural orientation with discursive institutionalism 
and its ability to bring-in actor-centered considerations. 
Lastly, on the basis of the literature review in chapter 2, it can be claimed that 
the sectoral handling of transitions has to a large extent missed the 
connections and interdependencies between distinct sectors. As will be 
showed here, a transition in one sphere is likely to influence or be influenced 
by another transition. The premise of this thesis, therefore, is that a more 
integrative approach to socio-technical transitions can highlight issues that 
are essential to our understanding of transitions and their implications on 
sustainability. In chapter 6 I therefore put to use a proposed broader approach 
to policy dynamics in the form of Integrated Transition Management. 
With respect to the forthcoming analysis, three notions merit a preliminary 
definition here: 'governance', 'institutions' and 'sustainability'. With respect 
to the former, I usually choose to refer to processes of governing as decision-
making or policy-making, rather than to deal in-depth with the theoretical 
aspects of the term governance. Particularly, with relation to the study of 
water management, I prefer the concept of water policy regime that is used in 
recent research (Pahl-Wostl et aI., 2007; Huitema and Meijerink, 2010b) 
rather than water governance. Nevertheless, since this term has gained a 
growing popularity during the last decade and because it encompasses also 
the useful term 'networks', it is unwarranted to completely disregard it. 
Briefly, in the term governance, I refer to networks of governing structures 
and methods beyond the government - the traditional sole player. It is 
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through governance that socio-technical transitions are crystallised and 
potentially managed. Depending on the strength of laws and regulations, 
effectiveness of implementation, types of actors involved, market structures 
and more (Treib et al., 2007), different modes of governance (e.g. statism, 
pluralism, corporatism, network governance) will fundamentally determine 
the nature and pace of a transition. Policy dynamics can largely be explained 
by different modes of governance. The overarching governance concept is 
embedded in every aspect of our lives. Water management, for example, is a 
governance concept (Brooks, 2007). The academic community of water 
policy professionals promotes the idea of "adaptive governance" as 
"integrated and collaborative approaches to resource management (which) 
support a process of collective learning and the resulting institutional changes 
needed to shift management operations for improved water management" 
(Fischhendler and Heikkila, 2007:4). 
This term is important because the socio-technical transition in the Israeli 
water sector, for example, has altered several components of governance 
through which the system has historically guaranteed water supply. These 
include changes in power distribution between ministries and authorities, 
responsibility for water production, rising involvement of eNGOs in the 
communication of water related issues to the public, ownership and market 
structures. Changes in governance have in tum accelerated policy dynamics 
and transformative processes. I chose not to use the governance terminology 
in the thesis because I felt that this ubiquitous term could, for the purpose of 
this thesis, be reduced into particular terms where these are needed such as 
polity or management. Yet, governance is a thread running behind or 
sometimes beside the conceptual language used here and therefore should not 
be completely ignored. 
The second notion that may require a brief notice is institutions. It is used 
here as the formal and informal organizations, associations and procedures in 
a society, that is, the substance of which governance is made up from. Within 
the environmental governance framework then, "resource management 
institutions are the laws, policies, rules, norms and customs by which 
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resources are governed" (Bakker, 2007:434). It is argued that moving toward 
more sustainable practices essentially entails institutional change (Frank and 
Hajer, 1999; Connor and Dovers, 2004). The effort to offer an account for the 
dynamics, of both modes of governance and institutions, is enhanced by an 
ability to demonstrate the interdependency of the social and technological 
systems (see Paavola, 2010). The cases in this thesis demonstrate such 
interdependencies throughout. 
A third term that requires concise attention here is sustainability. Promotion 
of sustainability pursues changes in governance, institutions, technologies, 
and social/individual behaviour, for the purposes of maintaining the 
maximum functioning of ecological systems in a way that is socially just and 
economically feasible. Following from this definition, is that socio-technical 
transitions' commitment to the goal of sustainability, is an indicator of the 
degree to which a sector's managers undertake directive that is protective of 
natural resources without risking continuous supply, access and safety of 
services - in our case of water and electricity. The environmental 
sustainability dimension of the interaction of governance mechanisms and 
institutions, even if sometimes implicit, comprises the core foci of the 
analysis undertaken in this thesis. 
The sustainability discourse is not dominant at state level institutions in 
Israel. Most governmental ministries promote development rather than 
sustainable development, especially In important sectors, such as 
transportation. A national plan to reduce the impacts ofGHG emission and to 
combat climate change, for example, has not yet been approved or adopted 
by either a governmental decision or any of the individual ministries. What 
did receive the support of the government was a national plan for "green 
growth" (Governmental decision no. 3768, 23.10.2011) that emphasises the 
creation of new "green jobs". This goes in line with a recent report on the 
Israeli environmental movement and organisations (in the non-profit sector), 
which concluded that successful oppositions to unsustainable initiatives was, 
and will increasingly depend in the future, on the extent to which 
environmental organizations are able to "talk" in economic language. In turn, 
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the industrial sector in Israel can be considered a passive player, as it only 
recently and slowly adopted voluntary regulations related to export, and in 
order to stand-up to European standards. Finally, even with growing 
awareness, especially to health-related environmental issues, the general 
public does not prioritize environmental sustainability issues; security and 
well-fare concerns remain on the top of the public agenda. The environmental 
context of this research is further elaborated in chapter 3. 
Between the three-fold conceptual motivation for the research, as depicted in 
the beginning of this sub-section, and the research's empirical justification 
(section 1.5 below), it is reasonable to bring the academic point of view on 
the interface of two particular policy regimes: water and energy, the two 
case-studies in this thesis. The water-energy interface is embedded in two 
complementary concepts: scarcity and abundance, which I deal with in the 
next subsection. Further exploration is incorporated in chapters 4 and 5. 
1.3. Constructions of scarcity and abundance 
Water may be one of the most valuable yet vulnerable resources in relation to 
sustaining life. It is generally acknowledged that it is mostly as a result of 
human actions that the depletion and contamination of water resources are 
making water scarcity an issue of major international environmental problem 
(Pearce, 2006). Clean drinking water is in particular an issue of enormous 
anxiety. Traditionally, societies in developing countries and arid regions are 
considered to be the most affected by the shortage of freshwater as well as by 
mismanagement of water resources (Lipchin, 2005). Several concepts 
indicate different magnitude of or sources for the problem. For example, the 
internationally accepted Falkenmark indicator sets 1000 m3 per person as a 
minimum annual level below which countries encounter 'water stress' (Tal, 
2006). In tum, water scarcity is defined by Bakker (2002:770) as "a 
generalised phenomenon in humid as well as arid countries, resulting from 
increasing pressure on water resources in terms of quality (increasing 
pollution) as well as quantity (increasing demand for water)". 
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The essence of the problem is therefore considered not always to be a 
problem of the amount of water available, but the inability to make it 
adequate to usc and available to consumers. In addition to inadequate storage 
and delivery systems, competition among users (agriculture, industry and 
cities) accelerates the problem (Hannigan, 2006). A 'water crisis' is either 
defined simply by the lack of access to safe and affordable water, or serves as 
an overall concept to describe the resulting situation from water shortage, 
stress or scarcity. 
Researchers have focused on the various drivers behind definitions of and 
coping-strategies with water crises across nations. According to Allan 
(1997), for example, global economic processes, such as 'virtual water' 
trading play much greater role in policy decisions than any professional, 
"objective" hydrological analysis. The concept of 'virtual water', i.e. the 
water embedded in exportedlimported grain, highlights one way among 
others to identify and assess policy choices and political-economic decisions 
in regard to a precious resource like water. 
Such an analysis is compatible with the social constructivism approach, 
which emphasises historical events, social forces and ideology, as the sources 
for the emergences of 'facts' and 'problems' (Hacking, 2000). In this line, 
intellectuals have questioned the mere existence, in several dry areas, of what 
is termed a 'water crisis', interpreting it as a discursive construction within a 
particular socio-political arena (Aguilera-Klink et aI., 2000; Hannigan, 2006; 
Trottier, 2008). It was critically argued, for example, that "nature is never 
'short' of water ... water is short only when social actors have decided it is so 
for a variety of reasons" (Trottier, 2008: 198). 
Trottier (2006) has stressed that different stakeholders within and outside the 
scientific community, hold different interests and put forward contradictory 
definitions of a 'water crisis', reflecting the inherently political nature of any 
scientific exertion. In some cases scarcity can be seen as the lack of enough 
resources to satisfy insatiable wants, as opposed to human 'basic needs' 
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(Meerganz Von Medeazza, 2008). In addition to "demand-induced scarcity", 
Meerganz von Medeazza (2008) difTerentiates between two other types of 
"anthropogenic" scarcities and claims, for instance, that the deficit in the 
supply system of Gaza Strip is mainly caused (and maintained) by the 
geopolitical situation, and that the deficit of water availability in the slums of 
Chennai is essentially a result of the ill-suited and, above all, inequitable 
water governance schemes. 
Another target for researchers' critique in regard to water mismanagement is 
the global tendency toward the privatization of water infrastructures and 
proVISIOn. Privatization is depicted in theory as the neo-liberal state's 
reaction to problems of scarcity or difficulties III management. Briefly, 
processes of privatization of environmental assets, natural resources 
(including water) and national schemes that directly or indirectly involve 
impacts upon the environment are already prevailing in countries around the 
world, with growing problems and concerns for quality, quantity and justice, 
involvement of multi-corporations and marketization (Sauri and Del Moral, 
2001; Haughton, 2002; Pretty, 2003; Bakker, 2007). In her research about 
water management practices in Spain, Bakker (2002) explained that the 
underlying assumption behind privatization is that the market is more 
efficient than governments at providing basic services and that public utilities 
services are better be outsourced in order to cover the failure of the state to 
manage them efficiently. 
Privatization, which involves the transfer of some or all the resources or 
systems of operation from public hands to private ownership or control, is 
explained as the outcome of the "hollowing-out" of the neoliberal state 
(Rhodes, 1997). Otherwise, it is seen as a process in which the capitalist 
economy forces us to value everything in terms of the market, thus 
transforming users into consumers (Bakker, 2001; Swyngedouw, 2005). The 
first western country to fully privatize its water services was England. At that 
time (the year 1989) other utilities such as oil and telecommunication were 
already managed by the private sector. But the full privatization that took 
place in England as part of its national economic policy had been partly 
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transformed into public-private partnerships, when several water companies 
have realized that not all parts of water management are profitable (Bakker, 
2003b). Water is thus depicted as an "uncooperative" commodity (Bakker, 
2007). 
The social impacts of such socio-economic restructuring vary from place to 
place. It is argued that water prices can often be expected to rise and level of 
quality to fall (Hannigan, 2006). In many 'Southern' countries such as South 
Africa, Bolivia, Argentina and Ghana, water privatization is an on-gomg 
source of major conflicts, which have worsened the problem of access to 
clean water and growing inequalities between communities (i.e. Loftus and 
Mcdonald, 200 I). 
Whether a natural problem or a socio-economic construction, the increasing 
negative implications have encouraged the search for more sustainable 
decisions, policies and plans for water management, such as the Integrated 
Water Resource Management framework (IWRM)2 and "soft-water paths" 
(Gleick et aI., 2002). The increasing anxiety from severe global water 
shortage has also prompted a greater chase after scientific and technological 
2 IWRM is an approach that alms at increasing sustainability of water resources, 
management, uses and treatment, by different types of integrations within the natural system 
(quantity and quality, surface water and groundwater, upstream and downstream etc.) and the 
human system (different users' needs, development policies in other sectors, different scales 
of management) (Jonch-Clausen and Fugl, 200 I). Although extensive body of work is done 
to promote IWRM around the world, diverse voices against the approach are recorded in the 
last couple of years. Trottier (2008), at the critical constructivist edge has criticised the mere 
adoption of the IWRM concept as an inevitable solution of centralized states, disempowering 
local social institutions and reinforcing a "global water crisis paradigm". Even from a more 
pragmatic stance, however, researchers have claimed that similar to other forms of 
integration, the IWRM approach, despite its presumed popularity, has largely stayed in the 
realm of theory and rhetoric and that it might be impossible to successfully address all the 
issues it is concurrently attempts to integrate (Biswas, 2004; Jeffrey and Gearey, 2006). 
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solutions for water scarcity (Aguilera-Klink ct aI., 2000), such as seawater 
desalination (Wangnick, 2002). 
The construction of scarcity is similar across managmg sectors of other 
natural resources. Energy scarcity can also be seen as either demand-induced, 
the result of inadequate management practices or a symptom for global ill-
politics. Indeed, to a large extent, the concern over scarcity of primary 
energy sources and particularly oil has shaped current energy regimes. Bridge 
and Wood (2010:567) consider for example that "scarcity is oil's meta-
narrative, the core storyline in the unfolding drama of the hydrocarbon 
economy since the late 19th century". 
Similar to cases of other natural resources, physical and socially constructed 
scarcity of energy resources serves different and sometimes contradictory 
interests, such as the oil industry's interest in high price of energy and the 
environmentalists' advocacy of low carbon economy and society. Although 
some commentators have challenged pessimistic elements of the scarcity 
discourse such as oil's geophysical limits, the "peak oil" and "the end of the 
era of cheap oil" (Clarke, 2007), its role and power in shaping energy 
regimes has hardly been questioned, particularly as a driving force and 
central theme in international relations (Haas, 2002). 
Studies of natural resources scarcity and crises typically trace their socio-
political sources and implications (Bakker, 2000; Mehta, 2003). For example, 
Aguilera-Klink et at. 's study (2000) highlights how socially constructed 
scarcity of water supported power relations and economic structures in the 
island of Tenerife. However, less attention has been paid to abundance as a 
constructed category and a factor shaping energy and resource regimes. 
Alatout (2009:367) suggests that water abundance was constructed to 
advance hydro-political goals in the pre-state Israel. Sen (1977) in turn 
highlights how food abundance might not prevent hunger because it is 
crucially linked to unequal incomes and access to food. Similarly, Dewees 
(1989) has demonstrated how the physical abundance of wood does not solve 
fuel wood crisis in developing economies because of differential access and 
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resulting resource allocation. Finally, critical geographers have sometimes 
examined the links between the availability of natural resources and socio-
political order, demonstrating how abundant natural resources may help to 
construct "imaginative geographies" and reproduce ideas about nation-
building, national identity, citizenship and territory (Perreault and Valdivia, 
2010). 
While much work has been done on natural resources scarcity and crises, 
much less attention has been paid to abundance. The concern over the less 
visible or sometimes unknown implications of the notion of abundance has 
begged the need to examine abundance as a " ... constructed category by 
itself, rather than the hidden, other side of scarcity" (Alatout, 2009:367). I 
intend to focus on abundance in chapters 4 and 5. 
In what follows, I tum to the water-energy interface. This inter-sectoral 
interface first and foremost derives from the constructed scarcity and 
vulnerability of the two resources, without which the interface would have 
surely become less of an interest for researchers and policymakers alike. 
1.4. The water-energy interface 
The pnmary nature of the water-energy interconnection is physical. 
Generally, the construction and operational stages of water delivering 
(pumping, transport, use and treatment), in that they require substantial 
amounts of energy (see Figure 2)3 - is a central dimension of what recently 
has come to be termed the water-energy nexus (Lofman et aI., 2002; Stillwell 
et aI., 2009). Research has highlighted the interconnectedness of the two 
systems for end-user individuals (Malik, 2002), in municipal or regional 
J This model treats desalination as a treatment procedure. I disagree with this choice and will 
treat desalination under a separate category of water production. Moreover, the energy use in 
desalination is much greater than in the other treatment techniques. 
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levels, and at national sca les (NRDC, 2004; Kenway et at. , 2008). In 
particular, energy cost of agricultural irrigation is a subject of concern, 
especia lly in developing countries (Shah et aI., 2004). Achievi ng certa in 
water qua lity standards also depends on growing energy input for the process 
of treatment (Rothausen and Conway, 20 II). 
Abstract ion Treatment ( ) and and S> End use S> conveyance distribution 
• Pumping of groundwate • Filtration • Heating 
surface water and 
• Oxidation • Cooli ng 
salt water 
• Ultraviolet treatment • Household appliances 
• Additives • CommerCia I appliance 
• Transfer of water 
• Denitrification • Industrial processes from souce 
to treatment plant • Desalination 
or reservoir 
• Pumping 
Figure 2: A life-cycle model of the water sector and processes i nvolving energy 
use. From: Rot hausen and Conway (2011 :211). 
One of the most obvious j uxtapositions of water and energy, for example, is 
hydroelectric power generation. With massive re liance on dams (for 
irrigation, energy, water supply and flood control), the Californian experience 
of the years 2000-2001, has demonstrated how an energy crisis soon became 
a water crisis and how droughts and lack of precipitation may only 
exacerbate an already difficult energy situation (Lofman et al. , 2002). 
Ultimately, according to the authors, management and policy intended to 
improve the supply or use of one resource can negatively impact the 
management/supply of other resources . 
Beside 'energy for water ', large amount of water is needed for thermoelectric 
power generation. The amount of water needed to produce energy varies with 
the type of faci lity and the characteristics of the fue l in use. Fossil -fuel, 
nuclear, and geothermal power plants require much water for fuel excavation 
(hydrau lic fracturing, oi l and gas dri ll ing, coal mining), processing and 
cooling (Gleick, 1994). Some renewable energy technologies are water 
intensive as well, such as geothermal plants and so lar panel fields. 
Wastewater 
treatment 
• Collection 
• Physical treatment 
• Chemica I treatment 
• Sludge treatment 
• Disc harge 
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Alternativc energy sources, however, such as biodiesel and ethanol are prime 
consumcrs, requiring cnonnous amounts of water for soy and com irrigation 
and are claimcd to worsen water pollution (Service, 2009). 
While water and energy systems are intertwined in several ways, their 
convergent points are strained by the effects of climate change. In particular, 
although the range of impacts of climate change on water resources is not yet 
entirely known, it is generally expected that the hydrological cycle will be 
dramatically influenced. For example, changes of the intensity and 
distribution of precipitation, of sea-levels, stream-flows and snowmelt 
seasons, were already recorded in different locations (lPCC, 2008). The 
effort to reduce GHG emission has promoted an industrial interest in 
decarbonizing the water sector and reducing embodied and operational 
energy III water services provision by several means, such as: reduced 
consumer demand and water heating; looking at total system carbon 
including treatment; biogas production and use; gravity feed standards; 
leakage reductions; heat recovery and more (Schiffler, 2004; Semiat, 2008; 
Ainger et aI., 2009). Technology is seen as a particular key-factor in climate 
change adaptation (lPCC, 2008). However, certain techno-institutional 
adaptation measures to particular impacts of climate change could in fact 
increase vulnerability; for example, whereas seawater desalination is a 
demand-side solution to water scarcity, it is claimed to be also an energy-
intensive technology and therefore inconsistent with efforts to mitigate 
climate change (Schiffler, 2004; Semiat, 2008). 
Nevertheless, despite of ample dimensions of these multiple linkages 
(physical, institutional, geographical and financial) only in very few cases, in 
specific locations (mainly Australia and California or Texas, US), researchers 
have pointed to the inseparability of water issues from energy Issues as 
highly significant for both markets and policy-makers. Furthennore, the 
current structures of resource managerial bodies are still far from addressing 
the issue in an optimal manner, as is described by Biswas (2004:249): 
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The current and the foreseeable trends indicate thaI water problems of the 
future will continue to become increasingly more and more compJcx, and will 
become more and more intertwined with other development sectors like 
agriculture, energy, industry, transportation, and communication, and with 
social sectors like education, environment, health, and rural or regional 
development. The time is fast approaching when water can no longer be 
viewed in isolation by one institution or anyone group of professionals 
without explicit and simultaneous consideration of other related sectors and 
issues and vice versa. In fact, it can be successfully argued that the time has 
already come when water policies and major water-related issues should be 
assessed, analyzed, reviewed, and resolved within an overall societal and 
development context. 
Existing physical, operational or managerial approaches may not be equipped 
to deal with the social, economic and environmental consequences of the 
nexus. When several parts or elements of the systems are in need to 
complement each other so that the systems would operate more efficiently, 
integration capacities may be required (Givoni and Banister, 20 10). 
Integration, however, may be found hard to achieve at the policy level, as 
Webber (2008:4) has noted: 
Although the two resources are highly interdependent, energy and water 
regulators operate separately, with different funding streams, accountability 
mechanisms, government oversight and legislative committees. Instead of 
water planners assuming they will have all the energy they need and energy 
planners assuming they will have all the water they need, we must get them in 
the same room to make decisions. 
Policy integration is therefore a key-interest of this thesis. Whether 
integration is possible, what kind(s) of integration are needed, what should be 
integrated and what are the mechanisms for integration, are questions further 
dealt with in chapters two, six and seven. 
1.5. The water-energy nexus in Israel: empirical justification for 
research 
It has been argued that "governments and people in severely water scarce 
regions are in denial about their water resources and their policy options" 
(Allan, 2006, 132) and that water scarcity IS "both real and 
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constructed ... through political and policy process" (Mehta, 2003:5066). 
Merely a perfect manifestation of these statements, Israel's current water 
trends are claimed to be the legacy of many years of neglect and disregard of 
continuous water problems by governments, policymakers and authorities. 
During the first two decades of the state's existence, water shortages were 
perceived in terms of a problem of accessibility, and not of quantity, 
congruent with the Zionist ideology of settling the land of Israel, securing 
food sources and the first Prime Minister's vision of "Blooming the desert" 
(Menahem, 2001: Alatout, 2008). But even when shortage of water became 
apparent, lack of long-term planning and unrealistic optimism have prevented 
the transition to a more sustainable water management (Tal, 2002). 
Following several clusters of dry years, the Israeli Water Authority had 
launched a master plan in 2002, which deals with the need to develop, 
independent of precipitation, sources of fresh water supplies, among them 
desalination plants (IW A, 2002). The plan set a target of approximately 400 
million cubic meters (MCM) per year of desalinated seawater to be produced 
not later than 2004 and 540 MCM/yr. by 20 10 (44% of the total annual 
production). The basic concern of the 2002-2010 water management strategic 
plan was the need to replace the problematic historical assumption that ruled 
water management strategy. Since for decades decision-makers and 
regulators have been "walking on the edge" of water sources (for the water 
map of Israel see Figure 3 below), utilizing them as much as possible, 
devastating consequences are now increasingly apparent, such as the drying 
out of natural flows in streams; the salinization of the coastal aquifer; severe 
pollution of wells; and the perturbing drop in the levels of the Dead Sea, 
Med,terranean Sea 
EGYPT 
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Figure 3: The water map of Israel consists of main attributes of the water 
system: the two largest aquifers , the national carrier and the four operating 
desalination plants along the coast-line. 
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to namc only few (Tal, 2002). The newer approach, however, had sought to 
increase supply "only" to meet demand. Although already quite behind 
schedule, governmental decisions have by now raised the targets even more 
and it is now expected that thc four new plants will produce 750 MCM/yr. to 
supply all domestic needs of the country by 2020 (Governmental decision no. 
3533 from 1.0.2008). Meanwhile, the Water Commissioner had explicitly 
declared a state of emergency with respect to water and initiated new 
regulations for agricultural and domestic sectors, along with public 
campaigns to promote water saving. But the question of what will be the best 
strategy for sustainable management of water resources in the country 
remams a burning public controversy, with scientists, policymakers, 
politicians, environmentalists, journalists and members of the general public 
all engaged. Moreover, the way in which desalination technology has 
contributed to a major transition in the water system bares the question of its 
hidden costs and its subsequent implications on both the natural and the 
social systems. 
Simultaneously, new discoveries of natural gas deposits in Israel's sea 
territory are accelerating a transition from coal-based electricity generation, 
which was based on 100% imported fuels, to approximately 40% local, self-
supplied natural-gas based production. The new discoveries along with three 
other emerging technologically-based alternative sources of "local" energy: 
nuclear, solar and oil-shale have induced a discursive shift and a social 
construction of an unlimited energy supply, which eventually feed-back to 
the on-going transition. These developments echo in many respects the 
transitional constitutes of the Israeli water regime: both water and energy are 
scarce resources which the State has had to secure since its incipient years; 
both are still controlled by governmental or semi-governmental monopolistic 
bodies in which the public is hardly ever involved; while still, in both sectors, 
partial privatization or profit-induced changes influence strategic decision-
making and policies, regulations, technological choices and efficiency 
measures. 
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Previous research supports the claim that the implications of a policy 
decision to embrace a certain technology are embedded in wider economic 
and social contexts (such as privatization schemes) and reflects certain values 
which societies may hold. Marsh and Sharma (2007) have undertaken an 
exceptional attempt to develop an input-output model assessing a range of 
technological options for the New South Wales region in Australia, in the 
context of the water-energy nexus. They have developed four scenarios, 
which describe different existing options to meet future water needs 
considering their energy footprint. Their findings concentrated on the socio-
economic and institutional conditions under which desalination technology 
would fit the most. They suggested that desalination is accepted as the most 
favourable technological solution, when policy makers' technological 
preferences are based on consumerist values and affiliated with the notions of 
world markets and international trade. In contrast, when global sustainability 
trends, stable political environments, international cooperation and 
maximization of regional resources are prevailing characteristics in peoples' 
worldviews, they would tend to support water strategies that include demand 
reduction, water recycling and water harvesting, rather than desalination. 
This research has several limitations. First, it assumed the sustainability of an 
integrated approach to the management of water and energy, rather than 
proved it. Furthermore, it did not establish a direct connection with 
stakeholders; rather the scenarios were created by the authors based on 
existing international scenarios such as IPee studies. Lastly, their scenarios 
are limited by a lack of a vision, in which significant socio-technological 
innovation might play a great role and influence a certain course of 
development. Despite these limitations, the research's findings are interesting 
and might reflect some tendencies behind the choice to support desalination 
in the Israeli polity. 
Decision-making in Israel was historically concentrated at national levels. 
Especially in regard to the environment, the founders of Israel have created a 
highly centralised system of controlling its resources, designing and 
implementing policies (Menahem, 1998; Tal, 2002). The Israeli Ministry of 
Energy and Water Resources is in charge of both water and energy sectors; 
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the National Water Authority and the Israeli Electric Corporation (lEC) 
operate under its direct authority. Principally, the government, the relevant 
Ministries and Inter-Ministerial Committees are responsible for setting the 
agenda and formulating national strategies. In practice, however, the national 
Water Authority controls most aspects of water, as well as the design of long 
tenn strategic plans (as the aforementioned master plan), short-tenn policies 
(such as water allocations) and regulations (such as a "drought tax"). The 
national electric company, as the sole company in the country, has 
historically established a dominant position within the energy sector, thus 
allowing itself to have a major influence also in the policy domain. 
Currently, any move attempting to address the issue of water or energy 
scarcity, especially at the backdrop of advanced technologies (such as 
Reverse Osmosis membrane desalination or solar PV panels), is closely 
linked to wider changes in socio-economic arrangements and governance as 
well as institutional trajectories at both the national and international scales. 
This thesis argues, as will be elaborated later, that transitions of the Israeli 
water and energy policy regimes are motivated not only by technological 
breakthrough and discursive shifts in each sector independently, but also by 
inherent interdependencies between the two sectors. It argues that these two 
socio-technical transitions are coupled and therefore, that any sectoral 
analysis of policy transitions contributes only partial explanation for such 
dynamics. 
This research is therefore interested also in these wider processes within 
Israel's national governance and institutions that make certain alternatives 
attractive upon other mechanisms governing supply and demand of natural 
resources, such as efficiency and conservation policies. Alternative 
approaches could have lower economic, environmental and social costs or 
higher benefits in tenns of availability and security of supply, especially in 
the face of coupled transitions. 
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1.6. Aims and questions 
The all11 of the thesis is to examme interdependencies, essentially 
environmentaL of policy dynamics. More precisely, this thesis aims to re-
thcorise the interplay of technology, policies and discourses within 
sociotechnical regimes and to examine the merits of these relations from an 
inter-sectoral perspective. The study applies an integrative approach (new-
institutional, co-evolutionary) to the empirical understanding of the complex 
and dynamic processes shaping the water-energy nexus, as this interface 
defines the nature and scale of these two sectors coupled transitions. This 
study identifies three specific conceptual questions that stem from the quest 
after a better understanding of the relationships between these sociotechnical 
components, as follows: 
i. How does technological change affect policy in sociotechnical 
transitions ? 
ii. What is the role of discourses in policy dynamics ofsociotechnical 
transitions? 
iii. What does the interdependency of socio-technical regimes mean 
for their transition? How can coupled transitions be directed 
toward greater sustainability? 
The first conceptual key-question which this thesis addresses is that of 
providing an additional account of the relationship between policy change 
and technologies in socio-technical systems during transition. While theories 
of policy change can be classified as either problem centred, actor centred, or 
external crisis based, the water regime case-study provides a fruitful ground 
to examine the ways and mechanisms by which technologies may affect 
policy dynamics and contribute to either change or continuation. At the 
empirical level, the investigation focuses on the question of how 
technological improvement of seawater desalination technology has 
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contributed to a shift in the Israeli water regime, altering infrastructures and 
institutions through the mechanism of displacement. 
The second crucial question in this study considers the effect of a discursive 
shift on technologies, policies and social arrangements in socio-technical 
transitions. The Israeli energy regime serves as an interesting case to examine 
the emergence of a new discourse on energy abundance which is replacing an 
earlier discourse on energy scarcity, and the ways by which moving away 
from traditional conceptions of the scarcity of energy resources has 
constrained socio-technical transitions, delimited future pathways or 
technological trajectories and influenced social capacities. 
Finally, The two parallel transitions in the Israeli water and energy policy 
regimes, as outlined above and analysed in depth in chapters 4 and 5, have 
led to the objective of showing the inter-linkages in the unfolding of policies 
in these two transitions over the past several decades (in chapter 6). With 
question three in mind, this thesis further examines (theoretically, not 
empirically) the ability of current models and theorisations of decision-
making processes and the transition management approach to deal with cross-
sectorial transitions. The analysis also begged a preliminary conceptual 
discussion on whether and how these policy transitions may be oriented 
towards greater sustainability and the merits and pitfalls of a more integrative 
transition management model. 
These three questions are general in nature. I will use them as a starting point 
and their broadness will allow me to focus on particular details at a later 
stage. The motivation for these research questions is primarily conceptual in 
nature, thus justifying their broad form and generality. I will go back to 
reflect on this choice of questions and its implications in the concluding 
chapter of the thesis (chapter 8). 
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1.7. Outline of chapters 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 introduced the key-
dimensions of the research problem, the empirical and theoretical 
justi fications for the research and the research overall aim and specific 
questions. Chapter 2 contains the conceptual material of the research. There 
I develop the theoretical basis for the analysis of the data presented in the 
three main empirical chapters (chapters 4, 5 and 6) and identify gaps in the 
literature. 
Chapter 3 sets the methodological stance of the research. I specify the 
methods used and raise methodological challenges in interpretive policy 
analysis. This chapter also set the socio-economic, political and 
environmental contexts of the case-study. Following, chapters 4 to 6 describe 
the two selected case studies. Whilst each chapter presents a separate topic, 
they share similar structure. Each chapter contains: brief introduction, outline 
of the setting in which the research took place, a crystallized and focused 
literature review; a section of discussion that contains the analysis of data, 
and a short conclusion part. 
Chapter 4 introduces the institutional setting of the Israeli water policy 
regime, the main characteristic of water infrastructures, supply and demand 
as well as a short presentation of issues that were not considered central but 
nevertheless are relevant and important as background infonnation for this 
thesis, such as the Dead-Sea, the Red-Dead Canal and The Palestinian water 
situation. I continue with the presentation of a theoretical framework against 
which the first research question was fonned. The empirical analysis is based 
on a case study of Israel's water regime, particularly the dynamics which 
surround the expansion and diffusion of desalination technology, as a 
panacea to water scarcity in the country. I discuss its origins and implications 
and close the chapter with a few intennediate conclusions. 
Chapter 5 introduces the institutional setting of the Israeli energy policy 
regime, the main actors in the policy arena and the main patterns of supply 
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and demand. I present the theoretical framework that links STS with 
Discursive Institutionalism and empirically show how discourses affect 
socio-technical transitions. I move on to discuss the implications of the shift 
on energy pathways and conclude with a few remarks on the long-term 
sustainability of Israel's energy policy regime. 
The principal conceptual contribution of the thesis can be found in chapter 6, 
linking chapters 4 and 5 and addressing the interdependencies and the co-
evolvement of Israel's water and the energy regimes. After a short 
presentation of the conceptual framework, the chapter focuses on the 
expression of the water-energy interface in the Israeli context. The discussion 
and the following conclusion subsections deal with the question of how these 
policy processes may be oriented towards greater ecological sustainability 
and lay the ground for a new integrative model for transitions management. 
Chapter 7 presents a coherent discussion and an account of the links 
between theory (chapter 2) and empirical findings (chapters 4-6). It suggests 
the merits of a more integrated transitions management model and further 
highlights the main theoretical contributions of this thesis. 
Chapter 8 concludes and details implications for policy and 
recommendations for further research. There I also reflect on the choice of 
methodology and raise key challenges in conducting this study. 
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2. A review of conceptual approaches to policy dynamics 
"Technology constitutes a new human 
environment that is unsuited to human 
symbolization; technology has turned into 
its own symbolic transformation" (Ellul, 
1978:216). 
2. 1.lntroduction: conceptualising environmental policy dynamics 
The assumption, that addressing only the social dimension of environmental 
issues (such as management and impacts) without an appreciation of resource 
and ecosystem dynamics will not be sufficient to move society toward 
sustainable future, is now widely accepted (Folke et aI., 2005). Key-questions 
are therefore reciprocal, interested in what ways ecological phenomena extort 
human responses, and in return, how do human practices influence 
ecosystems (Dietz et 01., 2003). Systematic interconnectedness elicits 
integrative lookout at the coupling of the socio-environmental systems. A 
theoretical recognition of the complexities involved in this coupling of 
systems has produced a set of both implicit and explicit interpretations of 
sustainability, all with various implications for policymaking. As I noted 
earlier, the core element in the various interpretations reflects the need to 
reconcile the points of friction and tension where the two systems interact. 
Accordingly, the most widely accepted definition of sustainability places its 
principle on three interconnected building blocks: environmental integrity, 
societal equality, and economic security, while recognizing that each system 
carries its own complexity and vulnerability (Sneddon et 01., 2006). Despite 
ample possible critiques of this concept, developing models of sustainability 
in recent decades are indeed appreciated mainly for their integrative promise: 
"as the study of complex adaptive systems continues to inform our 
understanding of socio-ecological interactions, models of sustainable 
development will likely continue to integrate this knowledge" (Newman, 
2006:633). 
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Yet, integration has also become a key-problem as policy making in general 
and utility companies in practice, are now required to deliver solutions in 
what is appreciated as a highly interdependent world. This is why this thesis 
has set the target of studying several aspects in what is manifested as, at the 
bottom line, a problem of integration. In order to study this phenomenon, this 
chapter reviews key-literatures that provide ingredients to the analysis in 
chapters 4-6, and more precisely, the strands of the literature that are most 
equipped to deal with changing policies in an interdependent world. I will 
outline the way classic public policy approaches have dealt with dynamics, 
providing the important starting point for any study; how institutional 
approaches and especially the institution of discourses have provided useful 
insights to the study of change and continuation; and how combining socio-
technical approaches with policy dynamics complements the aspect of 
technology, a crucial constitute in almost any socio-environmental relation. 
Since the 1960s, environmental policymaking4 has been commonly based on 
the integration of Costs and Benefits (CBA) associated with alternatives for 
action into a quantitative decision-making calculus, including the analysis of 
environmental considerations, which are not conventionally valued in term of 
money (Easter et al., 1999). It has been also occupied with standards setting, 
monitoring, enforcement and assessment at the level of one environmental 
media or natural resource. Two developments have drastically changed the 
way environmental policy is theorised and practiced. First, in spite of the fact 
that environmental decisions are still determined within the polity arena, in 
the face of current environmental degradation, there is a dual pressure on 
decision-makers to make decisions less on the base of CBA and more based 
on the integration of scientific expertise, while making sure that the process 
is at the same time deliberative, democratic and transparent and that private 
4A broad term, here refers to the course of state's actions with the aim of promoting 
sustainability by finding a solution to what is jointly perceived and defined as an 
environmental problem. 
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and public stakeholders are also involved (Drori ef al., 2003; Irwin and 
Michael, 2003; Jasanoft~ 2004). 
Second, considering the range of environmental issues, the possible number 
of alternative management strategies, and the cumbersome structure of 
governing institutions, the policy process in this field is expected to be far 
from one, coherent or consistent activity (French and Geldermann, 2005). 
Environmental problems are many times transboundary in nature and 
therefore require cross-national cooperation (Chechile, 1991). Environmental 
intervention is risky, often irreversible and inevitably involves making trade-
offs between several concerns, which are often competing over attention and 
funds (Kemp et al., 2005). Above all, policymakers hold inexplicit 
responsibility - in the spirit of The Brundtland Report - to consider, in any 
environmental decision-making process, the needs and rights of "the next 
generations". Because environmental problems tend to be inseparable from 
problems in other times, places and environmental media (Dryzek, 1987), or 
from other aspects of life, environmental policymaking is increasingly treated 
only as a function in the broader framework of environmental governance 
(Adger et al., 2003). Nevertheless, despite the many facets of 
interdependencies, in reality, policy fields still focus independently on 
discrete problems in specific environmental media, and those policies usually 
deliver narrowly defined solutions. 
This complex and multi-faceted nature of common policy processes is dealt 
with by a large number of literatures in public policy, political science and 
organizational theories, and from varIOUS perspectives, almmg at 
understanding how the multipart entity of the state, political actors and other 
players interact and produce public action in discrete sectors or policy 
regimes (John 1998). Studies also revolve around questions of change and 
continuation of these actions. 
The mechanism behind sectorial handling of problems can be better 
understood in light of the policy regimes concept, which encompasses 
institutional, organizational, and regulatory arrangements for governing an 
29 
established issue area (such as the environment), driven by certain policy 
paradigms (Vogler, 2000; Young, 2002; Menahem, 2008t The literature 
often considers international environmental policy regimes explanatory 
structures of multi-scale changes and continuities underlining the interplay of 
international institutions, policy-making and cross-national cooperation. 
Scholars are also increasingly applying the concept of a policy regime to 
national policy domains (Jochim and May, 2010), as will be used here, to 
examine three main questions: (i) why certain policies and policy regimes are 
more stable or resistant to change than others; (ii) what exogenous factors 
and internal forces are affecting the process of decision-making and the life-
cycle of one policy or an entire policy regime and; (iii) what is the relative 
ascendancy of structural verses actor-centred explanations of policy regime 
dynamics. To begin with, a quick comparison between international policy 
regime and national policy regime research suggests that also in the latter, 
changes are understood to be driven by (local) actors' maximization of 
power, status or autonomy, and/or by the aspiration of the rational actors to 
achieve the most efficient allocation of resources (cf. with Young, 1994). 
They compare in another aspect as well; dynamics in a national policy regime 
cannot be explained solely by political processes since social, economic or 
natural forces also playa role in complex structural changes. 
The cycle of policymaking in any policy regIme necessitates interaction 
between many entities, actors and/or institutions. One might therefore expect 
that policy regime dynamics - especially environmentally-related and that are 
aimed at delivering sustainability - necessitate cooperation, coordination or 
integration of some sort and level, and that such mechanisms would lie at the 
5 Policy regimes are analytically differentiated from socio-technical regimes. Although in 
both instances the term indicates on the assembly of various constitutes in space and time, in 
the first case the concept is used to point solely on governing arrangements at some scale 
(national, international). Sociotechnical regimes as will be further discussed include a 
particular state of policy regime as well as other constitutes (technologies, cultural norms and 
so forth). 
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heart of any intact policymaking process (Peters, 1998). In practice, however, 
empirical evidence alerts that policy regime changes in governing systems 
arc rather, to a great extent, "sources of causation, feedback, and the sheer 
complexity of what is going on" (John, 2003:4~n). 
A prominent practical challenge to greater cohesion at the national level, for 
example, is departmentalism: a sectoral rivalry over resources, media 
coverage and political capital that renders coordinated decision-making 
impossible (Kavanagh and Richards, 2001). A counter effort against sectoral 
interests is the attempt to promote horizontal integration, that is, an intra-
sectoral policymaking or in British terms - a "joined-up government" and 
what Dery (1998) calls "overall policy formulation", which is the attempt of 
different sections within one department or different governmental entities to 
create synergies between policies and use the same goals to formulate it 
(Geerlings and Stead, 2003). 
However, given the relatively short tenures of politicians and the ad-hoc 
nature of political activity (Pierson, 2000), it is not surprising that some 
problems, tensions or costs are intentionally ignored or reframed as the 
responsibility of someone else. Moreover, studies are often informed by cases 
in which even the most authentic attempt to practice policymaking (e.g. 
forming solutions to problems) inevitably meet the challenge of 
interdependencies. The term 'displacement', for example, is sometimes used 
to describe situations where decision-makers avoid the treatment of messy (or 
"wicked") problems, especially when these traverse the technocratic exercise 
of policy-making and involve or require political attention (Dryzek, 1987). 
As will be further illustrated in chapter 4, from an environmental point of 
view, displacement can have a physical manifestation. Dryzek (1987:428) 
argued, for example, that "any improvement on a single indicator... may 
mask problem displacement to another medium or location". That is, 
environmental problems and impacts can travel spatially and be transferred to 
other environmental media (e.g. water, air, or soil). For Dryzek (2009:4), the 
combination of short-term political thinking as of Pierson, and environmental 
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problem displacement, are manifestations of the "ecological irrationality" that 
characterises contemporary liberal-democrat states. 
Given the amplifying cases of policy interdependencies and problem 
displacement between times, places or from one media to another - such as in 
the case of water and energy interdependencies - the problem of integration 
thus becomes a key-concern. Yet, much of existing academic research in this 
field concentrates on "greening" sectoral policy regimes, by the integration of 
environmental concerns into decision-making in distinct non-environmental 
sectors (Baker, 2006) (see appendix I for a summary of literatures). Lafferty 
and Hovden (2003:2) have argued that the merit of environmental policy 
integration entails " ... a revision of the traditional hierarchy of policy 
objectives, with the portrayal of environmental objectives as central, if not 
principal". Environmental policy integration (EPI) might be crucial in 
offsetting what is perceived as the trade-off between economic growth and 
environmental integrity in line with the principles of sustainability. Yet, it 
remains confused and vague regarding the meaning of the notion itself and 
undetermined regarding ideas about what should be integrated, why, how and 
by whom (Nilsson and Persson, 2003; Scarce and Sheate, 2002; Pollitt, 2003; 
Hertin and Berkhout, 2003; Bammer, 2005). 
Regarding how policy side-effects or externalities could be reduced, there are 
some insights already in the existing literature. Among the strategies of Beck 
and his co-authors (2003) for overcoming side effects is the suggestion to 
always expect the unexpected. Grunwald (2007) advises that governments 
and policymakers should reflect more about decisions and interactions among 
actors in order "to gain knowledge about interests, perspectives and 
capacities and to learn about the character of sociaVenvironmental linkages" 
(Meadowcroft, 2007:309). Researchers often propose that greater cohesion, 
cooperation and greater integration between sectors and policies could help 
prevent some of the spills-over, undesirable outcomes of policies, which are 
otherwise postponed or dislocated (Meijers and Stead, 2004; Bammer, 2005). 
Horizontal institutional interplay potentially generates incentives to manage 
cooperation that can yield joint gains or prevent losses (Young, 2002). Policy 
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integration, however, is not easily achieved and transaction costs may still be 
high (Geerlings and Stead, 2003; Fischhendler and Heikkila, 20 I 0). 
It appears that beside a general agreement that environmental policy 
integration is a way to encourage the rationality and effectiveness of policy-
making and implementation, studies do not engage too profoundly with 
challenging interdependencies. As examples to interdependencies, one may 
consider how policy dynamics becomes more complex with the growing 
integrati\'e capacity of physical and biological elements in each policy 
regime, such as utility infrastructures. Dynamics are also exacerbated by the 
greater amount of individual actors and policy networks that are involved and 
the greater "organizational inputs" (funding mechanisms, stakeholders 
feedback and evaluation procedures) that need to be integrated into the 
policymaking process. 
With the water-energy nexus in mind, the aim of this thesis is therefore to 
engage with the question of the ways to deal in theory and in practice with 
policy dynamics in an interdependent, complex world. As mentioned above, I 
would study this question of cross-sectoral dynamics in the water and energy 
policy regimes, through three theoretical lenses that deal with policy 
dynamics: traditional models of decision making, institutional approaches to 
policy and the sociotechnical transitions scholarship. 
I will argue, however, that although traditional models of policy dynamics 
and institutional, structural-based approaches, are a good starting point, they 
are both largely unequipped to deal with complex policy dynamics that 
cannot be understood independently but through their interaction with other 
policies. This is because most often, these approaches' unit of analysis 
pertains to the level of one sector. While socio-technical transitions studies 
are complementary, adding to the complexity the technology factors and 
technological change, they are nevertheless also lacking a focus on the 
interdependencies of large technology-based, infrastructural sectors (such as 
water and energy). Furthermore, it is in my intention to show how, in our 
contemporary complex technology-driven world, these various policy 
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dynamics literatures on their own cannot explain substantive changes of 
systems from one state to another, beyond the policy terrain (hereafter 
'transition '). Thus, the interplay of policies, technologies, and discourses, as 
central constitutes IJl dynamics and transitions, IS insufficiently 
cunceptualized. 
To move a step forward, I present the Transition Management model as an 
alternative to more traditional models of environmentally-related decision 
and policy making, especially those concerning long term sustainability. The 
model is also an intriguing platform to deal with cross-sectoral 
interdependencies and coupled transitions, a task which I undertake in 
chapter 7. 
The present chapter helps to retheorise the interplay between policymaking 
and technology, and the shifting roles of actors, networks, paradigms and 
discourses. It will also provide the ingredients to developing an analytical 
framework in chapter 6 for cross-sectoral dynamics, such as in the case of the 
water-energy interface. For the sake of clarity and flow of argumentation, a 
selection of state-of-the-art literatures has been incorporated within the 
empirical chapters four, five and six rather than here. Hence, the reader is 
directed to the relevant chapter when appropriate. This chapter will present a 
more general conceptual base; will point to its weaknesses; and will identify 
research gaps. 
This chapter is organised as follows: section 2.2. I introduces traditional 
approaches to the study of policy dynamics. It explores traditional models of 
agenda-setting, procedures of decision-making and triggers for dynamics. 
Section 2.2.2 delves into less actor-based and more structural-based approach 
to policy dynamics through the focus on institutions. Understanding the 
relative importance of both actors and institutions is important to shading 
light on the interplay between policy, technology and discourses. Section 
2.2.3 reviews key-components in Social Studies of Technology (SST) 
literature, including the system, co-evolution and transition approaches to 
socio-technical dynamics. It highlights the role of technology and the co-
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evolutionary manner of policy changes, thus contributes to a more profound 
explanation of systems' interdependencies. The final section numbered 2.3 
concludes this chapter. 
2.2. Competing approaches to policy dynamics 
2.2.1. Classic public policy approach to policy dynamics 
Models mostly describe a chaotic, unpredictable, sometimes arbitrary 
procedure of making policies. Even when stages of the process can be 
defined and identified, such as problem framing, establishing alternatives and 
implementation (English et al., 1999), it is often agreed that any mechanistic, 
linear and distinct model cannot explain what initially had generated the 
process and usually fails to tell us about the interfaces of politics and power, 
and the interests, conflicts and social networks at play in real-life policy 
arenas (Lindblom, 1959; Fischer, 2003). Decision-making processes might be 
better depicted as 'garbage cans', into which various kinds of problems and 
solutions are dumped by participants as they are generated (Cohen et aI., 
1972) and the policymaking procedure as a 'primeval soup' (Kingdon, 1995). 
From an actor-based perspective to policymaking, the process is understood 
in light of the interactions of actors participating. Yet, while rational-
perspective models of decision-making have portrayed an individualist 
process of agents who make decisions as if they hold perfect information on 
which to ground their decision and that it is possible to predict, consider and 
know all possible future outcomes (Simon, 1976; Faucheux and Froger, 
1995), critics have challenged this great emphasis on rationalism and 
portrayed it as too ideal, but not real ("bounded rationality"). Alternatively, 
decision-making is argued to be made without any fixed goals in the policy-
makers' mind, but through an incremental process in which problems may be 
defined and redefined in light of the available means to solve them and 
through negotiations and coalitions among the participating agents (Lindblom 
and Woodhouse, 1993). Decision-making at the polity is therefore everything 
but organized: it is rather the science of "muddling through". 
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The incremental approach to decision-making may indeed explain how 
alternatives to a certain decision are evolved based on mutual adjustments of 
individual interests of participants 111 the process (Lindblom, 1959). 
Nevertheless, the model is limited to explaining gradual processes of 
bargaining and can hardly account for abrupt changes in decisions or policies 
(Kingdon, 1995), or "punctuations" in policy (True et aI., 1999). 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) therefore suggest that public policy-making is 
characterised by stable periods, which are interrupted by punctuations. 
Pempel (1998 in Streeck and Thelen, 2005:7) similarly argued that path 
dependencies - inherited and entrenched systems of governing - are 
"periodically ruptured by radical change, making for sudden bends in the 
path of history". Policy changes, like radical political-economic shifts (a 
popular example is the 1970s' transition from Keynesianism to monetary 
capitalism in Britain), are a particular subject for theorization. Prominent 
American political scientists, such as John W. Kingdon, Paul A. Sabatier and 
Frank Baumgartner put the initial stage of agenda setting at the focus of 
investigation of policy change. Others, such as Aaron Wildavsky, have put 
greater emphasis on the stage of policy implementation. 
For example, with a strong explanatory power, Stone's (1989) study has 
offered that decision-makers' choice to push forward particular issues is 
much depended on the kind of 'causal story' which they were able to draw. 
In order to target an issue, it usually needs to be defined as a problem that can 
be explained in terms of human intention or conscientiousness. In order to 
put a problem high on the agenda, decision makers and political actors will 
therefore try to push their casual story out of the realm of accident or natural 
disaster into the realm of human intent and responsibility. Alternatively, 
according to Kingdon (1995), certain issues can be abruptly pushed forward, 
if the right "window of opportunity" is formed. Policy is made through three 
parallel streams: recognition of problems, generation of solutions, and 
deployment of political interest. External shocks, such as environmental or 
monetary crises can also be seen an alternative trigger for punctuation in 
policymaking; these interact with internal competition between 'advocacy 
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coalitions' over different ideas and values - tenned by Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith (1984) 'policy core beliefs'. Advocacy coalitions attempt to translate 
their policy core beliefs into policy decisions through the utilization of 
'guidance instruments' such as changes in rules, budgets, personnel or 
information (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). 
Several ways to typify policy regimes dynamics and classify their triggers 
have therefore been proposed. Jochim and May (2010) have classified the 
triggers of policy regime changes into crisis-driven and coalition-driven. 
Policy change and continuity are often explained by the consolidation of an 
identified problem, solution and a political gain which may open up a "policy 
window" (Kingdon, 1995); by external crises such as an economic downturn, 
war or droughts (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Jones, 1994); or by an 
endogenous reconsolidation of policy networks, epistemic communities, 
interest groups, or policy entrepreneurs (Atkinson and Coleman, 1992; Haas, 
1992; Hall, 1993). 
A core perspective that emphasises dynamics, by focusing the analysis on 
networks, can be found in: 
... a decentralized concept ~lsocial organization and governance: society is 
no longer exclusively controlled by a central intelligence (e.g. the State); 
rather, controlling devices are dispersed and intelligence is distributed among 
a multiplicity of action (or 'processing') units. The coordination of these 
action units is no longer the result of 'central steering', or some kind of 
'prestabilized harmony' but emerges through the purposeful interactions of 
individual actors, who themselves are enabled for parallel action by 
exchanging information and other relevant resources (Kenis and Schneider, 
1991 :26 emphasis in the origin). 
Rhodes (1997:426) identified already some time ago the cross-scale 
interactions in the polity arena as a process of "self-steering inter-
organizational networks" and policy networks as "sets of fonnal and informal 
linkages between governmental and other actors structured around shared if 
endlessly negotiated beliefs and interests in public policymaking and 
implementation" . 
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The constellation of policy networks provides an arena for mediation and 
negotiation, communication and coordination of interests of either a single 
actor or a cluster of actors, built up around traditional ministerial policy 
sectors. The notion of policy networks, which provides a useful model to map 
and describe the relations between actors in a specific policy domain and 
explains a decision-making process or outcome, is commonly used for policy 
analysis in the EU context (Peterson, 2004), with an emphasis on the 
continuous leading position of formal government. The structure of a policy 
network is to a great extent defined by the strength of links between its 
members: a 'policy community' would be capable of steering or controlling 
the policy process while 'issue networks' are more loosely-affiliated 
(ideologically, politically, financially) and would find it harder to exercise a 
collective goal (Rhodes, 1997). 80th concepts are based on the assumption 
that the individual resources of an agent will influence his relations with the 
other agents and thus the scale of dynamics. Nevertheless, networks function 
also in a similar manner to structures (see section 2.2.2), as implied by 
Wasserman (\ 994:xiii): "network models focusing on individuals view the 
network structural environment as providing opportunities for or constraints 
on individual action". 
8y providing a bridge between the micro (actors) - and the macro 
(structures) orders, the policy network model certainly fills a void here. Stone 
(1989) herself pointed to the weakness of the agent-based description; her 
story misses institutional/structural patterns of individual and social 
behaviours that are needed in order to give a broader explanation for why 
issues are constructed as "problems" in the first place and are then subjected 
to policy intervention. Indeed, while studies have given agent-centred 
analysis to processes of decision-making, research in these fields has 
increasingly shifted emphasis toward structural explanations, assuming that 
individuals are constrained by larger entities, and that their actions are only a 
vessel through which these entities essentially affect policy outcome (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996), as will be further discussed below. 
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2.2.2. Institutional approaches to policy dynamics 
The structural-based approach to policy dynamics suggests that political 
institutions (the parliament, the courts, the bureaucracy) structure 
policymaking processes, outputs and outcomes. Constraining the behaviour 
of individuals, institutions enforced the "government of laws and not of 
men", articulating clear, context-based norms, values, habits and customs for 
societies (John, 1998; Peters, 2005), but maybe unrealistically leaving state 
officials' interests and societal groups, for example, out of the realm of 
influence and power. Neo-institutionalism, has therefore moved away from 
only describing institutions, to paying particular notice to the institutional 
environment in which social action takes place. 
2.2.2. 1. Neo-institutionalism 
According to neoinstitutionalism, institutions are no longer narrowly defined 
as fom1al structures in which aspects of activities (administrative, legal and 
political) are evolved, formed and governed (North, 1991; Hay and Wincott, 
1998). Rather, institutions, in a much broader sense, "incorporates informal 
and formal procedures, practices, actor relationships, costumes, norms and 
traditions" (Jones and Clark, 200 I :6) that structure, constrain and stabilise 
behaviour in the polity (Peters, 2005). In their influential paper, Hall and 
Taylor (1996) have depicted three fundamental analytical streams: historical 
institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and sociological 
institutionalism. Recently, the role of ideas and knowledge production in 
institutional dynamics is increasingly recognised as an additional stream 
(Frank (Frank and Hajer, 1999; Schmidt, 2008). While all agree that 
institutions matter, the streams differ in the form, scope and extent to which 
institutions are attributed with significance. 
In short, similar to rational-perspective models of decision-making, rational 
choice institutionalism (RI) suggests that actors achieve their policy 
objectives in a self-interest manner. Similar to the 'bounded rationality' 
thesis, however, it claims that actors' rationality is bounded, but this time not 
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confined to physical limitation, but to an agreed set of institutions that 
provide them with the rules of the game and impose restrictions equally upon 
all. In tum, historical institlltionalism (HI) asserts that policy choices are hard 
to change because once policy is initiated future actors will play according to 
its given arrangements. Sociological institutionalism holds that actors behave 
according to a set of cultural frames, including values and symbols. Their 
policy choices heavily depend on their nonnative perception of the situation 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996; Jones and Clark, 2001). The three neo-institutional 
streams share the assumptions, that a particular institutional design would 
therefore favour one policy network above others, affect actors' strategies 
and define the range of potential policy changes that can be brought about. 
For the study of environmental decision-making, and particularly questions 
related to the relation between participation, knowledge and sustainability, 
rational choice institutionalism for example, had offered a significant 
contribution. Institutions, as definers of rules, control who has the access to a 
resource, for what use and to what extent, as well as who is eligible to 
participate in decisions about these Issues. According to rational choice 
institutionalism, many types of fonnal and infonnal institutional 
arrangements are able to reduce problems of overuse or misuse of common-
pool resources, despite the traditional pessimism regarding the ability of 
communities to sustainably manage them (Dietz et aI., 2003). The neo-
institutionalism wave has inspired many more studies related to socio-
environmental issues, in regard for instance, to environmental management 
and protection of collective resources (Mccay, 2002; Dietz et aI., 2003; 
Paavola and Adger, 2005), environmental planning (Rydin, 2003) and 
environmental perfonnance of businesses (Prakash, 1999). It was pointed out, 
however, that these studies are largely disregarding an important type of 
player, that is, discourses. 
2.2.2.2. Critical neD-institutionalism 
A fairly new strand of neo-institutionalism is based on the Foucauldian 
legacy of discourse and the critical policy analysis disposition. Discursive 
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institutionalism (DI) uses discourse not only in its common sense of a shared 
form of speech entangled within a particular context, but " ... a complex entity 
that extends into the realms of ideology, strategy, language and practice, and 
is shaped by the relations between power and knowledge" (Sharp and 
Richardson, 2001: \95). 
Its mam arguments are based on the assertion that rational choice 
institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism 
provide mainly a static approach to institutions, which describe stable policy 
regimes, but are limited in their ability to explain dynamics (Schmidt, 2010). 
For instance, RI pinpoints the logic behind policy changes on the interaction 
among rational actors that depend to a large extent on fixed preferences and 
regularity of their institutional setting and therefore relies on external forces 
such as economic crisis to explain changes inside the polity. In tum, HI 
analysis is based on the assertion that policy change and institutional 
restructuring are path-dependent. Institutions are thus rather known to have 
"a continuing and largely detenninate influence over the policy far into the 
future" (Peters, 2005:71). 
Discursive institutionalists argue in tum that ideas (Hall, 1993; Hay, 1999), 
narratives (Mcbeth et al., 2007), and discourses (Campbell, 1998; Rydin, 
2003; Raven and Verbong, 2007; Schmidt, 2008) may provide a more critical 
explanation of institutional and policy dynamics. DI suggests that discourses 
pattern interests, preferences and strategies of actors (Schmidt, 2010) and 
explain how they are embedded in their choices and actions. While there is a 
wide agreement that discourses or narratives alone do not cause institutional 
change, they nevertheless may be a part of a powerful causal explanation 
(Blyth, 1997; Schmidt, 2010)6. Schmidt (2008; 2010) has therefore suggested 
h In order to make sense, discourses have to be analytically distinguished from the 
institutions they ought to change. When discourses are not merely shared ideas but rather can 
be attributed with a deliberative intention of their "owners" to extract change, they should be 
referred to as an analytical category by itself (Arts and Buizer, 2009). 
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to call attention to the ways "foreground discursive abilities" (including 
ideas, narratives, paradigms, frames etc.) of politicians and policymakers 
about societal, cultural or economic goods, reshape institutions, forcing them 
to change, adapt or even disperse by actively restructuring actual preferences, 
strategies, and normative orientations of actors. 
Central to the approach of discursive institutionalism is the concept of power 
and therefore it will be discussed here in brief. The connection between 
power and the role of ideas, particularly in politics, is well-established 
(Beland, 20 I 0). Discourse, in the Foucauldian sense, is power. The 
Foucauldian emphasis of power-relations and political conflicts as shaping 
and reshaping meaning is expressed, for example, in Escobar's definition of 
discourse, as the "articulation of knowledge and power, of statements and 
visibilities, of the visible and the expressible" (Escobar 1996: 326). 
Moreover, understanding discourses as institutions means accepting them as 
structuring people thoughts, acts and speaking. Therefore, discourses are not 
only a device by which power can be individually or institutionally exerted, 
but rather a distinct force behind societal processes (e.g. Arts and Buizer, 
2009). This understanding of discourses supports several claims I will be 
making this thesis, including the focus on the hegemonic discourse (and 
paradigm) in the water and energy sectors, even as the discourse 
simultaneously suppresses and marginalise others (cf. with Palmer, 2010; see 
also section 5.4.3 and footnote 9 within); as Arts and Buizer (2009:342, my 
emphasis) have asserted, studying "policy from a Foucauldian angle means 
identifying the hegemonic discourses that structure this domain ... ", and 
analysing its historical evolution and its implications (i.e. the ability to 
produce an effect) for the behaviour of actors and institutions. 
Some critique the prepositions of DI and its self-coronation as a fourth new-
institutional stream. Bell (2011 ), for example asserted that a more 
constructivist approach to HI that accounts also for interpretive agents and 
their interaction with wider structural contexts can engage with core elements 
of constructivism (discursive approaches) and explain institutional change. 
According to this criticism, agents, institutions, structures and ideas "holds 
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each to be mutually constitutive 111 a dialectic manner" without glvmg 
primacy to either (Bell. 2011 :891). Nevertheless, discursive institutionalism 
is gaining an increasing attention from critical policy analysts with different 
interests in urban governance (Fuller, 20 I 0); political feminism and gender 
(e.g. Kulawik, 2009) and: environmental-related policymaking (i.e. Palmer's 
(20 10) analysis of renewable transport fuel policy in the UK and Lynggaard's 
(2007) research on changes in common agricultural policy in the EU) (see 
more in chapter 5). 
To sum, scholars have claimed that any change (regardless of the way it 
comes about), any recreation or reaffirn1ation of policies and institutional 
arrangements (between actors or organization at the same level of governance 
or at different scales of governance), bears an effect for coupled systems and 
can either hinder or foster sustainable management of environmental 
resources, resolutions to environmental dilemmas, and the implementation of 
environmental policies (Young, 2002; Paavola et aI., 2009). Insights from 
neo-institutionalism theories therefore should also be useful for studying 
dynamics and transitions (socio-technical dynamics). It appears that certain 
institutional arrangements could encourage transitions while others might 
prevent them. As will be further discussed, transitional processes are 
explained by different mechanisms (system innovation, co-evolution, 
external forces at the macro level and regime shifts), other than sustainability 
concerns. Yet, Transition Management, as a perspective, normative model to 
guide transitions, assumes (as will be elaborated in section 2.2.3.5.) that there 
is a way to control and direct these forces in a certain way, which would lead 
to greater sustainability, a claim which is not explicitly made by neo-
institutionalists. Ideally, an understanding of the challenges behind transitions 
toward sustainability, can contribute to better understanding of dynamics and 
maybe most importantly, the ways to guide or manage them. 
The neoinstitutional approach to policy dynamics contributes a more intricate 
explanation to the problem of integration because it reflects the complexity of 
the polity and human interaction (internal and external) in general, more 
realistically. Discursive institutionalism provides useful commentary on the 
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role of discourses in such interdependencies that result from ditferent types 
of interactions. Furthermore, discursive institutionalism helps to bridge the 
gap between an agency-oriented vs. structural conceptualisation of 
discourses. 
At the heart of the question of the best approach to analyse real-life political 
situations as they unfold in practice, lies the classical problem of explaining 
the weight of actors versus institutions in processes of change. However, 
considering the impossibility of disconnecting actors from their social 
environment, social and political scientists attempt to bridge the gaps 
between individual agency and conditioning of well-rooted social structures 
(Giddens, 1984 in Arts and Buizer, 2009:343). This effort is mirrored by 
models such as 'policy networks' on the one hand (see section2.2.1) and 
'discursive institutionalism' on the other. 01 approach was even accused for 
running the risk of taking institutions 'back out' from structural-based 
analysis (Bell, 2011). A mediated approach, which identifies discourses with 
neoinstituionalist, structural explanations of change and continuation, while 
simultaneously recognises the agency of individual actants (human and non-
human) in promoting discursive constructions, seems valuable for the 
analysis undertaken in this thesis. 
2.2.3.SST approach to policy dynamiCS 
Up until now I focused on different models of and approaches to policy 
dynamics. In what follows I turn to discuss a set of literatures, broadly 
entitled Social Studies of Technology (SST), which are emphasising the role 
of technology, thus providing a genuine approach to the study of dynamics. 
These studies originate in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) 
scholarship, which battled to overcome the barrier preventing social scientists 
from studying the realm of natural and scientific facts (Shapin, 1995). A 
major contribution to SST was the growing acceptance of previously 
scientific "facts" as social constructions and technological artifact as "social 
constitutes", so as the rejection of technological determinism (Pinch and 
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Bijker, 1984). This socio-technical framework does not confine itself to one 
definition, conceptual framework or domain. Broadly, it contextualises 
technological change and its interplay with wider societal dynamics in 
evolutionary economics terms, through the lenses of three central notions: 
systems, co-evolution and technological lock-in. 
2.2.3.1. Technological systems 
A system approach to the subject of study is desirable when linkages between 
elements can be analysed in what else would be a complex phenomenon. 
This chapter began with a brief introduction to the coupled socio-
environmental system. In the same line, the technological systems approach 
asserts that technology does not operate in a vacuum; neither is it 
exogenously designed, developed, or replaced. A technological system IS 
rather embedded with matters of design, economy and politics (Hughes, 
1994), channels of communication, social structures and social values or 
cultures (Katz, 1999). Hence, the development of technological artifacts 
should be interpreted within an analysis of the battling growth of 'systems' or 
'networks'. In line with the Actor-Network Theory (ANT), Latour (2005) 
rejects the traditional view of society and technology as separate systems by 
his treatment of both humans and non-humans as actants. He also rejects the 
idea of a stable 'society' and argues that the social is about artifacts, 
institutions, procedures and concepts and their reassembly. Birkenholtz 
(2009) has stressed along the same lines in a study of water technologies in 
India the capacity of artifacts to form sweeping, unpredicted new production-
relations, institutions and social networks - a process he termed "reverse 
adaptation". Technology, it is argued, not only results from many interacting 
actors and artifacts creating a complex system with its own emergent 
attributes, but also poses transformative powers (see chapter 4). 
The view that technology can cause and has caused substantial material and 
immaterial changes is in no way new. Technology has often been considered 
the driving force of human progress and not less than a social agent of 
institutional and environmental change (Marx, 1994; Murphy, 2007). New 
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technologies may have emerged within existing networks of spare parts, 
infrastructun:s, markets, and old technologies (compiling systems), but these 
new technologies also serve as catalysts for social change, patterns of 
behaviour, preferences and order. ]n addition, Katz (1999) asserted that 
"altogether, (technological - NT) diffusion research is (or at least was) a way 
of describing, maybe even explaining, social and cultural change". 
Early studies of technological systems used functionalist terms to explain 
innovation, diffusion, transfer and application of technological systems, 
which were conditioned in providing its function and in a 'fit' between the 
technology's attributes and its adopter. ]n the functionalist perspective, the 
technological system acts as an organism that can adapt its performance to 
external conditions (the societal environments) and adjust accordingly (Hard, 
1993). However, critics have argued that the functions provided now by a 
specific technology cannot indicate the reason it was invented or even the 
purpose for its development and diffusion. Critical neo-Marxist and feminist 
studies have further used their terminology to assert that technology is shaped 
by hegemonic groups and used for particular social interests, contributing to 
an explanation for why innovation processes are seen as contradictory and 
uncertain and why the scientific superiority of a particular technological 
solution will not necessarily guarantee its success (Howcroft et aI., 2004). 
Such an analysis follows the well-established principles that firstly, 
technology is too easily dismissed as a tool and its effects are too easily 
attributed to the good or bad intentions of its users (Weinstein, 1981) and 
secondly, that technology embodies forms of power and authority, and indeed 
'politics' (Winner, 1986). 
2.2.3.2. Co-evolution 
As mentioned above, the SST tradition has rejected two basic prevalent 
assumptions: that technological development and adoption is an independent 
process; and that social change is predetermined exclusively by technological 
development (Pinch and Bijker, 1984). The coevolutionary approach to 
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society and technology is in many respects also a critical response to these 
two premises. It can be traced back to Norgaard's (1984) book, in which he 
argued that an ever-increasing feedback between the social system and the 
ecosystem can be seen as a co-evolutionary process, wherein nature, 
knowledge, institutions and technology are al1 interrelated and a change in 
one sphere involves a change in others. The mutual and interdependent 
development of systems, such as the social and the environmental (Norgaard, 
1984; Holling et a/., 2002), the scientific and the technological (Barnes, 
1982; Fransman, 200 I), the social and the technical (Rip and Kemp, 1998; 
Geels, 2005) or the cultural and the scientific (Irwin and Michael, 2003), is 
sometimes described in biological terms; systems are always responding to 
each other, or coevolving. Co-evolution in socio-technical systems therefore 
exists between technical components and social actors or networks. Co-
evolution is the counter-deterministic force behind innovative technological 
artifacts, depicted by Rip and Kemp (1998:330) as "configuration(s) that 
works" (see chapter 4). 
Earlier than ANT, the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) theory is a 
well-cited example of the co-construction of society and technology. It is 
based on the assumptions that the design of a technological artifact is the 
product of "flexible interpretation" and intergroup negotiation of its users, 
and that different social groups impart distinctive meanings and objectives to 
it. This process thus overweighs straightforward considerations of efficiency 
or cost. Through a co-constructive process, users and social institutions (such 
as political, cultural, economic and gender rules, preferences and meanings, 
asymmetry of power relations and so forth) shape and reshape a newly 
technology'S design, development and adoptions (Klein and Kleinman, 
2002). Pinch and Bijker (1984) further argued that technological 
development is underpinned by different "relevant social groups", each with 
its own interpretation of sociotechnical problems and accepted definition of 
successful solutions. 
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2.2.3.3. Technolog;callock-;n 
A relati vely recent deve lopment of a co-evolutionary approach is applied to 
dynamics that involve technologies and institutions, and is, broadly speaking, 
a conceptual effort to explain both changes (i.e. economic growth) and 
stabilization (i. e. technological locks-in) (Foxon, 2006; Paavola, 2010) . 
Notions such as lock-in and path-dependency emphasise the link between 
past occurrences and limited choices and changes available for present 
decision-makers (Cowan and Gunby, 1996; Mahoney, 2000; Berkhout, 
2002). Socio-technological lock-ins originate from formal and informal 
institutional systems of infrastructure, finance, insurance, supplier networks, 
customer preference, embedded training routines, and policy and regulative 
contexts, which make incumbent technologies difficult to replace and 
innovation to breakthrough (Hoogma and Kemp, 2002 ; Meadowcroft, 2009). 
Increasing returns from early adoption of a technology often result in that 
technology, not necessarily the economically or technical superior one, 
dominating the market (Cowan, 1990). As will be strongly evident in chapter 
5, there are various factors contributing to the lock- in of socio-technical 
regimes, for example: 
Constraint 1 
--
Technological New technology is immature and expensive while ex isting 
technology benefits ex isting infrastmcture, maintenance and 
manufacturing fac ilities, as we ll as complementary technologies 
(Kemp el aI. , 1998 ; Hoogma and Kemp, 2002). New technologies 
compete not only with existing technology, but also with the soc io-
economic system in which it is embedded (Foxon and Pearson, 
2008). 
I Economic Existing technology benefit s from scale economics and increasing 
I returns (e.g. Pierson, 2000). 
Environmental New technology might have undesirable or unknown impacts. High 
scienti fic uncertainty involves taking high risks (Walker, 2000). 
Social The "coordination barrier" - a given technology will become more 
attractive as more people use it (Pierson, 2000). Existing 
technologies already carry symbolic and cultural meanings, and 
require specific experti se, knowledge, skills and habits, which 
actors would be reluctant to lose control over (Bames, 1982; 
Hoogma and Kemp, 2002). 
Governmental New technologies require legal framework (in the form of 
policy and 
regulatory 
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contracts), organisational capacity (involving producers, users and 
tinanciers) and political commitments of various state actors (e.g. 
Walker, 2000). 
Table 1: Constraints of socio-technical change 
In general, as noted above, a socio-technical regIme will remam stable or 
'locked-in', as a result of positive feedbacks or 'increasing returns' to the 
adoption of dominant technologies, institutions and practices, which make 
the adoption of new alternatives less and less probable (Mahoney, 2000; 
Unruh, 2000; Berkhout and Gouldson, 2003). The difficulty of moving from 
one system-state to another lies, among other things, in the rules, practices, 
skills and cognitive routines of engineers and designers, embedded in an 
existing socio-technical regime (Rip and Kemp, 1998). In socio-technical 
systems "technologies and their institutional context... interact to guide 
change along preferred channels and form barriers preventing switching to 
alternative regimes" (Berkhout and Gouldson, 2003:3). 
But despite many constraints (the above list is only partial and it is usually 
the combined effect of a few factors that alternative technologies have to 
compete with) and numerous instances of technological fixation, societies 
constantly face sociotechnical changes, shifts and transitions that 
dramatically affect both the natural environment and the way people perceive 
it. The next sub-section is devoted to the idea of such dynamics. 
2.2.3.4. Socio-technical transitions 
A growing body of literature examines dynamics in and transitions of socio-
technological systems (for example, from horse carriages to automobiles, 
from energy production based on coal to gas, or from technocratic to adaptive 
water management). A fresh understanding of society-technology relations is 
therefore developed by this growing body of literature. Entrenched within the 
neo-institutional and co-evolutionary traditions, it portrays policies and 
technologies as two cogwheels within a complex set of other societal 
cogwheels - culture, economy, ecology (Van Oer Brugge et aI., 2005; Tabara 
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and I1han, 2008; Foxon, 2010) (see Figure I in chapter I). These components 
reinforce each other to form an interlock, a sign for a full completion of a 
transitional cycle (Loorbaeh, 2007). While stability emanates from aligned 
linkages between different socio-technical elements, a transition would be 
manifested from disrupting forces (see Figure 4 below). A disruption in the 
system - that results in a new 'architecture' or system structure (Lawhon and 
Murphy, 2012) - could be of different type and scale, including for example: 
a real or perceived significant damage from existing technology, such as 
ozone depletion (Glynn, 2002) or ideological changes in governmental 
functions, which occurred, for example, with the changing role of public 
authorities in the Netherlands from liberal avoidance to more active 
intervention. In the latter case, a change in perception of local authorities, 
have created a feeling that something had to be done by the central 
government to improve hygienic conditions, thus contributing to the 
transition to a sewer system (Geels and Kemp, 2007). 
The scales of dynamics are explained by the interaction of three functional 
levels, sometimes referred to as the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) (Verbong 
and Geels, 2007; Kern and Smith, 2008): 
• Niches at the micro-level: where local practices create technological 
innovations. Especially the more radical technological breakthroughs 
are emerged, tested and defused within technological niches, 
protected from market forces. 
• The undergoing physical and immaterial structuring changes at the 
meso-level of the regime, composed of societal constitutes (culture, 
policy, technology, science, discourses, industry and the market). 
• The macro-level of the landscape, where wider economic, cultural 
and natural processes take place. The landscape conditions delimit 
and direct changes that take place at the lower levels. 
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A transition is therefore dep icted as a four-phase7 evo lutionary process that 
has resulted in a significant transformation. These interactions and flows 
between the three levels are we ll portrayed by Geels and Kemp (2007) in 
Figure 4 below. 
To conclude, according to studies, a transition is not simply a period of 
abrupt change fo llowing a cri sis, as has been explained by Sabatier ( 1994) 
and it does not necessarily take place to solve a pre-identified problem, a 
characteristic of policy change albeit Kingdon (1995). Transition is better 
defined as a long, multi-stage period of structural , institutional and 
organizational changes from one system-state to another (Rip and Kemp, 
1998; Geels and Schot, 2007), a view which blurs the distinction between 
radical and incremental change and therefore can also be depicted as a 
process of "gradual transformation" . In order to identify these cases of 
gradual transformation (particularly of institutions), Streeck and Thelen 
(2005) have o ffered to make a distinction between the process of change -
which can be either incremental or abrupt, and the outcomes of change that 
can be resulted either in continuity or discontinuity of the previous course 
(see table 2 below). In order to be depicted as a transition, a socio-technical 
system would experience an incremental process, which will result in a 
significant change: 
Result of change 
Continuity j Discontinuity 
........................... 
Incremental Reproduction by : Gradual transformation: 
Process of adaptation : Transition 
change Abrupt Survival and return ,. i3r~~itd~~ ~~d"""'" .. 
replacement 
· 
· 
· 
· 
· 
._ .. _------_._._-- _.-
Table 2: Types of change: processes and results. In Streeck and Thelen, 
2005: 1 04 (with my addition) 
7 Loorbach (2007) distinguishes four phases in a transition: predeve\opment (the stage of 
experimentati ons), take off (the state of system starts to shift), acceleration (the transition 
become visible and changes are di ffused within the system) and stabilization (the final stage 
during which the state of system returns to some temporal equilibrium). 
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One of the challenging critiques of any attempt to define transition was made 
by (Meadowcroft, 2005), who argued that compared to policies or 
institutions, transitions are even less definite, definable units neither in time 
nor space; old technologies do not completely vanish, several transitions can 
concurrently start, and delineating regimes might be impossible . 
.. 
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Figure 4: Illustration of the interaction between scales from the Multi-Level 
Perspective (Geels and Kemp, 2007:1263). 
The important contribution of the sociotechnical analysis nevertheless is its 
strengthened observation that despite the fact that technological change is 
often correlated with progress, it is rather a messy, ambiguous process that 
increasingly requires intentional steering especially at the regime and niche 
levels. Notwithstanding, the need for an overall guidance is not obvious. 
Recently, a meta-steering of the whole transitional process is advocated by 
scholars who are engaged with the transition management model, as will 
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further be elaborated. Yet, studying the role of actors in transitions has been 
mostly confined to niche-managers - i.c. actors wanting to foster new 
technologies through information sharing, network-building or legitim ising 
new technology (see e.g. Haxeltine and Seyfang, 2009). On top of who 
should be involved, there is a lacuna in these studies regarding the interests, 
abilities and ways in which actors could be engaged in the management 
process. In chapter 5, ] will undertake the task of linking discursive 
institutionalism approach to dynamics with the socio-technical framework in 
order to gain a more actors-centred perspective to fill this gap. 
The final part of this chapter presents the transition management model in 
most general lines. Since this research could not test the applicability of the 
model to the particular case-study, the model was rather used as a conceptual 
and analytical frame to study policymaking. ]n return, the case-study could 
have informed the model, as will be shown in chapters 6 and 7, by pointing to 
its current udertheorisation of interdependent policy dynamics. 
2.2.3.5. Transition Management 
Transition management (TM) is a conceptual model of a polieymaking 
process. It is based on the assumption that socio-technical transitions that 
took place in the past did not necessarily result in a desirable way and that in 
order to achieve the goal of sustainability, however it is defined, a deliberate 
effort is needed. The TM model aims at long-term desirable social change 
and development, which could be achieved by the use of social actors and the 
alignment of their interactions; co-evolutionary processes of societal 
institutions and technologies and; a modulation of collective chosen goals 
(Hoogma and Kemp, 2002). Its multi-actor nature means that different 
stakeholders (policymakers, scientists, politicians, NGOs, businessmen, 
interest-groups, industries etc.) are expected to play different roles in 
different phases of the process (Rotmans et aI., 2000). Transition 
management is therefore first and foremost based on dynamics integration 
and the coordination of" ... multi-actor processes at different levels, aiming at 
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long-term sustainability, through the creation of long-term vision, innovation 
networks and experimental playgrounds" (Van Oer Brugge et al., 2005: 167). 
The genuine belief of the TM model's developers is that some transitions, 
though complex processes occurring in complex environments, can and 
should be managed (Rotmans et al., 2000; Kemp and Rotmans, 2005; 
Loorbach, 2007), whereas for now questions of who is to manage them and 
under which mandate remain open. Based on the literature, I dissect four 
major operative stages along the process. First, transition managers need to 
establish 'transition arenas' - where actors can interact, express and exchange 
their agendas and prospects. At the same time, this forum should create joint 
images to guide a desirable vision along with indicative targets 
(Meadowcroft, 2005). Second, 'transition routes' or 'pathways' - directed by 
the vision - should be identified while the industrial/business sectors continue 
to explore potential innovations (,transition technologies') and the public 
sector continues to invest in research and development. Finally, it is the stage 
of 'institutional transition', where reform and restructuring are needed in 
policies and regulations, infrastructures and public behaviour, to promote the 
preferred pathways. 
Transition pathways are of particular interest here. While they are developed 
naturally and sometimes even unintentionally, without a steering hand, they 
nevertheless often suffers from technological fix, a static view of the 
transition process or a narrow view of endogenous dynamics that could have 
crucial impact on transitions (Verbong and Geels, 2010). In contrast, 
managed pathways may stimulate learning from key-elements in current and 
historical regimes, identify the diverse range of actors and networks and 
encourage the inclusion of wider landscape and focused niche factors (see 
Foxon e/ al., 2010 and further in chapter 5). 
In more practical terms, transition pathways are the range of possible futures. 
As such, they are usually developed using scenario-building techniques, 
however, not necessarily quantitative. Studies have pointed to the usefulness 
of backcasting method for managing transitions. As opposed to qualitative 
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predictive and explorative forecasts, the results of backcasting are innovative 
images of the future, which represent long-term solutions to the social 
problem in question (Quist and Vergragt, 2006). The desired scenario, 
however, does not have to be pre-determined, but should be produced along 
the process. Backcasting is therefore unique in that its products arc desired, 
normative scenarios rather than descriptive and optimal. 
According to Rotmans et al. (2000), TM process should include the following 
core properties: 
• Using long-term thinking for short-term policy; 
• Thinking in multi scales terms; considering diversity of stakeholders 
at different governance levels; 
• The use of participatory decision-making; 
• Aiming for learning-by-doing and doing-by-learning; 
• Bringing about system innovation besides system improvement and; 
• Flexibility, meaning keeping open a range of options. 
It is anticipated that a successful transition will necessarily depend on a wide 
support from existing governance structures and different institutional 
arrangements, such as well-established policy networks and technological 
enterprises (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). Yet, a TM process is also expected 
to act as a force of its own which will bring about socio-cultural, institutional 
and economic changes, and will not be depended on the good will of any 
particular actors. 
The TM model has attracted various responses, as will be further discussed in 
chapters 5 and 6. While the Dutch government has undertaken several means 
to implement the TM model, gaining some real-life experience with the 
concepts (Kemp et aI., 2006), there is still much to discover on how does TM 
work in practice; what operative stages are required; according to which 
indicators can we evaluate transition management's success or failure; and 
eventually, what problems can TM expect to encounter. A critical analysis 
has pointed out that the TM model cannot avoid the faults of present 
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deliberative policy approaches, in which who participates, who wins and who 
loses from a chosen direction (or 'pathway'), are contested issues (Shove and 
Walker, 2007). It is therefore not clear how the process of TM could elevate 
power relations, strategic behaviour and hiding interests, all current obstacles 
to greater deliberation and coordination in policymaking. In addition, the 
forces behind certain technologies and regimes lock-in might be too powerful 
and it is not obvious whether and how TM can in fact transform existing 
institutions, policies and political reality (Shove and Walker, 2007). 
Finally, Kemp et al. (2006) have noted that TM is being practiced in the 
Netherlands for managing transition toward sustainability in distinctive 
sectors: energy, agriculture, mobility, biodiversity and more. I will be arguing 
in this thesis that TM could benefit from a more integrative approach. As part 
of the objectives of this research, chapter 6 will therefore examine the role of 
a largely neglected integrative dimension of TM, that is, integration of inter-
sectoral policies and specifically as in the case of water and energy dynamics. 
2.3. Conclusions: moving policy dynamics theory forward 
When policyrnakers make decisions and design policies they set off a process 
which is conceptualised as policy dynamics. Since policymaking takes place 
in a setting of constant interactions (between actors, actants, networks, 
institutions and the environment), the attempts themselves to uphold or 
hinder integration inaugurate dynamics. This chapter has undertaken a novel 
attempt to combine different approaches to such policy dynamics in order to 
lay down the theoretical foundation for an examination of the thesis's key-
question regarding the interplay between sociotechnical components and 
interdependent regimes during transitional processes. For the purpose of 
exploring this, the literature review crossed decision-making models with the 
newer approach of transition management. 
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While these literatures provide valuable insights into various aspects of the 
dynamics of sociotechnical components, changing policy 111 an 
interdependent world is nevertheless undertheorised and insufficiently 
explained. Three original conceptual claims can therefore be drawn from this 
chapter's literature compilation: 
1. Recent studies may have focused on dynamics of large infrastructural 
systems from the transition perspective and have highlighted the 
entrenched and interrelated nature of large systems of infrastructures 
within a system web of policies, economies, institutions, technologies 
and behaviours (Frantzeskaki and Loorbach, 2010). Yet, these 
contributions cover distinctive areas, such as energy, mobility and 
water and there is an absence of reference exactly to the crucial 
phenomenon of interdependency, such as of cross-cutting 
environmental issues. While the scientific community has widely 
recognized by now the complexity of the environmental system itself 
and its interconnectedness to the social system; and environmental 
scientists are looking on the interactions across sectors (water quality, 
rivers, soil, energy, air and biodiversity, for instance) from numerous 
angles - policy, as opposed to that, is still lagging behind and policy 
studies are still lacking some crucial evidences for what is estimated 
to be the current level of intra-sectoral environmental 
interdependency; whether different kinds of integrative ideas and 
tools can in fact promote sustainability and; how these can be 
implemented in certain contexts. The important questions of how and 
why policymaking differs between sectors (John, 1998: 12) should 
therefore be followed by questions on how policy sub sectors correlate 
and co-depend. I intend to fill this gap in chapter 6. 
II. Dynamics in any particular sector, such as water, energy and mobility 
can be expected to derive from a technological change. Yet, the role 
of technology has not been adequately addressed in the literature on 
policy regime change and we are therefore left with one-sided causal 
explanation of sociotechnical transitions. I have mentioned earlier in 
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this chapter that policy dynamics theories put the policymaking 
component at the centre of thcir analysis, through which socio-
technical transition can be explained. They miss, however, the role of 
technology, especially within environmental policy regimes, as an 
explanatory variable to transitional processes. The sociotechnical 
transition literature, only partly fill this void by treating technology as 
an actant. Yet, often it treats technology as dependent variable that is 
usually constrained or promoted by policy dynamics. The classical, 
institutional and sociotechnical approaches to dynamics are offering, 
each by itself, an incomplete explanation of policy change. Together, 
however, they will provide the base to explain, in chapter 4, how 
technology caused dynamics that manifested essentially as 
interdependencies of the water and energy regimes. 
III. Finally, the sociotechnical transition literature may provide a heuristic 
framework and analytical concepts to studies of policy change. Yet, 
while policy change is seen as a tool, rather than the outcome (see the 
previous point), policy and decision makers are absent in the 
conceptual language, and transition processes are analysed separately 
from the policies, management or steering approaches that are to 
influence them (De Haan and Rotmans, 2011). Therefore, the role of 
agents in transitions is to a large extent ignored. I suggest that 
bringing discourses - ultimate mirrors of power-relations and interests 
- back in, could have the potential to bridge this gap. This will be 
done in chapter 5, by linking the discursive institutional approaches to 
the socio-technical transition framework. 
A principal rationale for this thesis is, therefore, to offer the contribution of 
an integrative lookout to the study of socio-technical transitions. This is 
particularly worthwhile, as the studies of transitions have tended to focus on 
one policy regime in distinctive sectors (e.g. energy, water, communication, 
transportation etc.). Such studies have generally examined, through case-
studies approach, transition of utility provision, such as the transfer from coal 
to natural gas (Rip and Kemp, 1998; Monstadt, 2007). Others have looked on 
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water management transition processes (Van Oer Brugge et aI., 2005; Pahl-
Wost!, 2007) or specific niche-innovation trajectories (Hoogma and Kemp, 
2002; Verbong and Geels, 2007). Interestingly, not much has progressed in 
the subfield of policy dynamics and integration since Underdal (1980: 159) 
has observed that "interaction systems characterized by significant exchange 
of 'externalities' are likely to generate proposals for some kind of 
coordination and attempts to reach joint decisions regarding the conduct of 
interdependent activities". 
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3 . Methodology, materials & methods 
3.1.lntroduction 
"Objectivity is not measured by 
procedures that assure an accurate 
mapping of the world but by the growth of 
knowledge". (Burawoy, 1998:5) 
The prevIOus chapter outlined the conceptual framework that have been 
guiding the theoretical prepositions for the study and has opened-up the 
analysis of various aspects in the water and energy sectors, for each sector 
independently and for both interdependently. In light of the complex and 
dynamic nature of policy and decision-making processes such an analysis is 
required to be grounded in convincing methodology and empirical approach. 
This chapter is therefore devoted to a more detailed presentation of the 
general methodological framework and specific methods that were employed. 
Specifically it focuses on the Interpretive Policy Analysis framework, which 
is perceived as merely a tool but rather a general, critical methodological 
approach to the field of public policy, as well as on a few of the difficulties it 
may present to researchers. Thereafter, the material and methods used in this 
thesis are detailed. 
3.2.What is policy 
To begin with, the term policy cannot be easily defined. Generally, a policy is 
"any output of any decision maker, whether it be an individual or a 
collectivity, a small collectivity or a large one, a government or a 
nongovernment" (Lowi, 1970:317). A policy also necessarily involves a 
normative angle as it is produced by some kind of an authorized entity to 
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satisfy some sort of a public need (Pierson, 2005). Although definitions have 
varied, it still might be possible to push these into roughly two categories. 
First, scholars equated policy with an intended solution to a perceived 
problem (Dery, 1998; Sabatier, 2007). This is, according to Pierson (2005) a 
functionalist explanation of public policy. The problems with understanding 
policy this way is that first, in many cases, the act of making a decision and 
crafting a policy precedes the perception of an actual need or problem 
(Kingdon, 1995). Second, taking into consideration the "sizable time lag" 
between policy-making and its consequences, rarely policies embody the 
goals of social actors but rather are much often by-products of social 
processes. These critical observations have shown the way to an alternative 
interpretation according to which policy is understood as an arena of 
conflicting interests, an outcome, sometimes arbitrary, of a process, rather 
than an intentional output. The latter view is based on the observation that 
policy arenas are composed of numerous stakeholders which are, or at least 
can be expected to be involved (Kiker et aI., 2005), and that they constantly 
negotiate, "puzzle", or in fact "power" (Hugh Heclo, 1974 in Hall, 1993). 
This view of policy directs us to think of it indeed not merely as the output of 
policymaking, but as an essentially contested and bewildering process (see 
Colebatch, 2006). The policy analysis in this thesis therefore tries to do 
justice with both approaches to policy. As will be deliberated upon in the 
following sections, policy has been methodologically conceived both as text 
(meaning a pure product) and a discourse, that is, a negotiated and contested 
process on meaning and interpretation. The political arena in which policy is 
made can therefore partially explain policy dynamics; why policies are 
sometimes hard to change, while in other times the speed of their change is 
hard to catch-up with. 
3. 3. Competing methodological approaches to policy analysis 
The mainstream positivist approach to policy analysis relies on quantitative 
data, replicable experiments, causal generalization and objective hypothesis-
61 
testing to accumulate valid scientific knowledge that can be considered as 
facts and provide policymakers with rigid solutions to problems (Fischer, 
1998). Its accompanied methods - cost benefit analysis, input-output 
modelling or survey studies - are being increasingly criticised by post-
positivists, however, following the argumentative tum in policy analysis 
(Fischer and Forester, 1993; Hajer, 1995). 
The post-positivism stream, according to which scientists produce discursive 
and contextual understanding of societal problems, necessitates certain 
assumptions about the nature of these problems. In this line, constructivists 
argue that the problems themselves are scientifically or more generally 
socially constructed (Hill, 2005) and that certain "conditions come to be 
defined as problems, and have better chance of rising on the agenda, when we 
come to believe that we should do something to change them" (Kingdon, 
1995: 198). The rationale behind the claim that our understanding of the 
conditions around us, of social and in particular environmental problems and 
their scientific solutions, are socially constructed - is twofold. At the 
epistemological level, truths about the natural world were observed to be 
falsehoods so many times along history that it will therefore be unreasonable 
to easily dismiss calls for "relative truths" in any human activity such as 
policymaking or scientific observations (Bird, 1987). Relative truths or 
"changing conceptions of nature" are also uncovered among different 
societies (Latour, 2004:4). At the ontological level, the potential number of 
"truths" about nature, environment or scientific inquiry, and the amount of 
possible "problems" in particular, are at any given time much bigger than the 
actual issues that receive attention by politicians, scientists, public, media or 
any other societal actor. Therefore, the realms in which problems are dealt 
with and the level of coverage a topic receives indicate an active process of 
problem's construction (Yearley, 2002). Hence, the constructivist approach 
also assumes reality is always particular, dependent on subjective framing, 
moment in time and place specific representations, metaphors, symbols, and 
experiences. For example, the scientific consensus that humans face a severe 
crisis with respect to water quality and quantity serves as an underlying 
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assumption for most social studies on water. Yet, when taking into account 
the particular context in which problems are fonnulated and certain ideas and 
technologies are adopted, the approach that sees water scarcity as 'socially 
constructed' has the potential to provide multiple layers to the analysis. 
An established methodology for a constructive analysis of policy dynamics is 
the interpretive policy analysis framework, which treats policymaking as a 
social interaction on its various implications (linguistic constructions of 
discourses and hegemonic concepts, composition of networks and coalitions, 
existence of power-relations and interests), rather than a technical process. 
For example, interpretative studies of water policy and management have 
shown how different epistemic communities promoted each a very specific 
understanding of what is a 'water crisis', which has resulted in a limited 
capacity to ask questions and determine the manner they formulate their 
solutions (Trottier, 2008); how some understandings of 'water crisis' or 
'water wars' tend to obscure issues concerning unequal access to and control 
over water (Mehta, 2003); and how different discourses of water (such as 
treating water as an economic good vs. basic right) influence de Jacto 
different (and sometimes contradictory) trends like decentralization, 
centralization, and privatization (Sangameswaran, 2006). 
3.4. The interpretive policy analysis framework 
Interpretative Policy Analysis (IPA) as a methodology (i.e. a way of seeing 
the world/social reality), suggests post-positivist phenomenological, 
epistemological and ontological stances about meanings, knowledge(s), 
practices, ideas and discourses in the policy-making arena (Yanow, 2000). As 
mentioned above, policymaking is regarded not merely as a technical, 
objective or rational process but a complex one, involving multiple 
stakeholders (including politicians, practitioners, managers, scientists and the 
public), with multiple perspectives, interests and mentalities. 
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From an interpretive point of view, policy processes are constrained by 
subjective, geographic/politicallsocio-cultural context-based and situated 
articulations (rather than facts) by policy actors who are constituted in frames 
of language and subject to power relations, regarding institutes that are not 
objectively relevant but yet are often framed as such (Gottweis, 2003; Yanow 
and Schwartz-Shea, 2006). The goal of the interpretive policy analysis 
approach is therefore to underline the roles of these subjective, actor-based 
ideas or frames in the policy arena and especially in processes of policy 
change and continuation (Rydin, 2003), and by that to give rise to diversity of 
voices, choices, interests and understandings. A second and third layer of 
interpretations which are of interest to the analyst materialise during the stage 
of policy implementation, by the executers and then by the subjects of the 
policy. The policy analyst is therefore required to examine the policy 
problem from the situated perspectives of the actors involved, taking into 
consideration also the fourth layer of interpretation, that is, of the researcher 
himself, as was put by Yanow (1993): " ... much of their (i.e. policies -NT) 
meaning can only be elicited by an act of interpretation on the part of the 
researcher (1993 :42). 
Interpretations are entangled with questions of meaning, as any policy in 
itself. The interpretative tum has sought to identify policymaking with the 
generation of meaning and the ways those different meanings are 
communicated, as was suggested also by Dryzek (2006:90): "Policy analysis 
encompasses a variety of activities concerned with the creation, compilation 
and application of evidence, testimony, argument and interpretation in order 
to examine, evaluate and improve the content and process of public policy". 
Fischer and Forester (1993) as well as Majone (1989) were essentially 
referring to policymakers as producers of arguments, while Stone (1989) and 
Roe (1994:3) portrayed them as storytellers. Colebatch (2006: 10) argued that 
the view of the policymaker as storyteller or argumentator entails the 
understanding that "much of the policy process is about managing 
overlapping and conflicting interpretations of the subject of concern". 
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In order to understand the vanous mean1l1gs, which are the products of 
stakeholders' views, the analyst should study the process within its specific 
context and against the participant's own system of values and motives, for 
example by analysing discourses. This is further stressed by Fischer 
(2003:68): "A socially relevant approach to policy inquiry has to include the 
subjectively oriented goals, motives, and intentions of the policy actors. As 
such it has to be grounded in an interpretive analysis." 
The idea that policies are embedded with values IS fundamental to the 
understanding of what policy is and how it could be interpreted. In that 
respect, Ball's (1993:3) assertion, that "policies project images of an ideal 
society", provides a good demonstration of the usefulness of the interpretive 
approach to policy analysis because it brings subjectivity, values and interests 
(different systems of values define 'ideal society' significantly different) to 
the core-definition of what policy is. Nevertheless, as aforementioned in 
chapter 2, the term 'policy' itself is challenging since it is being used to 
describe different "things", "units" of references, processes or outcomes. For 
Ball (1993), "much rests on the meaning or possible meanings that we give to 
policy; it affects 'how' we research and how we interpret what we find". 
Ball (1993) differentiates between two types of policy: policy as text and 
policy as discourse. At the first instance, policies are expressed in documents, 
which are written by multiple authors and read by multiple readers in a 
variety of settings, which already explain why policymaking cannot be 
treated a one linear, coherent process. Policy documents are a result of 
compromises and contestation that are "coded" into text, and therefore 
indicators of different meanings. Moreover, policies are "textual 
interventions into practice" (Ball, 1993: 12) in that they have trans formative 
effect. Ultimately, both authors and readers are active agents over the course 
of policy development in their act of interpretation. At the wider lever, 
however, policies are discourses within the social system, in that they are 
understood to be exercising power in the Foucauldian sense, as the producers 
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of 'truth' and 'knowledge'. Policies arc enacted with politics and structure 
what can be said and thought. Gradually, certain interpretations become more 
probable and legitimate than others as well as the possible forms of solutions 
and implementation. 
Ball's distinction provides useful methodological input to the analysis in this 
thesis that is constantly weaving between the roles of particular actants 
(humans and nonhumans) and institutional structures in policy change and 
continuation. As a departure point, there is no one coherent or official policy, 
neither of water nor of energy that the analysis had looked at, but rather a 
process of negotiation, contest responses and attempts to representing 
solutions to perceived problems of natural resources scarcity and 
management. In other words, an underpinning assumption of this thesis is 
that interpretive approach would be the most suitable to examine different 
dimensions of policy dynamics. This is because the unit of analysis was not 
consider to be a definitive, final policy outcome summarised in a text, but the 
discursive world that lies within and around target-issues in the water and 
energy policy regimes. This discursive world, according to Fischer (2003) 
may be expressed as a policy, but is in fact a set of arguments, favouring 
different ways of looking at the world. 
Yanow (1993 :41) suggests that an interpretative policy study should be 
occupied with the questions of how policy "makes" meanings. That IS: 
" ... how a policy accrues meaning; where meaning resides; how they are 
transmitted to and among various policy stakeholders; how they come to be 
shared or not shared; how they may be destroyed". Interpretative policy 
studies reveal multiple understandings of the actors involved in processes 
along the policy cycle, how these understandings are created and importantly, 
how they are manipulated as part of political strategies. Actors' multiple 
understandings of problems and solutions create the challenge of 
understanding and explaining these disparities without ending up with the 
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conclusion that no real problem in fact exists. By showing that behind the 
variation of policy alternatives promoted by different policy networks x to 
solve the problems of water and energy scarcities, lies only one powerful 
shared paradigm or discourse (that is of the "more is better" - chapter 4 or 
the "discourse of abundance" - chapter 5), I meet this challenge. It thus 
suggests that the plurality of interpretations in some stages of the policy cycle 
could be more limited than proposed above by previous studies. It also 
suggests that various interpretations would not necessarily result in different 
understandings of which of the policy alternatives should be implemented. 
It is important to note here, however, that alternative voices to the shared 
discourse of plenty do exist. Environmental NGOs, mainly the Society for the 
Protection of Nature in Israel (see section 5.4.3 for elaboration) have 
advocated the need to reconsider the excessive use of desalination through 
studies and reports, and called for greater emphasis on demand-side solutions 
to the water crisis. They also campaigned with relation to energy issues, 
against, for example, drilling oil-shale (also see chapter 5). Significant 
alternative voices to the hegemonic discourse of plenty, however, both in the 
water and energy sector, as well as with respect to their nexus, are apparently 
absent. This can be explained by the attractive environmental benefits of 
abundance, such as the ability to restore dry streams and salinised aquifers 
with the additional amount of available water, benefits which cannot be 
disregarded by environmental NGOs. Similarly, socia-environmental NGOs 
did not emerge as a significant opponent to energy abundance, as they too 
recognise the importance of energy for economic development and the social 
benefits national income from natural gas could foster. 
H Devora Yanow's conceptualisation of policy networks is based on an older idea, the one of 
"interpretive communities". These groups are composed by members of a community (not 
necessarily geographically determined) that share a set of values, beliefs, feelings and similar 
cognitive and linguistic characteristics (Yanow, 2000). 
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To sum, stakeholders' conflicting interpretations of a problem, discursive 
struggles on the production of shared social meanings, and discrepancies 
between will and deed, are, according to the interpretative framework, the 
main drivers of change, rather than policy itself. Interpretive analysis is 
therefore a dynamic process, with shifts of values and interests throughout, 
making new interpretations relevant constantly (Colebatch, 2006; Fischer, 
2007). The act of interpretation taken by the analyst seeks to better explain 
the world of policymakers. It does, however, also hold the normative goal of 
pointing toward possible solutions in a more deliberate and just ways. 
3.5. Research design 
The two main accounts for the linkages between theory, as a set of abstract 
categories, assumptions and models (Colebatch, 2007), and (qualitative) data, 
as a collection of both content (of research's participants and documents) and 
the way it is represented by participants and actors, are known as 'theory-
testing approach' and' grounded theory'. The theory-testing approach treats 
theory as a guide to research (i.e. data gathering, analysis and presentation), 
while research can be a means of testing the efficacy of the theory. It often 
begins with theoretical assumptions and propositions. As a methodological 
issue, the theory-testing approach takes, to a large extent, an empiricist point 
of view of the world. Grounded theory, on the other hand, advocates the idea 
that theory must reflect people's experiences, meaning and understanding, 
rather than identify 'empirical' variables that 'externally' influence behaviour 
(Layder, 1998). Concepts and hypotheses must emerge from the data by 
means of a process of mutual feedback between theory and data. 
This research has employed these two approaches to research design. The 
research was motivated simultaneously by strong theoretical propositions 
derived from a pre-identified specific gaps in the literature (i.e. the ways 
technology affect policy, the lack of agency in socio-technical analysis and 
the lack of account for inter-sectoral interdependencies in the transition 
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management model) and by real-life experiences and perceived problems that 
may alter current theoretical assumptions and are reflected in the case-studies 
(that is the issue of water-energy scarcity, technological alternatives and 
institutional change). Therefore, while the first stage of research conducted 
with line with 'theory-testing approach', the following steps, including field 
work, analysis and writing-up were guided by principles of 'grounded theory' 
and were more inductive in nature. It required a continuous interplay between 
theory and data. The conceptual combination between "theory-driven" and 
"practice-driven" offers a clear articulation of aims and questions prior to the 
empirical work on the one hand, while on the other hand it encourages 
flexibility and reflexivity of data gathering and analysis. Naturally, too much 
flexibility in a long-term research can become a disadvantage in terms of 
losing focus and wasting resources. Keeping in mind the time and budgetary 
limits for the research was therefore important. 
The Interpretative Policy Analysis framework essentially involves 
questioning the relationships between research elements: theory, 
methodology, data and analysis. A fluid course of research as a result of 
blurred boundaries and overlaps between these concepts has consequently led 
to a call for "on-site flexibility and less step-wise research design" (Yanow, 
2003). In order to capsulate the empirical part in the most organised way, the 
research has taken the case-study approach, as will be next elaborated. 
3.6. Case-study approach 
The case-based research might only produce context-dependent knowledge 
which is hard to be generalised, yet it ultimately describes, reflects and tests 
views and understandings of a situation as they unfold in practice. Thus, by 
focusing on real-life situations and examination of particular cases some sort 
of proximity to something "real" might be best achieved (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
However, the use of empirical methods and case-studies in a theory-driven 
and conceptual research is not obvious. Replicability and the ability to make 
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generalisations - two prerequisites of a theory - are not (and should not be, 
as some will argue) goals to be achieved in a social research. In his 
exploration of the extended case method, Burawoy (1998: 14) has proposed 
the premises of reflexive science to deal with the presumable gap between 
" ... participant and observer, knowledge and social situation, situation and its 
field of location, folk theory and academic theory". 
Reflexive science is guided by four assumptions. First, intervention of the 
interviewer in the experience of the interviewee is desired and not something 
to avoid. Second, the reliability of the research steams from a process of 
aggregation of 'situational knowledge' into social process, that is, the ability 
of the researcher to explain participants' 'data points' in term of social 
dynamics. Third, an underlying assumption is that everyday life situations are 
never the same and that there is a need to account for changes across time. 
This is termed by Burawoy (1998) the "structuration of social forces", 
meaning the external and structural powers that delimit the sort of things that 
happen in multiple different 'locales'. Finally, the goal of research analysis 
should be the reconstruction of a theory, not by generalisation, but by 
increasing its 'empirical content'. In developing the extended case methods 
M. Burawoy does not take a deep interpretive point of view. His goal is 
rather to find a third way wherein positivism means something despite its 
flaws. He also does not take a grounded approach to research because the 
extended case method necessitates the pre-existence of a theory: "we cannot 
see social world without a theory, just as we cannot see the physical world 
without our eyes" (Burawoy, 2009:xiii). 
What reflexive science contributes for the design of this thesis is the claims 
about the importance of contextuality and the conceptual connection between 
the micro (i.e. detailed analysis of internal social process) and the macro (i.e. 
account of external social forces); in other words, the supposition that case 
study can be used to extend an existing theory. It helps in thinking about the 
relations between empirical data and theory and in rationalising the 
modulation of the data back into theory. 
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Case-studies, however, should be carefully chosen in order to be able to 
provide a rich data against which the research questions could be tested and 
theory expended. As can be seen in section 1.2 the study went back and forth 
between several layers of theorising: at the first layer, the study concerns the 
socio-technological relation with policy changes and continuation, in the 
second, it looks at the interacting forces within environmental decision-
making processes and their effects on sustainability. A third layer 
concentrates on natural resources scarcity and abundance. By way of 
investigating these issues, I have selected two national policy regImes 
affected by the availability and management of natural resources; wherein 
new technologies are becoming increasingly prominent; and the sustainability 
of environmental decision-making is questioned (see further section 3.5.2. in 
this chapter). While the cases supporting my research served different goals 
and were of a different nature, it can be argued in fact that the two policy 
regimes do not only follow a similar pattern or reflect similar tendencies, but 
they are also complementary to each other, together providing a more holistic 
account of socio-technical developments. 
The two case studies dealt with are the transition of the water policy regime 
and the role of desalination technology (chapter 4) and the transition of the 
energy regime and the role of discourses (chapter 5). The two case-studies 
were then compared and combined in chapter 6. The choice of two 
complementing case studies - similar infrastructural systems in which one is 
undergoing a transition led by one technology and the second is driven by 
four major alternatives - enabled this analysis to capture a broad range of 
socio-technical dynamics occurring in both sectors both separately and 
jointly. 
The cases differ in terms of the number of technological alternatives involved 
in the dynamics but compare in alternate ways. First, the case-studies do not 
differ in terms of their geographical location. The identical space in which the 
two policy regimes are crafted allowed me to focus on the discursive level 
71 
without spending a considerable effort in the attempt to bridge over formative 
differences in cultural, political and regulative systems of different countries. 
Second, they basically share similar drivers of dynamics because in both the 
water and energy sector, as will be further demonstrated, policy is driven by 
large-scale technological choices based on their promise to solve perceived 
scarcity. Third, policy in both sectors emerges through coalitions of policy 
networks. Theoretically, these networks vary in composition from sector to 
sector, but in practice, in the Israeli context they consist of the same 
governmental/policy agencies (primarily the Ministry of Water and Energy 
the Ministry Environment and the Ministry of Finance and to a lesser degree 
in our case-studies the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Interior); the 
same key legislators in these ministries as well as in the Public Utility 
Authority; some identical relevant business and industry representatives (the 
same company could be dealing both with desalinated water production and 
gas drilling); almost the same pressure groups and environmental NGOs and; 
a few prominent journalists and media reporters that covers both sectors. 
Consultants and policy analysts, being specialists to specific subjects are 
expected to differ from domain to domain but also this is not always the case, 
especially when international consultant companies (McKinsey, RAND) are 
involved in national strategic planning and sector-specific consulting at the 
same time. 
Policy regimes have to be evaluated against the context in which policy is 
shaped and acted upon, that is the particular case-studies. Also the 
Interpretative Policy Analysis approach anchors the validity of interpretation 
in the wider context in which the events are taking place (Wagenaar, 2011). 
For this purpose, in the following sections I bring a brief introduction to the 
Israeli socio-political and environmental settings and go back to explain the 
choice of focusing on the water and energy sectors. 
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3.6.1. The Israeli setting 
Located in the Middle East regIOn by the Mediterranean shore, Israel is 
geographically and strategically situated as a continental bridge between 
Asia, Africa and Europe. Modern Jewish settlement in the land of Palestine 
began under Ottoman rule at the end of the 19th century and continued under 
the British mandate, against the backdrop of regional and global geopolitical 
events. Current borders (Syria in the northeast, Lebanon in the north, Jordan 
in the cast and Egypt in the southwest) were delineated in several wars with 
its neighbouring countries following the establishment of State of Israel in 
1948. Despite a few decades of peace negotiations and several agreements, 
regional stability is yet far from achieved. 
On the eve of the day of the declaration of independence the county counted 
approximately 800,000 Jewish residents. Waves of immigration have resulted 
in rapid population growth, which is still kept today due to high birth rate 
(3.5%) and very high life expectancy. Population growth is an important 
factor in the context of natural resources and environmental issues, especially 
when considering the relatively small size of the country, which may become 
even smaller in a future agreement with the Palestinians, and its high 
population density. In 20 II there were 7.7 million citizens, approximately 2 
million of which are non-Jewish. More than 90% are living in an urban form 
of life and are concentrated along the coast. While the Southern region of 
Israel occupies 12,900 km:!, or 62% of Israel's territory (in the pre-1967 
borders, i.e. excluding the West bank and Gaza strip), it is a scarcely-
populated desert. A large proportion of the population IS therefore 
concentrated along the very short coastline of 206km. 
Economically, Israel is rated by the UNDP in the "very high category" of the 
Human Development Index, between Denmark and Belgium and in the 39 
place of the nominal gross domestic product (GOP) list of countries of the 
World Bank. In 2010 it has joined the OEeD. The political-economic 
ideology of all Israeli governments since the 1980s, with no major difference 
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between right-wing and left-wing parties, is essentially a neo-liberal, market-
based economy, which is accompanied by an intensive privatization schemes 
across sectors, including health, social welfare, education, communication 
and public housing. Market liberalisation also encompasses governmental 
compal1les and operations; natural resources and environmental-related 
services such as the privatization of the Dead Sea Works LTD (that makes 
profit from a public asset and contributes to its disappearance (Sherwood, 
2010)); a recent bill to privatize the ownership and management of natural 
reserves; and privatization of water production and treatment as well as of 
electricity production (further elaborated in chapters 4 and 5). These are only 
few relevant examples among many. 
As a representative democracy, the Israeli polity arena is divided into three 
authorities - the Knesset (the parliament with its 120 members, the legislative 
body that is elected every four years), the government (the executive 
authority) and the judiciary. The number of seats assign to each party in the 
Knesset is proportional to its share in the total national vote. The head of the 
largest party becomes the Prime Minister and is granted the assignment of 
building a coalition. Local government include dozens of municipalities and 
more than 140 local councils. The major arena of interaction between local 
and state authorities is state services, principally in the areas of education and 
welfare. The legal basis for the present system of local government in Israel, 
as other laws, is based on British Mandate system in Palestine (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs website, 2011). Israel does not have a fonnal document 
identified as a constitution. Instead, the Knesset decided to enact a list of 
Basic Laws, which define and protect several human rights. Primary 
legislation is composed of laws that are initiated by the government, with 
very few private bills, which must gain governmental approval. Since 1989, 
the 'Arrangements Law', originally aimed at supporting the political-
economic systems 111 the 1985's economic crisis, has been servll1g 
governments to pass a bundle of legislation without a separate, focused 
debate. Secondary legislation consist of regulations and rules under the 
supervision of ministerial offices and various statutory authorities. 
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The relatively short existence of the national institutional arrangements of the 
state might explain the lack of well-established, stable and effective 
administration both at the national and regional levels, especially in 
comparison to other developed countries in North America and Western 
Europe. StilL a transition from "government to governance" can be depicted 
also in the Israeli pluralist political sphere, with the decreasing power of 
political parties and the growing dominance of other actors such as interest 
groups, the bureaucratic system, the media and the third sector (Nachmias 
and Sened, 2002). 
The social, economic and political conditions in Israel affect the behaviour of 
actors, the emergence and character of policy networks and consequently, 
policy itself. For example, the growing economIc interests of private 
compames m energy sources exploration, which are encouraged by low 
state's revenues and poor taxation, have changed the balance of players in the 
energy regime, by reducing the centrality of the traditional state's players and 
by making private companies quite influential in the economic and political 
spheres. Concurrently, the increasing role of environmental non-
governmental organizations in the policy arena and growing public 
awareness to environmental issues (Tal, 2002; Hananel, 20 I 0), have created 
room for public influence on policies and regulation related to energy. An 
example for the latter is the legislation in 2008 of a Clean Air Act, which was 
considered an unprecedented achievement of the Israeli environmental 
9 
camp. 
Secured drinking water and energy availability, the two mam fields 
considered here, are essentially environmental problems. Not only because 
precious natural resources are sometimes at stake, but also because water and 
9nrg (20 II) For the breathers: Clean Air Act has came into force. nrg,. 
http://www.nrg.co.il/online/I/ART2/195/855.htmILast Accessed: 2.1.20 II. (Hebrew). 
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energy are extensively exploited by human and their continuing 
unsustainable management have resulted 111 wide-reaching negative 
environmental consequences, at local and global scales, and generated new 
environmental problems, such as soil salinization and air pollution. It is 
therefore important take a focused look at the environmental setting against 
which water and energy policies are crafted. 
3.6.2. Environmental context 
The scarcity of resources in Israel, mainly of water, energy and land has a 
tremendous effect on the quality of the environment. Coupled with 
population growth and tendencies of construction, sprawl and development, 
the state of air quality, aquifers, open spaces and biodiversity is in constant 
decline. To this list one can join more "natural" environmental problems that 
stem from Israel's geographic conditions, such as droughts, desertification 
and air pollution from natural particles. Among the various environmental 
challenges that the Ministry of Environment has reported about extensively 
during the time frame of this research are: domestic and industrial solid 
waste, streams and marine pollution, drinking water quality, soil pollution, 
noise pollution, and GHG emission (Ministry of Environment website, 2008-
2011). 
There are a number of laws related to specific environmental issue (such as 
the Water Law), several inter-sectoral laws that deal also with environmental 
issues (such as the Planning and Building Law) and a wide range of 
legislative instruments that include environmental provisions. Whereas local 
and regional municipalities hold the responsibility for environmental 
protection but in practice have a very limited authority, Ministerial officers 
and particularly the Ministry of Environment are occupied with many 
environmental issues, big and small alike. This has often led to the inefficient 
use of human resources and budget (OECD, 2011). Another impediment to 
effective environmental governance is fragmentation of responsibilities and 
the distribution of environmentally related functions between many sectoral 
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ministries (elaboration with examples 111 chapter 4). Environmental 
legislation, however, is improving. Important additions since 2008 include 
the Clean Air Act, the Polluter Pays Law, the Packaging Law and the 
Environmental Enforcement Law. 
The Israeli planning system is an important mechanism through which 
environmental policy and regulation are crafted and implemented. Although 
currently under a massive reform, it is still a highly centralised, hierarchical 
statutory planning system; within it six regional planning committees are in 
charge of the planning, inspection and judicial aspects of building, 
development and land-use in the local committees of their jurisdiction 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, 2011; Tal, 2002). Land development 
proposals and projects are approved or rejected based on the restrictions 
explicitly mentioned in the national, regional and local levels. The Israeli 
National Planning and Building Council, under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Interior, initiates the preparation of national land-use and 
development plans: dozens of domain-specific national Master-plans set 
aside lands for power plants, nature reserves, forests, tourist facilities, 
mining, desalination plans and so forth. My choice of interviewees included 
the head of Infrastructures Planning Unit within the National Planning 
Council and a member of the special Planning Committee on Sea Protection 
because the planning system does more than regulating land-use; it is an 
active actor in the policy-making process and an important arena in which 
strategic details of policies are negotiated. For example, in the preparation 
process of the desalination plants Master-plan, the planning committee 
required from the Water Authority to make a convincing argument to support 
its projections of water demand and consequently the amount of desalinated 
water needed. One of the interviewees explained why: 
If the water Authority came and said 'we know what to do, we know all the 
details, we have a plan from now until forever, and we have the exact data and 
projections and here is the bottom line: the water system needs five more 
desalination plants', then the National Planning Committee would have 
designated five locations. But it does not work like that. Why? Because the 
Water Authority might have the responsibility for the water sector and the 
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general view of the water sector, but the planning institution bring together 
many more eontlicts and issues and interests that arc important for us to keep 
at the policy rather than the technical level (Interview, The Planning 
Authority) 
Notwithstanding, institutional actors which have little to do with 
environmental protection are prominently involved in environmental 
decisions due to a highly political nature of environmental management, 
especially of water and energy resources. For example, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs is involved in decisions concerning annual water allocations 
to neighbouring countries according to bio-national agreements and 
regardless of the mere availability of water. Indeed, both water and energy 
are natural resources in conflict. Thus, very often the political reality in the 
Middle East constrains the ability to promote a more sustainable management 
of natural resources. 
Environmental challenges require a strategic, long term and comprehensive 
planning with respect to development and conservation. In 2003 the 
government of Israel adopted a "Strategic Plan for Sustainable 
Development", which seeks to integrate environmental considerations within 
future activities at the national level, based on the Johannesburg Conference 
of the United Nations in 2002 and the country's historic commitment to 
implement Agenda 21. This decision determined that "each ministry will 
prepare a strategic sustainable development plan with rules for 
implementation and funding, measurable objectives and timetables" 
(Governmental decision no. 246, Israel parliament, 2003, 14 May). Years 
later and no ministry, governmental office or other statutory authority, had 
yet seriously complied with this commitment (State of Israel Comptroller 
Annual Report, 2006). Recently, the OECD report on environmental 
performance in Israel determined that strategic planning and implementation 
capacities in Israeli ministries are very low and mechanisms for enforcement 
and evaluation are almost completely absent. A lack of strong data base on 
the economic aspects and range of possible economic tools of environmental 
policy is also considered an impediment to more sustainable decision-making 
by the ministries (OECD, 2011). 
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The institutional point of departure for this thesis is the water and the energy 
sectors. This does not suggest that policy dynamics or transitional processes 
are limited to these sectors. However, several factors contributed to making 
these particular sectors the most relevant for a focused mqUlry on the 
relations between policies, technology and shifting discourses m 
sociotechnical transitions. Firstly, water and energy are vital resources. Water 
especially is a vital element of the Israeli nation-building and rural landscape. 
Israeli water discourse, however, is diverse and increasingly fragmented 
(Feitelson, 2002). Similarly, Israeli energy discourse revolves, more than 
anywhere, around state security and foreign relations. Secondly, although 
technological innovations offer to tap the massive oceans and employ the 
infinite sun, the ability to directly intervene in natural cycles and artificially 
supplement availability of resources entails its own consequences. The water 
and energy sectors in Israel best reflect the international quest for 
technological innovations in these fields and they further mirror national 
political-economic tendencies of market liberalisation. Finally, intricate 
interdependencies which link the two sectors provide rich fora to examine 
coupled transitions. Until now policies in the water and energy sectors have 
evolved separately with none or little consideration of the impact of socio-
ecological changes for interdependent systems. However, the two sectors are 
intertwined, as problems are displaced from one media to another. 
3.7. Time frame 
The research undertaken in this dissertation took place during the years 2008 
-2011. However, the study is not confined to these four years. A rather wide 
and detailed historical setting on the development of the water and energy 
sectors in Israel is given in sections 4.3, 5.3 and 6.3, which paves the way for 
looking more intensively on a shorter and much more recent period (the last 
10 years). The year 2001 signals the point of policy change in the water 
regime when the Israeli government made a decision to desalinate non-
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negligible amounts of water. I use earlier studies for insight into the period 
that preceded this point of change: they have established the adherence of the 
water policy regime to ideological and political support for agriculture and its 
water needs. Although desalination targets have been changed several times 
(see section 4.3.7), three large desalination plants have been constructed and 
integrated into the system since 2007, making the year 2008 a dawn for a 
new period. In the energy regime, discoveries of natural gas in Israel's 
claimed economic waters only came about for the first time in the year 1999, 
while only in 2004 it began to feed the State's power stations. The transition 
to desalinated water and natural gas based- electricity is the two major 
dynamics in the Israeli water and energy regimes respectively. I therefore 
treat these events as punctuations and analyse more in-depth policy dynamics 
just beforehand and immediately afterward, while the historical review 
established the claim that in general, both sectors have been presenting path 
dependency and locked-in tendencies prior to these developments. I reflect 
back on some of the implications of studying on-going policy dynamics in 
the concluding chapter. 
3.S.Materials and data validation 
The research combined two mam complementary qualitative research 
strategies: documents analysis and in depth, semi-structured interviews. 
Information obtained in one strategy could therefore be validated or refuted 
by the alternative source in a kind of triangulation. The Interpretative Policy 
Analysis approach, however, gives the requirement for data validation a 
different meaning from the one assumed by more traditional approaches to 
research, such as triangulation. That is, since post-positivist's epistemology 
captures research as "a product of the very social world it seeks to explain" 
(Fischer and Forester, 1993:333), interpretive research does not differentiate, 
as opposed to Wolcott's (1994) observation, between "undeniable" analysis 
and interpretation. To promote the validity of analysis and interpretation, as 
interchangeable activities, it has been offered to give a "thick description" 
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(Adger et aL 2003 after Cliford Gecrtz) that is placed in "a proper context" 
(Wagenaar, 2011), as set above. 
3.8.1. Documents 
A variety of written sources has been explored. This secondary data was 
obtained from archival work as well as published and unpublished documents 
divided into two types of written documentation: official minutes and news 
media. 
I. Over 60 minutes of "Parliamentary Committee of inquiry to examine 
Israel's water management and crisis" including transcripts of 
interviews with more than 100 central actors in the water sector. 
Among interviewees are: two ministers of Energy and Water 
Resources (current and former), the minister of Environment, dozens 
of governmental officials, including ministerial directors, 
representatives from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the entire leading team of the Water Authority, the 
managers of Mekorot, dozens of scientists and academicians in 
universities and research institutes (specialists of water engineering, 
water chemistry, hydrology, environmental policy and public policy), 
directors of major industries, including desalination plants, sewage 
corporations and the agricultural union and representatives of major 
environmental non-governmental organizations. The interviewees 
were asked to elaborate on the experience in decision-making 
processes within the Israeli water sector including the alternative 
considerations, budget, responsibility, authority, power, 
accountability, coordination and implementation. Specific questions 
also addressed the issue of desalination, its social, economic, political 
and environmental costs. 
II. Major type of policy document used here is transcriptions of 
parliamentary committees, including, among others, meetings of the 
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Intcrior and Environment Committee, Economic Committee, and 
Science and Technology Committee (selected list below). These 
committees, which are composed by 15-19 MPs, are the operative 
mechanism within the Kncsset (the Israeli parliament) in which 
specific topics are discussed in greater detail and rules or regulations 
arc craftcd and modified. Discussions involve a wide range of invited 
parliamentary, public and private stakeholders, while non-invited 
citizens can usuaIly observe (see a selected list of minutes). 
Additional documents included official parliamentary reports, 
minutes and summaries of parliamentary meetings (such as the inter-
ministerial committee for climate change) and planning committees 
available on-line. Unpublished minutes included meetings summary 
of the National Planning Committee working on a national Master 
Plan of desalination sites. 
III. Newspaper articles and press releases published in national media 
between 2008 and 2011. Media coverage as a source of data was 
considered particularly significant because it is considered not only to 
reflect discursive constructions but also to produce and frame them 
(Pan and Kosicki, 1993 for one example among many). News media 
published online were used frequently by means of keywords (water, 
desalination, energy etc.) to identify relevant actors, developments 
and key-events. 
The Water Authority, 2002. Strategic plan for the water sector 2002-2010. 
The Ministry of Energy and Water Resources, 20 I O. National Plan for Energy Efficiency 
2010-2020. 
The Ministry of Energy and Water Resources, 2010. Renewable Energy Policy. 
- Parliamentary minutes, 2008. Readiness for emergency time of the water and- en~~gy 
infrastructures, State Comptroller Committee 
: Parliamentary minutes, 2009. Issues in solar energy. Economic Commiti~e, jO.12~09 
i Parliamentary minutes, 2009. Failures in energy supply and the IEC energy demands 
i plan. Economic Committee 
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Parliamentary minutes, 20 I O. Exploration of oil and natural gas, Economic Committee 
Parliamentary minutes, 20 II. National plan for altemative car-fuel. Economic Committee 
Parliamentary minutes, 20 II. Oil shale technology for the production of fuel - challenges 
related to development and production. Scicnce and Technology Committee 
Pari iamcntary minutes, 20 II. Caps and licences for solar energy facilities. Economic 
Committee, 21.6.11. http://oknesseLorg/committee/meeting/4214/. 
Pari iamentary minutes, 20 II. Environmental protection of NG drills in the sea. Joint 
Committee for Health and Environment 
Parliamentary minutes, 20 II. Energy sources, law 111 preparation (energy efficiency. 
standards). Intcrior and Environment Committee 
Table 3: A partial list of parliamentary official documentation reviewed (all in 
Hebrew) 
3.8.2. In-depth semi-structured interviews 
Primary data was obtained from twenty-six interviews undertaken during 
seven months field work during 2009-20 I O. Generally, target institutions in 
which I was looking for suitable interviewees were choscn based on their 
appearing relevance to decision-making processes in the water and energy 
sectors. Specific interviewees were then identified based on the analysis of 
documents, and especially based on the protocols of the "Parliamentary 
Committee of inquiry to examine Israel's water management and crisis". The 
simple selection criterion suggested by Stake (1995), according to which the 
best interviewees will be the people who can provide an opportunity to leam 
something new about the subject, has guided the process of identifying the 
most relevant actors within these target institutions. 
While one document can only teach us something on a particular time in a 
particular moment, one interview can reveal a whole process and hint on 
significant institutional as well as ideational changes. Interviews are the place 
to investigate the actors' perceptions about the phenomenon in question in 
greater depth. The selected interviewees therefore included persons from 
R3 
both the water and energy sectors and at di fferent scale of governance, and 
can be seen as representatives of their collective institutions. These 
"institutions" included the following organizations: The Water Authority, the 
Israeli Electricity Corporation. Mekorof (the National Water Company) The 
Ministry of Environment. The Ministry of Energy and Water Resources, the 
National Planning Committee. the special Planning Committee on Sea 
Protection, The Israeli Energy Fonllll (NGO), Israel's Society for the 
Protection of Nature (NGO), Israeli academicians and scientists, TAHAL 
(water technologies and planning company), private environmental 
consultant companies. and a carbon-trade business company. I intended, 
however, to capture, not only the fonnal actors but also those who make an 
attempt to influence the process inforn1ally, or without a fonnal position. 
Interviews were intended first to provide general data on both historical and 
contemporary events and processes that may clarify the current state of 
affairs and the issue at stake through questions such as: how processes of 
making decisions in regard to resources management are carried out in 
practice; what were the mechanisms by which interrelated concerns were 
addressed; how were trade-ofts balanced; and more (A list of questions in 
Appendix 2). Second, to elicit stakeholders' experiences, views and 
interpretations on specific topics, by asking for instance what the 
interviewees think about the way interrelated issues are being dealt with by 
decision-makers; what is their interpretation to this course of events; etc. 
Distillation of physical data from situated views was proved hard to achieve, 
although not necessarily desirable, because what people perceive as "ought" 
to be (their nonnative perceptions) is what drives change (Swart et aI., 2004) 
and therefore can be used by the researcher to explain it. In that, interviews 
are also best to reflect complexity, "discovering and portraying the multiple 
views of the case" (Stake, 1995:64). One prominent example for such 
"multiple realities" in my research and selective use of scientific data is 
Figure 15 provided to me by the Hydrological Service (the Water Authority). 
The graph shows the percentage of annual rainfall in compare to the annual 
average for a period of the last 15 years. According to this graph, a sharp 
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decline in average precipitation in the last few years can be traced. While the 
quantitative data presented in this particular graph underpins the Water 
Authority's stand regarding the need to rapidly promote large-scale 
desalination policy. there are several researchers who claim that presenting 
annual rainfall at the national scale is essentially misleading since regional 
variation is significant. and while some regions in Israel do experience 
decline in raint~lli. others have in fact received much larger amounts in recent 
years (Hydrological Ser.ice report. 2011). When I asked my Water Authority 
interviewee about the competing theories regarding annual average 
precipitation in Israel. he answered in certainty: "there is no such a thing as 
scientific controversy about it". Such discrepancies in the interpretation and 
presentation of scientific hydrological data is a well-researched phenomenon, 
related to the constructive nature of environmental problems, to different 
interests and to the way certain issue are set on the agenda and choices are 
selected among different alternatives. 
A third purpose of interviewing, as suggested by Weiss (1994), was to 
provide a more holistic picture of the institutional system, the many actors of 
such a multipart entity and their inner interactions. Lastly, interviews were 
used to scrutinize and refine issues and interesting directions that could later 
support the design of a more focused discourse analysis. 
Interviewing as a method is not faultless. Difficulties related to differences in 
d d . 10 f "." fd language use an wor meanIngs ,accuracy 0 answers, meSSIness 0 ata, 
and the basic expectation that the interviewee will talk about the chosen 
topics at all. These challenges were underlying assumptions that 
accompanied the interviews and taken into account in the process of data 
analysis. 
III While in this particular case difference between scientific and lay languages is quite 
apparent, the chance of misunderstandings based on cultural difference was relatively 
minimal because both the researcher and the participants share the same cultural setting. 
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------------------------. ---------] 
I Date + location _oj I Initials I Position / affili ation ______________________ w ______ 
- -----
t The Water A1Ithority -... .•....... _. _ .. _----_._, .. ____ 0._-•.• _ .. _---
f---- ------------ ---
AG Coordinator, energy in water team in strategic 3.2.2010, 
planning department, The Hydrological Service, Jerusalem 
IWA 
ryo- - -----_.- ---------- ----------------------------- ----Fonner manager, Planning Unit, IWA. Currentl y 25.4.2010, 
external advisor to rw A. Ra 'anana 
_. -----------_._---_._-_._---_._._ .. _ .... _._-_ ... __ .. _. __ .. _ ... __ ._ ...... _--_ ..... _ ..._ ...... _ .. -
-------------_._--_._-
AT Manager, Desalination Department, IW A 24.2.2010, Tel-
Aviv 
-----------_ .. 
MZ Manager, Planning Unit, IW A 21. 7 .20 10, Tel-
Aviv 
--
AP External environmental advisor to the rw A and 12.4.2010, Tel-
head of the Water and E~~!gYJ2!~~~_~!!g .. ~~af!l. __ . __________ . __ Aviv 
--------
- --
.. _--
-- - --- - ----- - ----- ------I- ----------
Water Company -Mekorot 
_._-----
YK Head, Energy Department, Mekorot National Water 13 .1.2010, Tel-
Company Aviv 
-----------------.------
Company - l AHAL ______________________________________ 
------------
SN Environmental economist, T AHAL water 10.5.2010 
engineering company Tel-Aviv 
.-
--------_._-----------------
----
Electricity Corporation 
ZL Deputy director-general, Planning and 17.1.2010, Haifa. 
Environmental Unit, Israel Electricity Corporation 25.1 completed 
by phone 
The Ministry of Energy and Water Re;-;..r};-;;;;=~=~~=~_ ----------
--
SV Chief scientist 4.1.2010, 
Jerusalem 
----------------.--.-----
--
AK Fonner manager, Sewage and wastewater 9.5 .2010, 
department, IW A. Currently head, water and energy Jerusalem 
in frastructures 
-------.----
-
The MinistfY of Environmental Protection 
-
MH former CEO, The Ministry of Environmental 3.1.2010, Kiryat 
Protection Uno 
NK Fonner Economist, The Ministry of Environmental 4.2.2010, 
Protection Jerusalem 
VB Former Deputy director, The Ministry of 9.11.09, 
Environmental Protection Jerusalem 
----- --
RA Head, Sea and Seashores Department, The Ministry 14.12.09, Haifa 
o f Environmental Protection 
------- --
._-----------
-----
National PIQ/1I1in~ Committee, MinistrJ!....Ef/nterior 
MK Member, Planning Committee for marine 14.12.09, Haifa 
environment and water pollution 
--
, ME 
DAG 
JG 
OA 
DNK 
'IH 
MP 
YCF 
NS 
ALT 
AD 
86 
Head of Infrastructures planning unit, National 
Planning and Building Council, The Ministry of 
Interior 
Academia alld research institutes 
Environmental Sociology, Tel-Aviv University 
Desalination Scientist, Ben-Gurion University 
Coordinator, Energy in water forum, 
Samuel Neaman Research Institute 
Political Geography, Haifa University 
. NOIl-Gm'ernmental Organisations 
Deputy director, Open Landscape Institute, NGO 
Marine and Coastal Environment, The Society for 
Protection of Nature in Israel (SPNI), NGO 
The Israeli Energy Forum, NGO 
The Israeli Energy Forum, NGO 
9.4.20 I 0, 
Jerusalem 
19.8.09, Tel-
Aviv 
5.8.09, Sde-
Boker 
4.8.09, by phone 
. 7.9.09, Haifa 
16.8.09, by 
phone 
31.1.2010, Tel-
Aviv 
11.11.09, Tel-
Aviv 
3.5.2010, Tel-
Aviv 
, Founder, Israel's Environmental Defence, NGO and, 27.4.2010, Sde-
member, the Jewish National Fund (JNF/KKL) Boker 
management board. 
Energy husiness 
Founder and CEO, EcoTrade, Israeli carbon 
emission trading company 
30.5.2011, Sde-
: Boker 
Table 4: List of interviewees 
3.B.3. Public appearances 
Another type of data was generated in public appearances and speeches of 
governmental policymakers and regulators taking place in several 
conferences and various forums (academic and public). This type of data can 
be classified somewhere on the line between primary and secondary since it 
often involved both speeches prepared in advance and read from text, as well 
as personal communication with the researcher. 
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-- I Qrgall i_zer~~~j~_~~!kri~~=~_=~~~~=: __ Name Date 
-
Water Wisdom : a New Menu for I Ben-Gurion Uni versity + Arab 9-11.4.2008 
Palestinian and Israeli I Assoc iation fo r Quality 
Cooperation in Water Development and 
Management I Improvement, 
Bethlehem Branch, Palestine, 
. held in Amman, Jordan 
--
---
.,---
The Feasibility of uclear Israeli Institute fo r energy & 30.11.2009 
Energy in Israel 
-- -
~ n v i r.Q n m en !~_!.~!~_~.!.'_~.Y ________________ 
A moment be fore Copenhagen: I The Interdisciplinary Center 2. 12.2009 
The Israe li perspective i ( lDC), Hertze li a 
---
Planning along the sea shore: I University of Haifa, Haifa 18.3 .2010 
The annual Israeli Planning 
Associati on Conference 
~--.----------
Israel's readiness to climate Bloomfield Science Museum 2 1.4.2010 
change - implications on the I & Friends of Earth Middle-
water sector I East, Jerusalem 
----------
The Israeli Association of Uni versity of Ben-Gurion in 21-22.6.2010 
Ecology and Environment the Negev, Beer-Sheva 
Conference 
------------
Jerusalem Conference fo r . The Society for the Protection 7.11.2011 
Environment and Society: of Nature in Israe li , Jerusalem 
crafting sustainable energy 
policy fo r Israe l 
Energy and Business Confe rence EcoEnergy Company, Ramat- 28-29.11.2011 
Gan 
----------
Table 5: List of forums and conferences attended 
3.9. Data analysis 
Discourse analysis is often treated as a "whole package" of theory and 
methodology, guiding a critical research, that is, a research that investigates 
and reveal power-relations by highlighting the role o f language in societa l 
transformations (Hajer, 1995 ; J0rgensen and Phillips, 2002). For example to 
its use as a theory, Discursive Institutionalism, a building block in the 
theoretical framework of chapter 5 in this thesis, has extended neo-
institutional analysis to include ideas, language, and discourses in its account 
of organi sational or institutional change. Whereas di scourse analysis 
functions a lso as a tool or a method in interpretive research, the exact way of 
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conducting such an analysis is very often obscured, generally consists of 
several stages; from transcription, through sorting and reducing, reorganising 
the data in light of the purpose of the research and finally abstracting 
conceptual claims that I ink the data with the theory. 
The coding of written documents was a multi-stages process. Initially, key-
words and key-issues were identified, by using Nvivo program. In Appendix 
4, I have highlighted the key-words that have relatively high number of 
references in the sample of interviews and documents, to show how these 
key-issues emerged quite early in the research as central and how more 
findings and later analysis reinforced their prominence. The interviewing 
process has started only after key-themes emerged and the interviewees were 
selected accordingly. For the purpose of the second stage of analysis of data 
in this thesis, fourteen interviews were tape-recorded after granting 
pennission from interviewees and later transcribed. The rest of the interviews 
were hand-recorded and typed into the computer immediately after. The 
interviews were transcribed in Hebrew and remained in their original 
language during the analysis. Selected quotes have been translated into 
English only at the last stage of writing the chapters. Public appearances were 
also transcribed. All documents, including transcripts were subject to 
thematic coding. 
Thirdly, key-issues (of now all written material) were used to create a 
conceptual map by using Freemind program (example in Appendix 3). At the 
third stage, key-words and issues were gathered into main themes (thematic 
coding) and identified as constitutes of the hegemonic discourse, which may 
be regarded as the rules of practice or "the game". Finally, words or issues 
that seemed to be marginal were then brought back to the analysis as the 
counter-discourses or at least as complementary. The combination_of central 
and marginal (or in fact marginalised) discourses allowed for the creation of 
new claims about the Israeli water regime (chapter 4), the Israeli energy 
regime (chapter 5) and the interlinkages between the two (chapter 6). No less 
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important it is hopl:d that the analysis went beyond the data to inform theory, 
as is elaborated in chapter 7. 
3.10. Reflection of methodology 
The methodology was built based on understanding of my interests and the 
knowledge that was gained in the first and second chapters. The methods 
then chosen were consistent with this methodology, and were devised to test 
the theoretical puzzle developed in the previous chapter, with the aim of 
answering the research questions, by means empirical study of the 
technological configuration dominating the water and energy sectors in 
Israel. The research uses different methods for exploring the material data 
(interviewing, documents and public appearance analysis), but rooted in the 
approach to knowledge and knowledge claims, as socially constructed, 
mediated and interpretative. 
3.10.1. The position of the researcher and more research ethics 
I was born in Israel and grew-up there. While there are advantages in being 
familiar with the local setting under study, first and foremost in terms of 
familiarity with the local language and culturally accepted norms, several 
specific challenges potentially face the researcher studying the context of his 
or her day-to-day life. First, authors have called attention to the meaning of 
social relations whilst conducting research. Differences between researchers 
and researched based on gender, age, position, social-status, power or others 
(Christians, 2000), could not have been eliminated also in my own locale. 
Gender and age differences were particularly apparent whilst interviewing 
decision-makers in the field of energy, which is dominated by veteran men, 
although this was not expected to have a major effect on research results. 
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Additionally, elite interviewing involves both issues of validity and reliability 
(Berry, 2002). Even though 1 did not interview politicians, many of the 
participants in this research are public Figures that speak with the press and 
in front of large audiences. They are used to being publicity quoted and being 
identified with their positions, and consider this an essential part of their 
official duties. Despite the advantage of being able to easily guarantee their 
participation and to schedule a meeting and to usually receive full 
cooperation during the interview, quite often elite's answers to questions 
remain at the level of statement (or 'politics') and can hardly move beyond 
the official standpoint toward the interviewee's personal observation or 
interpretation of the issue at stake. Sometimes it was hard to explain that I am 
interested in more than mere technical details, and wish to engage with them 
in a dialogue to hear what they think, rather than know, about the policy. In 
any case, there were no issues regarding interaction with vulnerable people 
and I often expressed myself in a straightforward manner. 
One way to overcome this difficulty and gam interviewee's personal 
perspective is by keeping the anonymity of informants and avoiding from 
quoting interviewees by their names. Notably, none of my participants 
expressed any concern regarding having their name going forward with their 
quotes. Furthermore, considering the small amount of key-actors in the Israeli 
environmental arena, complete anonymity is impossible and people in the 
field would probably be able to identify the source. In order to mitigate 
possible implications, participants were first, notified verbally, in the 
beginning of the interview that what they say can be used in a direct way in 
the research (i.e. quoted) unless they specifically ask to say something "not 
for citation". Only one interviewee did not want to be recorded but he, also, 
permitted me to freely report my understanding of what he has said. Second, 
I decided that direct quotes will not include a specification of the 
interviewee's initials and usually will not include also his or her affiliation in 
the organization, such as head of department or general manager, in order to 
keep a distance between their sayings and a definite identification of who 
they are. These issues were pre-recognized and clarified during an ethical 
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revIew process undertaken m the university, and approved by a research 
ethics committee. 
Not less substantially, in attempting to reify discourses, I was making claims 
and identifying discourses that have no substantive form beyond my own 
research. I was therefore engaged in the joint production of these discourses. 
Being a member of the society under investigation meant even a closer 
engagement within this shared discursive sphere. However, because my 
interest from the beginning was establishing the conditions of processes 
rather than to evaluate any specific policy output, when actors from different 
sectors argued the same point - I could get a unique overview of the 
construction of discourse, albeit without being really external to it. 
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4. Water: the role of technology in paradigms, politics 
and policy transitions 
4.1.lntroduction 
"First modern societies have a particular 
concept of nature founded on its 
exploitation. Nature is simultaneously 
central to society and marginalized. It 
appears as the 'outside' of society. Nature 
is conceived of as a neutral resource, 
which can and must be made available 
without limitation. This is the 
prerequisite of an industrial dynamic of 
affluence which regards its normal state 
as one of endless growth, and which 
succeeds in displacing its negative effects 
so that they seem to originate elsewhere" 
(Beck et aI., 2003:4). 
As part of the general aim of this thesis to reconceptualise technology-policy 
dynamics in sociotechnical transition, the goal of this chapter is to contribute 
to the on-going discussions on policy dynamics. As mentioned in the 
literature review, the role of technology has not been adequately addressed in 
the literature on policy change. Sabatier (1988: 136) did claim early on that 
the role of technology is similar to that of a crisis as an external pressure on 
policies and institutions, while Lovell (2007) emphasised the importance of 
construction material and low-energy technologies in the housing sector's 
policy process in the UK. But apart from these exceptions, much of the 
policy dynamics literature conceives of policy as a lever that is shaped and 
manipulated in order to influence technological trajectories and escape 
unsustainable lock-ins (Rip and Kemp, 1998; Elzen et al., 2004; Geels, 2005; 
Hekkert et aI., 2007; Foxon et al., 2010), downsizing the important reverse 
causal relationship in which technology has the potential for transforming 
policy regimes. 
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In what follows it is demonstrated how a technological breakthrough can 
reshape policy paradigms and subsequent policy dynamics through the case-
study of desalination technology and its influence on Israel's water policy. 
The water regime in Israel was static for decades, anchored to a hydro-
ideological support of water-intensive agricultural production and 
characterised by a kind of environmental brinkmanship, and a muddling 
through periods of crises and political manoeuvring. As will be emphasised 
in this chapter, while several factors had contributed pressure toward a socio-
technical transition of the Israeli water regime for some time, these were not 
sufficient to engender a significant change in existing policies and institutions 
before technical improvements in desalination process made desalination an 
economically feasible alternative. 
Though techniques for transforming seawater into drinking water had been 
known and practised in water-scarce regions such as Israel for decades and 
the technology was promoted vigorously as a large scale solution for Israel 
by some actors, it was deemed unfeasible by the Ministries of Finance and 
Agriculture. A parliamentary decision to increase desalination capacity made 
little progress due to political impasse (Feitelson, 2005). Recent scientific and 
technological breakthroughs have significantly reduced the cost of water 
desalination per cubic meter. Thus, whilst multiple factors laid the basis for a 
shift (as will be discussed below), technological advancement in the end 
made desalination a panacea for water scarcity. As has been introduced in 
chapter I, desalination technology and large scale water infrastructures will 
dominate Israel's water management strategy in the next couples of decades, 
planned to supply all domestic usages (approximately 750 million cubic 
meters) by the year 2020 (Tenne, 2010). 
On a theoretical level, this chapter is interested in the relationship between 
technology and policy change and specifically in the causal power of the 
former over the latter. It is asking how the technology was able to cause 
policy dynamics. Whilst it has been suggested that supply-side technological 
solutions such as desalination do not address entrenched underlying political 
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and social paradigms and arrangements (for example Meerganz Von 
Medeazza, 2005, 200H; De Chatel, 2007), it has not been explained how and 
why the technology allows underlying issues regarding desalination to be 
bypassed. In this chapter, I shed light on how desalination, both as an actant 
and as a discourse, has displaced growing costs and tensions into new and 
less visible realms and avoided direct confrontation with existing power 
arrangements. I argue that this kind of displacement is a structural 
mechanism in which a new technology can shift a policy regime in socio-
technical transitions more generally and that it is important to make 
displacements more visible in order to ensure that the regime will change in a 
positive direction. The findings call for greater integration and reflexivity in 
the policy regime arena, thus providing another evidence for an already 
established assertion in policy integration studies (see chapter 7). 
This chapter is consists of four main sections. I will first recall a few of the 
theoretical prepositions for understanding technology as an explanatory 
variable for paradigm and policy regime changes. I will then describe the 
setting in which the study took place: the water sector in Israel, institutional 
context, infrastructures development, current water allocations, wastewater 
reclamation and desalination production. A few acute issues such as the 
declining of the Dead Sea and the Palestinians' water situation are also noted. 
Section 4.5 focuses on the emergence of desalination policy. In section 4.6 I 
will discuss the mechanism of displacement by which desalination 
technology was capable of inducing radical change. Section 4.7 concludes 
that an integrative and reflexive structure for public policy and management 
(could be in the form of integrated transition management - see chapter 7) 
could better handle the consequences of "problem displacement" by 
technology. 
4.2. Policy regime change and the role of technology 
Even with its objection to technological determinism, much of the SST 
literature reviewed in section 2.3 assigned transformative powers to 
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technology. As opposed to these studies, many scholars are reluctant to 
consider technologies as driving social change. For example, Nye (2006) 
resists the view that something embedded in technology could make its 
dominance over society inevitable. Similarly, Gcels (2005b: I) argues that 
" ... technologies do not fulfil societal functions on their own. Artefacts by 
themselves have no power". 
In order to resolve this, I suggest that contrary to Nye's (2006:28) lament, 
accepting the possibility of technological causation does not rule out the 
"importance of particular individuals, accidents, chance, and local 
circumstances" and does not necessitate "technological detenninism". Also, 
it does not preclude the role of institutions, agency, values, perceptions or 
social construction. Marx and Smith (1994:xiii) suggest that" ... the history of 
technology is a history of human action"; technology can offer something 
that enables and promotes change at a certain point of time and in specific 
circumstances and environments. In this light, concerns about technological 
inevitability are misplaced. This is especially true if we accept an 
intennediate view of a "dialectical relationship between the social shaping of 
technology and the technical shaping of society" (Wyatt, 2008: 176) or the 
view of "technological momentum" which highlights technology's dual role 
as both cause and effect (Hughes, 1994). 
While socio-technical transition necessarily entails policy changes as part of 
a wider institutional evolution, these have seldom been the focus of research. 
Instead, the research on socio-technical transitions primarily aims at 
reconstructing a narrative of regime change in a way that allows the 
emergence of new transitional paths. Policy change is seen as a tool, rather 
than as an outcome. Policy and decision-makers are largely absent from the 
conceptual language, and transition processes are analysed separately from 
the policies, management or steering approaches that are to influence them 
(De Haan and Rotmans, 20 II ). 
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The literature may contribute an important understanding of the power of 
technological development to forn1 a new sociotechnical regime around that 
technology (Foxon et aI., 2010; Nye et aI., 2010). Yet, public policy 
researchers and theorists of policy change have not taken Sabatier's (1988) 
early claim - that new technology's effect is similar to the role of external 
crises or a "policy window" - much further. The assertion that technological 
solutions to what are identified by policy-makers as problems can shift policy 
regimes - is supported by only a few case-studies (e.g. Lovell, 2007) II. 
I therefore argue that technological breakthrough can playa pivotal role in 
policy dynamics and socio-technical transitions although it is usually treated 
as a dependent variable in the policy dynamics literature, with its 
development and diffusion aligned or co-evolving with policies and 
regulations I ~. In what follows, I will demonstrate this claim by investigating 
the Israeli water policy regime and take one step further to ask how the 
technology was able to play such a role. I will first provide a short reminder 
of the empirical materials used. I then set the background to the water policy 
regime and its sociotechnical landscape, including the emergence of 
desalination policy. Finally, I will focus on the displacement mechanism by 
which this new technology was able to shift a locked-in policy regime. 
4.3. Empirical materials 
The following analysis of the Israeli water regime and particularly of policy 
dynamics revolving around desalination, is based on an extensive documents 
analysis and interviews with key actors. Dozens of minutes generated by a 
II Exceptions to this are studies that focus on the circular relation between resources, prices 
and the adoption of technological devices (for a review see Jaffe et aI., 2003). 
12 This is especially true of the research on green technologies and environmental policies 
(see e.g. Foxon, 2010; Kemp, 2000). 
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Parliamentary Investigation Committee provided a rich source of written 
material that was subjected to close reading, thematic coding and selected 
quoting. It included internal dialogues of a wide range of stakeholders from 
the public and private sectors. The work of the committee aimed at tracking 
down the chain of events that led to what was acknowledged by the 
government to be a severe water crisis and at the process of work many 
related issues had surfaced: the role of agriculture, the divided responsibility 
of managers and legislators, the role of science versus politics in making 
decision and so forth. Among these issues, participants in the process 
highlighted the water-energy interface with respect to desalination. On the 
basis of this reading I have chosen key-actors in the water regime that are 
actively involved in making those decisions (heads of departments in the 
Water Authority and Mekorot national company, representatives of 
ministries, planners in the Planning Authority, scientists, and water 
companies) I was interested in. Together with additional official documents 
and public appearances of stakeholders, these materials constitute the source 
on the base of which the first research questions can be answered. But first 
thing first. 
4.4. Water infrastructures in Israel: a brief history and current 
setting 
A wide range of studies has examined Israel's water policy and management. 
The studies emphasised the role of the Zionist-agrarian ideological 
movement in determining the development of water infrastructure and 
centralised institutions (Alatout, 2008; Feitelson, 2005; Feitelson et aI., 
2007); the geo-political situation of both conflict and cooperation between 
Israel and neighboring nations regarding water resources (Tal and Abed 
Rabbo, 2010; Wolf, 1995); and the spatial and physical integration of the 
water system, based on a "national water carrier" (see picture 1) that transfers 
water 130km from the Sea of Galilee in the north to the south (Fischhendler, 
2008). Improper practices, such as over-pumping, neglect and pollution, are 
highlighted simultaneously with innovation and best practices that Israel has 
demonstrated for instance in combating desertitication (Portnov and Safriel, 
2004). In this section I describe the water policy regime from historical 
perspective and sct its institutional context. 
4.4.1. Geographical conditions and the pre-state period 
Israel is a land of water scarcity, with 60% desert and eight dry months a 
year. Annual precipitation averages from more than 700mm in the north to 
less than 35mm in its Southern strip (Kislev, 200 I). In ancient times, water 
has been collected in cisterns and wells, and transported from springs, 
streams and groundwater to settlements by aqueducts, e.g. to Jerusalem and 
to Caesarea. Later, the Arab inhabitants of the land watered their fields and 
orchards by open canals, taking advantage of gravitation (Sitton, 2002). 
Water infrastructure started to change dramatically in the first half of the 20th 
century, developed in parallel by the British Mandate and the new Zionist 
settlers, who came predominantly from Europe and included engineers who 
had a vision of cultivating the land. In his futurist book Altneuland, Theodor 
Herzl, "the visionary of the State of the Jews", described fields of wheat and 
barley, com, poppy seeds and tobacco, which are high water consuming 
crops. The first person to envision a national water plan in 1920 was Pinchas 
Rotenberg, one of the leaders of the Yishuv, the Jewish Zionist settlement in 
the land that preceded the State of Israel. Nevertheless, the expert delegation 
of the US Federal Bureau of Reclamation that visited Israel in the mid 
1920's, invited by Zionist leader Haim Weitzman, still concentrated only on 
the coastal aquifer (ignoring the Sea of Galilee and the mountain aquifer). It 
was not before the late 1930's that Dr. Walter Laudermilk outlined the plan 
that is considered today the initial vision for developing the national water 
system (Schwarz, 1990). By then the senior water managers at the time 
agreed that the strategy should be to transfer water from where it is plentiful 
to where it is not, to supply water during the dry season, to convey water 
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under pressure in pipes 111 order to overcome topographical barriers and 
reduce leakage, and finally to take an integrative approach and supply water 
throughout the country, particularly to the arid Negev desert (Sitton, 2002). 
In 1937, in rare cooperation, all the central development agencies of the 
Yishuv established one company, in order to found, operate and manage 
hydrological projects for irrigation and domestic consumption - Mekorot 
("Resources") (Tal, 2002), which was registered in the British Mandate 
government. Its first head was Levi Eshkol (later the third Prime Minister of 
Israel), and his professional partner was Eng. Simha Blass. Eshkol and Blass 
conducted the first water infrastructure initiative two years earlier, water 
drilling for agriculture in the Yizrael Valley in the North of the country. 
During its first decade, Mekorot executed drilling and pumping facilities, 
placed water pipes and supplied water to settlements in the North and Centre 
oflsrael as well as the North-Western Negev. However, one of its main aims 
was to provide water to the Negev desert at large (Mekorot, 2010). Blass was 
in charge of planning this infrastructure. He submitted the first plan in 1939, 
and it included three stages: 1. transport water from nearby drills, 2. transport 
water from the Yarkon river in Central Israel, and 3. transport water from the 
North (Blass, 1973). After a pilot transport effort in 1947, the first major 
stage, the Yarkon-Negev pipeline became operational during the 1950s. 
Blass's plans were the basis for a national water carrier that was executed 
after the establishment of Israel in 1948, as further described below. All plans 
were inspired by the Zionist mission to create a large Jewish settlement based 
on agricultural activity and the soon to be first Prime Minister David Ben-
Gurion's vision of "making the desert bloom". Ben-Gurion, like other 
European Zionists, thought that the desert will be a blessing only if it will no 
longer be a desert. He wrote that "the state of Israel cannot stand a desert 
within it" (Ben-Gurion, personal diaries, 1955). However, the new 
infrastructure created a non-realistic thirst for water, and blinded decision-
makers regarding the long-term implications of the pressure on such a 
delicate resource (Tal, 2002). 
100 
4.4.2. Early years after national independence: Institutions, 
regulations and major projects 
Most of the water-related infrastructures and institutions in Israel are a result 
of the Water Law. Enacted in 1959, this comprehensive law reflects to a great 
extent its creators' ideology and perception of water. Its first concern was 
with the nationalization of all sources of water. Its opening section therefore 
expropriated all private water resources and all types of water (including 
rainfall and wastewater), and fixed the control over collection, storage and 
distribution of water under the authority of the Ministry of Agriculture (later 
the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources) and three operational bodies: 
the Water Commission, the national water utility Mekorot and Tahal, the 
national water planning company (which was later privatized in the 1990's). 
The Water Law is the most significant mechanism that supported a 
completion of the shift from communal (especially of Arab communities, 
which used to collect and divert rain water for drinking and irrigation 
purposes) or regional scales of management, toward an integrative, 
centralised and statist water management (Feitelson and Fischhendler, 2009). 
The Water Commission (later 'Authority') determined the abstractions from 
all water resources, allocates the water to the different users (now all 
metered) and following a recent structural reform in the sector, the renewed 
Water Authority is also responsible for setting water tariffs (until recently 
fiscal decisions were made by parliamentary committees). A Public 
Committee of Water Management that is mainly composed of members of 
the agrarian sector, and a "water court" that deals with any claims of a person 
or organization that sees itself as damaged by the commissioner's decisions, 
were also established as part of the centralised water institutions. 
The hydrological map of the country consists of a few main natural sources 
of fresh water. The Sea of Galilee, which receives most of its water from the 
Upper Jordan River, used to provide more than a quarter of the country's 
total demand. However, the average of 400 MCM annually pumped by 
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Mekorot from the lake dropped to merely 133 in 2009, an indication of the 
severe water deficit and the water leve ls decreasing below the "red line" , 
which was set as an indicator of the minimum water level that the lake can 
reach wi thout severe consequences to the quality of the water. Already in 
1990 defi ciency of the water resources reached 1.6 bill ion MCM (Tal, 2002). 
The second major water resource is the Western Mountain aquife r in the east 
and the Coastal aquifer in the west, providing approximately 350 MCM 
annuall y. 
Picture 1 The National Carrier (Northern open section) 
The sources of water that flows to the Sea of Galilee are partly situated in 
Syria and Lebanon, which for decades meant that any activity related to water 
diversion in either side of the border was a source o f contention and agitated 
conflict. These geographical and geopolitical conditions have served an 
additional reason for an integrative system of water management and use that 
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could foster large scale hydrological projects (Fischhendler and Heikkila, 
20 10). Prices as welL were set at a single, unifonn level across the country 
(Tal, 200g). Physical integration was achieved by the National Water Carrier 
that connects the three major sources, with a huge cost for the young state 
that reached 175 million dollars. Pushed by enonnous pumps, massive pipes 
bring water from the Sea of Galilee, at 213 meters below sea level, to 44 
meters above sea levels. The water is then carried along 130 Kilometers. Its 
northern section is an open canal while its southern sections conveys in large 
pipes underground, transporting about 400 MCM of water a year. Today, 
with the introduction of desalinated water to the integrative water system (see 
water map Figure 3 in chapter I), the National Carrier has to be reconstructed 
in a way that will allow water to also be moved from desalination plants in 
the west coast to other parts of the country in the east, south and north. 
Additionally, population growth requires a new pipe line from the west to 
Jerusalem, a massive infrastructure project that is currently carried out by 
Mekorot. 
The original water salinity in the Sea of Galilee was, however, too high for 
agriculture. Upon establishing the supply, a diversion of saline sources via a 
special canal to the lower Jordan River decreased the salinity of the lake by 
almost 50%. Still, regulations of drinking water quality had to be set in the 
early days by the Ministry of Health. These measures were, by any means, 
neither sufficient nor significantly capable of protecting the quality of the 
sources themselves. For example, during the 1950s and 1960s urban sewage 
systems as well as industrial waste were directed into near-by streams with 
little or no treatment. However, the drafters of the Water Law did not 
mention the word 'pollution' in any of its 150 sections (Tal, 2002). Parallel to 
the development of environmental legislation in the US during the 1970s, a 
new section was later added to the Israeli Water Law with the objective of 
regulating and preventing water resources pollution, especially of 
groundwater, wells and streams. Yet, although the amendments to the law 
determined that the Water Authority can also initiate enforcement actions and 
force polluters of water to repair damage, enforcement capacity - and 
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consequently the ability to deter heavy polluters - remains relatively weak 
(Tal, 2007a). 
4.4.3. Water allocations 
During the first decades of the State of Israel , water was allocated 
generously. Rapid population growth and rising standards of living, the 
Zionist visions of agriculture, the desire to attain food-independence, and the 
aggressive development of industry, were seen much more urgent than 
addressing the long-term effects of over-pumping. Moreover, the real Figures 
of water availability were not agreed upon in the early stages. In 1948 
hydrologists estimated that the 248 MCM utilized that year was only a 
fraction of the potential refill of the water resources, but in reality it was 
about a quarter of it (Schwarz, 1990; Tal, 2002). Nevertheless, by 2009 water 
consumption increased to 1910 MCM, for all usages (including allocations to 
Jordan and the Palestinians) , and from all sources, including desalinated and 
reclaimed water (Water Authority, 2010). Figure 5 shows that while overall 
water supply in Israel has been fairly steady over the last two decades, fresh 
water supply to agriculture decreases, reclaimed water usage in agriculture 
increases , and domestic and industrial supply remains relatively constant. 
The overall water for agriculture per capita was reduced by about half from 
the 1960's to today (but productivity per capita increased), with water 
productivity three times better today (Kislev, 2001). 
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Figure 5: Water consumption (MCM) in Israel by sector and type of water. 
Source: Water Authority, 2010 
104 
In the past, the association of the Water Commissioner with the agricultural 
lobby otten resulted in decisions which mirrored the Commissioners' 
personal values, favoring the farming sector in national water allocation 
(Feitelson et a\., 2007). The generous allocations to agriculture that 
characterized Israel's water management strategy, enabled farmers to grow 
high water consuming crops such as cotton. The policy came at the expense 
of over-pumping of ground and surface water, with severe hydrological 
implications. This general approach was stopped by a new water 
commissioner, appointed from Israel's academic sector in 1991, soon after he 
took over (Tal, 2002). As an emergent measure allocation to agriculture was 
cut by 70% inter alia through use of economic tools, such as raising water 
prices and reducing subsidies. After paying less than a third of the cost of 
water for many years, by the mid 2000's farmers paid 88% of the actual cost 
with little effect on their profits. Adaptive measures, such as changing crops 
to more water-efficient ones such as peas and sunflowers, helped make this 
transition possible (Tal, 2007a). 
In recent years, severe water shortages led to water saving campaigns and the 
introduction of the "drought tax", a politically contested measure designed to 
reduce water demand. Nevertheless, these actions reduced water usage by 
II % in the domestic sector and 9% in the agriculture sector during 2009 
relative to the previous year (Water Authority, 20 I 0), and 13% reduction in 
total consumption of local authorities, including domestic, public gardening, 
education facilities, hotels and retail (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009). 
Figure 6 shows the current water consumption in Israel by sectors, indicating 
that out of the total 1910 MCM (1267 MCM freshwater and 643 MCM 
reclaimed and saline), the agriculture sector is still the largest consumer with 
53.2%, the domestic sector consumes 35.8%, and the rest is divided between 
industry (5.8%) and allocations to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Jordan 
(5.1%) (Water Authority, 2010). When one considers freshwater 
consumption alone, however, (Figure 7), the equation changes: of a total 
1267 MCM, the domestic sector is the largest consumer with 54%, the 
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agriculture sector receives only 32%, Jordan and PA 8% and the industry 6%. 
In other words, the domestic sector has overtaken the agriculture sector in 
consumption of freshwater, a recent and increasing trend. The domestic 
consumption of freshwater range is between 100 and 230 litter per person per 
day (Mekorot web site, 20 II ). The average water consumption per capita in 
April 2009, however, has been reduced by 18% compared to the same month 
a year earlier, following a water saving campaign 13. 
Jordan & PA 
Figure 6: All water consumption in Israel in 2009 
Figure 7: Freshwater consumption in Israel in 2009 
13 Bar-Eli, A. (2009, 7 September). Mekorot: following Bar Refaeli's Campaign, water 
consumption reduced by 18%. The Marker. http://WW\v. themarker.coll1/misc/ I .532993 
(Hebrew). Last Accessed: 14 April, 2012. 
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4.4.4. Waste-water reclamation 
Many efforts were made in Israel to advance the transfonnation of sewage 
from a hazard and a primary source of pollution, to an additional reliable 
source of usable water, thus reducing pressure on natural water resources. In 
20 II, 95% of the population is connected to a sewage system and 75% of 
domestic effluent is reused for irrigation, industrial or recreational purposes. 
The Dan Region Reclamation Project (Shq/dan) which operates since 1987 is 
the largest wastewater reclamation facility in the country. It treats 130 MCM 
of wastewater annually from the heavily populated Tel-Aviv Metropolitan 
area. Most of the effluent is treated to a secondary level, through a biological 
process. In the Sh(?/dan there is also use of a Soil Aquifer Treatment 
technique (originally implemented in Arizona). Here, a sandy aquifer serves 
as both an additional treatment and a seasonal/multi-annual storage, and the 
high quality effluents delivered 100km south to agricultural purposes in the 
Negev desert. As part of the integrative water infrastructures system, 
reclaimed wastewater is also discharged upstream in several rivers in order to 
help restore dried and polluted streams. The water is later recaptured 
downstream for irrigation of parks or agriculture crops (Friedler, 2001). 
However, extensive use of recycled wastewater poses health, economic and 
environmental risks, resulting from residual chemical or biological 
contaminants such as high concentrations of nutrients, salts that are toxic to 
plants including sodium, chloride and boron. While some nutrients were 
found to be beneficial to crops, others cause soil degradation and 
groundwater pollution (Ben-Gal et al., 2006). In 20 I 0, after a decade of 
negotiations, the Interior and Environmental Protection Committee of the 
Israeli parliament finally approved new standards set by the "Inbar 
Committee". These recommended values for reused wastewater quality - for 
thirty-seven parameters - are designed to minimize potential damage to water 
sources and to cultivated soil, while protecting public health. 
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A major part of an institutional reform in the water sector is the effort to 
manage the resource in a closed fiscal system in order to improve efficiency 
and to promise that any economic surplus from the water sector is invested 
back in the system. Until recently, water management was based on a divided 
jurisdiction between government and local municipalities: the latter 
responsible for delivering water within its jurisdiction, collecting water bills 
and providing sewage services. The result was often severe neglect of urban 
sewage infrastructures and untreated leakages in water pipes. Local councils 
were tempted not to pay Mekorot for the water and instead to use the money 
for other purposes. Therefore, the Water Authority is leading a transition 
toward the establishment of sewage corporations within local and regional 
councils, an intermediate step toward the possible privatization of sewage 
services (Tal, 2007a). 
4.4.5. The Dead Sea and the Red-Dead Canal 
The name "Dead Sea" originates from the absence of flora and fauna life in 
this lake, the result of its extreme salinity (approximately 30% - ten times 
more than the Mediterranean Sea). The Dead Sea is a terminal lake situated 
in the lowest place on earth, currently 424 meters below sea level. This 
constitutes a 34 meter decrease since the beginning of the 20th century. 
During the last two decades, the sea has been shrinking rapidly; from a 
surface area of 940km2 to 637km2 due to a reduction from 1,500 MCM refill 
annually to a current 400 MCM (Abu Qdais, 2008). The reasons for the 
decline are the diversion of water from the Sea of Galilee to the Israeli 
National Carrier and also to Jordan and Syria, preventing the natural flow 
through the Yarmouk stream and the Southern Jordan river to the Dead Sea. 
In addition, the pumping to the chemical industries in Israel and Jordan, 
natural evaporation and the general drop in precipitation (often attributed to 
climate change) lead to the steady drop in water level of one meter a year, 
with attendant costs estimated in 90 million dollar annually in Israel alone 
(Gavrieli et aI., 2005; Tikva, 2006). 
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The shrinkage of the Dead Sea has severe consequences: with the dramatic 
drop in underground water levcls, sinkholes are created unexpectedly in the 
vicinity, including under roads, settlements and agricultural land. The drop in 
the sea level and at the same time the artificial increase of the level of the 
industrial pools, have severe economic (mainly on tourism), environmental 
and safety impacts on all riparians. The Dead Sea constitutes the border 
between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. Israel and Jordan 
developed significant tourist industries along the Dead Sea which are 
threatened by the disappearing sea. This situation led to international and 
regional efforts to find a solution that will stop the decrease in the sea level 
and mitigate some of the massive anthropogenic interruptions. 
Perhaps the most popular and most examined solution to the shrinkage of the 
Dead Sea is the Red-Dead Canal, or the Peace Conduit. According to this 
proposal, 2,000 MCM/yr. water will be transported from the Gulf of Aqaba 
to the Dead Sea. Using gravity, 1,200 MCM will be dropped to the Dead Sea 
in order to create electricity that will enable desalinating the remaining 800 
MCM (Tikva, 2006). This will enable supplying the severely water stressed 
Jordan and increasing the Dead Sea water levels, supposedly benefitting all 
parties and the environment. The cost of the project is estimated at two 
billion dollars. The current feasibility study initiated by the World Bank 
alone have already reached a cost of fifteen million dollar l4. Experts warn 
about significant downsides, including leakage of sea water to the 
underground water along the way, vulnerability to earthquakes, change of 
landscape, mixing Red Sea water with the brine of desalinated water, 
(including the chemical used in the process) with Dead Sea Water. It is 
postulated that this might lead to creation of gypsum, making mineral mining 
more difficult and changing the color of the water to white, possibly leading 
also to growth of algae. Finally there is a concern about the consequences to 
14Tal, D. (2006b) $15m Red-Dead canal feasibility study mooted. Globes. Available on-line: 
http://www.globes.co.illserveen/globes/docview.asp?did= 1 000 1 02704. 
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the Red Sea from pumping such quantities, including hann to the coral reef 
(Asmar, 2003; Gavricli ef al.. 2005). Several experts suggest that while the 
deteriorating state of the Dead Sea should be addressed, the urgency still does 
not call for magic bullet mega-solutions such as the conduit, which may have 
irreversible effects. 
4.4.6. The Palestinian water situation 
I present here a brief account of the Palestinian water situation, as it can 
hardly be disconnected from water infrastructure in Israel, while more 
thorough accounts of the Palestinian water situation can be found in the 
literature. Water is a major issue at stake in the conflict between the 
Palestinians and Israelis, in this water scarce region. Notwithstanding 
improvements in the water infrastructure and allocations, Palestinians suffer 
severe scarcity of water, especially in Gaza, and frequently their ability to 
manage their water sources is constrained by Israeli authorities. The largest 
water source in The Palestinian Authority is the Eastern Mountain Aquifer, 
while the Western Aquifer is a main water source for Israel within the green 
line, where downstream flow from the aquifer is utilized, and for limited 
Palestinian communities. Concurrently, the Jewish settlements in the West 
Bank get their water supply from the Israeli National System (Aliewi, 20 I 0). 
Israel and the Palestinians share additional water resources and hazards. 
These include the Mediterranean Sea, a source for desalination, mainly in 
Israel but with a potential to rescue Gaza from its severe water scarcity; the 
Dead Sea, which is a source for tourism, and may be a source of desalinized 
water, should the Red-Dead canal materialize; and finally, sewage, which 
needs to change from a hazard to a water resource, but still flows from the 
West Bank to Israel, polluting its streams and causing a major environmental 
health hazard. At present, only 6-7% of Palestinian sewage is fully treated 
(Tal and Abed Rabbo, 2010). This severe lack of sewage systems and 
constant leakage in water pipes, characterize both Palestinian towns and 
Israeli settlements, and are a major hazard to public health, to groundwater 
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and to ecosystems. Another major hazard to the groundwater is the 
unauthori sed drill ing of we ll s by Pales tini ans that lower the wa ter table and 
can pollute the aquifer. Major water projects such as desa lination in Gaza or 
water reclamati on in the West Bank have made littl e progress due to a vari ety 
of fac tors, including Pa les tini an internal considerations, Israeli security and 
bureaucracy agencies or the suspending of funding from international 
fu nders, recently due to the ri se of Hamas in Gaza (Reuters news agency, 
201 0). 
The Oslo Agreements between Israel and the PA included the establishment 
of several j oint commissions. The one commission that continued to function 
and meet for over a decade, including during the violent days of the second 
Intifada, is the Joint Water Commiss ion. While the two sides have di fferent 
views regarding the fun ctioning of the committee and the effi cacy of 
meetings, it is agreed that the commission has contributed to some 
improvements in the Palestinian water infrastructure, but at the same time 
may be responsible fo r lack of progress in other essentia l water proj ects. Yet, 
the Committee proved that both sides can cooperate and solve problems 
jointly, which is a promising outcome (Jayousi, 20 I 0; Kerret, 2010). 
Regarding Palestini an allocations, the estimated water use is as follows 
(Figure 8): municipal and industrial: 11 2 MCM/yr. (59 in the West Bank, 53 
in Gaza) and irrigation: 174 MCM/yr. (89 in the West Bank, 85 in Gaza) . 
Therefore the total water usage in The Palestinian Authority annually is 286 
MCM/yr. 
• West Bank : municipal 
and industrial 
Gala : municipal and 
industrial 
• West Bank : Irrigation 
• Gala: Irrigation 
Figure 8: Estimated water use in the West Bank and Gaza 
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The estimated needs of the Palestinian population. however, are much 
greater, estimated in 20 10 at 723 MeM, which is 437 MCM beyond the 
current supplies. Similarly. while according to both Israel's Water Authority 
and the Palestinian Water Authority the potential freshwater for domestic use 
in the West Bank is approximately 110 llcld (litter per capita per day), due to 
severe leakages and unauthorized water abstractions, the actual allocation is 
estimated in no more than 73.7 IIc/d. Since this Figure does not include those 
who arc not connected to the water infrastructure at all, it is argued that a 
realistic Figure is 50 IIc/d (Aliewi. 20 10; Water Authority, 2008). The water 
situation in Gaza is much more severe and allocations are estimated at 13 
IIcld (Aliewi, 2010). 
4.4.7. Desalination: water for now and the future 
In some regions around the world communities rely on desalinated water for 
their supply. The largest installed capacity is of Saudi Arabia, which is then 
followed by Spain and the USA. Rest of the largest capacities are within the 
Middle East (see Figure 9). Desalination is a process of removing salt and 
other substances from water. Over the past decade desalination plants and 
their total capacity worldwide have almost doubled. There is a range of 
desalination techniques. The most common techniques are the thermal and 
the membrane processes. The thermal process is based on distillation and 
heat transfer. Main thermal technologies are the multi-stage flash (MSF) and 
multi-effect distillation (MED). The membrane process involves water 
filtration through a membrane. Today the most efficient membrane 
technology is based on reverse osmosis (RO), in which pressure is used to 
force seawater to move through a membrane to obtain fresh water and 
separate the salt. RO plants are considered to have low capital cost but high 
maintenance and running cost due to the high cost of the membrane 
replacement and the energy requirements to operate the plant. The process 
also requires intensive post-treatment of the water, including re-
mineralization, Boron and chloride removal and disinfection. 
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Figure 9: Global desalination capacities in cubic meter per day. From: 
Lattemann et aI., 2010 
In Israeli , experiments with desalination technology have started in already in 
the 60s, based on a feas ible breakthrough made by Eng. Alexsander Zarchin, 
a new immigrant to Israel in 1947. Zarchin was a founder of the 
governmental owned company IDE Technologies, which later would be fully 
privatized and become a multinational group of desalination technologies . 
First seawater desalination plants (in Multi-Stage Flush technique) were 
constructed by Mekorot in dry and relatively remote areas, such as the city of 
Eilat (in the country's southern tip), desalinating water in the Gulf of Aquba. 
This and other settlements were too far to be connected to the national water 
system. Few years later it was revealed that a cheaper production is possible 
through a mix use of brackish water and seawater and by using the RO 
technology (Gvirtzman 2002). An interesting attempt to construct a seawater 
desalination plant that is powered by nuclear energy was made in the year 
1964. Unpredicted support for the project was given by President L. 10hnson 
of the Uni ted States, and a joint Israeli-American team received a green light 
to examine the economic and technological feas ibility of such a fac ility. This 
5.4 " 
Austra lia 
Pacific 
461,266 
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mega-project to generate 600 MW and 100 MCM/yr. of desalinated water, 
was considered megalomania even in American terms 15. Finally, financial 
commitments, as well as nuclear knowledge and technology to support the 
facility were not given by US government. Even today, in Israel and 
elsewhere, nuclear desalination with its economic benefits may not be 
sufticient enough to overcome technological risks and the socio-political 
resistance against nuclear power and disposal of its wastes (Wang, 2009). 
As for 2012, the volume of approximately 300 MCM/yr. produced in Israel is 
equivalent to 40% of its domestic water requirements. All five seawater 
desalination plans (see table 3 below) apply the RO technology. During 
1999-2008 the Israeli government has made several decisions regarding 
desalination. The first governmental decision (no. 4895) was made in 1999. It 
stated that the water sector should promote seawater desalination. This 
decision was made in contrast to the official standpoint of the budgetary 
department in the Ministry of Finance (for the reasons behind its objection, 
see this chapter, section 4.5). Following this decision, some organisational 
changes took place, and a special supervisory committee in the Water 
Authority had been appointed, to oversee the bidding process of desalination 
plants. Concurrently, the Water Authority initiated a strategic plan for the 
years 2002-20 10, in which it recommended to produce 400 MCM/yr. of 
desalinated water. In 2002, the government adopted this target in a 
governmental decision (no. 1682). However, since the introduction of the 
desalination program in 1999, there have been several changes in 
governmental decisions regarding the targets of annual quantities to be 
produced, from various reasons: the initial target capacity of 50 MCM/yr. 
was raised in 2002, to 400 MCM/yr., but reduced in 2003 to 230 MCM/yr. in 
response to an unprecedented large amount of rainfall in 2002. In 2007, after 
I" The source for this story can be found in Natan Arad's memoir. He described it in his blog: 
http://www.nathanarad.colll (in Hebrew). Arad was a leading Mekorot engineer in this 
project, as well as involved in many others, including the Red-Dead Canal, Oil-Shells 
exploitation and more. 
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several dry years, the target was re-sct to 500 MCM/yr. to be reached by the 
year 2013. The year altcr flll1hcr increase was set to 750 MCM/yr. to be 
reached by the year 2020. 
In July 2000, therefore, the first bid was published and the contract with the 
winning company was sighed 14 months afterwards. The facility, with 100 
MCM/yr. capacity started producing desalinated water in August 2005. 
Parallel to unsuccessful attempts to promote small-scale facilities, 
preparations were made for another bid of a large-scale plant. It took, 
however. almost two years to agree on a suitable location and the facility was 
ready to go only in 2009. With the growing recognition of the water deficit 
levels, the actions to promote desalination intensified, and two more bids for 
large scale facilities (above 100 MCM/yr.) were opened. Additionally, it was 
agreed that small scale plants will expend their operation capacity. The latter 
decision has not came easily, as meanwhile desalination prices dropped and 
desalination companies were reluctant to expend production based on current 
market prices. 
It is envisioned that any supplementary desalinated water that becomes 
available between 2010 and 2050 will be infiltrated to aid in replenishing 
Israel's aquifers (Water Authority website, 2012). Smaller desalination 
facilities desalinate brackish water from groundwater wells. Such facilities 
exist in Eilat, the Arava, and the northern coastal plain (Gvirtzman, 2002). At 
present, total production of desalinated water from brackish sources is 30 
MCM/yr., and planned production is planned to reach 80-90 MCM/yr. by the 
year 2020. Desalination facilities follow a similar procedure of public 
tendering and bids by the private sector for the construction and operation of 
each facilityl6 (Water Authority website, 2012). 
16 Small plants arc built under BOO agreement (Built-Own-Operate), while bigger plants arc 
based on BOT (Built-Operate-Transfer). Consider also footnote 20. 
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2014 
(projected) 
Ashkelon 105 III 115 119 120 120 120 
Palmahim 19 30 35 42 45 45 90 
Hadera 10 115 127 127 145 
Sorck 150 
Ashdod 100 
Total 124 141 160 275 292 292 605 
Table 6: Seawater desalinated water production in Israel 2007-2014 (MCMlyr.) 
The future of expansion of desalination use in Israel depends on several 
factors. Desalination presents new challenges to water professionals and 
planners, especially in a geographically small country such as Israel. It 
requires major adjustments in current water infrastructures since the major 
production is shifted from the northern source of the Sea of Galilee to the 
central and southern coast of the county. Additionally, while desalination 
technology carries the benefits of introducing a new and theoretically 
unlimited source of water and therefore securing water supply for all usages, 
it entails long-term environmental disadvantages. (Schiffler, 2004). Among 
the major concerns are the high energy needs and associated GHG emissions, 
waste (brine) discharges and the occupation of valuable coastal areas. The 
government and the Water Authority's intentions to base water management 
strategy primarily on desalination have drawn some criticism, primarily from 
environmental NGOs, which demand that greater attention be given to water 
saving campaigns and reclamation of polluted wells. They also expressed the 
concern that desalination plants would turn out to be white elephants in the 
anticipated energy-constrained era. 
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4.5. Socio-technical transition in the water sector and desalination 
policy 
There is a wide agreement that water management in Israel has historically 
been based on hydro-ideological support of agricultural production, and that 
it has been characterised by "walking on the edge" of water sources, utilizing 
them to a degree of environmental compromise (Fischhendler, 2008; 
Parliamentary Investigation Committee, 2010). These two features have 
contributed to equilibrium in the water regime and to its long-term stability. 
Some authors have suggested, however, that various recent socio-technical 
developments such as water cuts and price increases, water re-allocations, 
and the weakening of the agricultural policy network have already 
contributed to a transition which is manifested as: 
• Innovative irrigation technologies and advanced wastewater 
reclamation facilities, which have allowed more efficient water use 
and released additional water for non-domestic usage. 
• Reduced contribution of agriculture to the state's economy - it has 
fallen below 2% of the country's GOP over the recent decades. 
Following an economic crisis during the 80s, a new paradigm 
supported the shifting of resources from agriculture to other sectors. 
The "agricultural myth" that established untouch-ability of agriculture 
and policies related to that sector (Brown, 1992 in Feindt, 2008) has 
faded away the more dependent Israel became on global food 
markets. 
• Growing public interest in health and environmental matters has led 
to the emergence of a new policy network with actors such as 
environmental NGOs (Menahem, 1998; 2001). The inclusion of 
environmental values 111 laws and regulations embedded 
environmental groups to new "issue networks". Israeli environmental 
movements have campaigned, for example, for nature's right to water, 
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which was encoded in law in 2004. New paradigms such as these 
have challenged the alleged contribution of agriculture to society and 
nature, or the view of agriculture as a "public good", and have 
therefore contributed to shifting the focus away from it. 
• Joint meetings of the King of Jordan and leaders of the Israeli 
government conducted in secret since the 1960s. Water was among 
the contentious issues in these negotiations. In the peace treaty of 
1994, Israel committed to allocating a fixed amount of fresh water to 
Jordan annually. Parallel "water talks" between the Palestinian 
Authority and Israel took place as part of the Oslo interim agreement 
in 1995 and resulted in one of the most important parts of the 
agreement - "Article 40: Water and Sewage". Despite current 
problems of implementation and various critics, this agreement 
recognises the Palestinians' immediate water needs and lays the 
foundation for cooperation in developing new sources and protection 
against water pollution (Kcrret, 2010). As a part of geopolitical 
negotiations with neighbouring nations these "water talks" have 
underlined that drinking water demand would increase on each side of 
the border (Feitelson, 2002; Kartin, 2000) and have highlighted the 
concerns over potable water rather than water-intensive crops. 
• Transformation of water in Israel, by means of pricing, from an 
ideological, symbolic scarce resource, to a commodity, the scarcity or 
abundance of which would be determined solely by the market and 
regulatory mechanisms (cf. Bakker, 2003a; 2003b). According to 
Alatout (forthcoming), this transition includes the construction of a 
new Jewish identity as the "citizen of the world", replacing the old 
identity of "immigrant and settler". A neo-liberal, global perception 
of Israeli society therefore also contributes to changes that are taking 
place in the water sector. 
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These multiple processes in the technological, cultural, economIC and 
geopolitical realms, have laid down the groundwork for a transition. Yet, 
none of these changes in itself has been able to induce transformation in the 
Israeli water policy regime. Decision-makers, mainly in the political sphere, 
have continued to ignore continuous depletion of water resources and 
evidence of changes in rainfall quantities and distribution (Feitelson and 
Fischhendler. 2009; Parliamentary Investigation Committee, 2010; Shuval, 
2010)17. 
Desalination did not appear spontaneously. As has been noted earlier, it had 
been used at experimental and small scales for example in oil-rich countries 
as well as in the southern region of Israel since the 1960s. The first seawater 
desalination plants were constructed by Mekorof (the national water utility) in 
dry and relatively remote areas, such as the city of Eilat (in the Gulf of 
Aquba) to desalinate a mix of sea and brackish water (Gvirtzman, 2002). 
Large scale water production, however, still remained impossible though as 
the technology was immature and costs were too high (Tal, 2006). Attempts 
by water professionals (water commissioners, water engineers or government 
and academic hydrologists and scientists) to promote desalination during the 
mid-1990s were rejected by the Ministry of Finance economists (Personal 
communication, Planning Department, IW A, 20 I 0) who claimed that 
postponing desalination would be economically and strategically justified 
(Unpublished letter from the Ministry of Finance, 1999). Nonetheless, in 
order to compensate for a growing overdraft in the country's main fresh 
water reservoirs - two large aquifers and the Sea of Galilee - the Israeli 
Government adopted an unprecedented target in 200 I to desalinate 400 
million cubic meters of water. 
One major impediment to desalination was the Ministry of Agriculture and 
the agricultural lobby. They were active opponents of desalination, fearing 
17 I present such an evidence in chapter 6. 
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that the increase in the pnce of water will fall on the farmers (Feitelson, 
20(5). However, when the Minister of Agriculture was questioned about the 
Ministry's role in installing desalination, he preferred to put the blame on 
someone else, claiming that: "all that is happening today can be traced back 
to the year of 2000 ... the Ministry of finance's bureaucrats have never agreed 
with those decisions"lx. Indeed, the Ministry of Finance also objected to 
these expensive puhlic projects without guarantees of a full cost recovery by 
an increase in the price of water l9 . Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance did 
not support the idea that Mekorot, the National Water Company, which is 
already heavily subsided by the state, will be responsible for constructing 
such an expensive project as a desalination plant. The political window of 
opportunity for desalination had opened in 1999-2000 because it was the 
same person that had been appointed as both the Minister of Finance and the 
Minister of Water and Energy, and past political controversies became almost 
irrelevant. 
Implementation has still lagged behind, and it was only in 2005 when the first 
large desalination plant (100 MCM/yr.) was constructed. As has been told by 
interviewees, delays in meeting the new target have three, institutionally-
based, key reasons. Firstly, rainy winters in 2002-2003 masked the sense of 
urgency of desalination for unprofessional eyes. Secondly, finding suitable 
land in the already over-crowded coastal strip was slow and difficult 
process20 . Thirdly, the construction of desalination plants involved private 
IX S. Simhon, Minister of Agriculture during 2001-2002, 2006-2009 and 2009-2011, in 
Investigation Committee, protocols, 2009. 
19 References to this claim can be found in the Investigation Committee's protocols. For 
example, one interviewee c1aimcd that hc can "sec the main reason for this water crisis in the 
Ministry of Finance actions. The Ministry announces every now and then that there is no 
need to desalinate. And by that they have overthrown governmental decisions" (Prof. R. 
Samiet, a desalination engineer, protocols, 200R, in Hebrew). 
20 According to a report, written in 2009 by G. Rozental and submitted to the Investigation 
Committee (in Hebrew), the government decided that a BOO (Built-Own-Operate) tender 
can be found more appropriate, considering that bureaucratic procedures and inherent 
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companies and capital. The procedure of adapting the water sector to the 
new era of private-public partnerships (PPP) required the establishment of 
new arrangements and institutions, such as the Water Desalination Authority 
(Interview, AT). 
Meanwhile, the cost of supplying water rose as water shortages required 
emergency production from marginal water sources. In the agricultural and 
water sectors it was realised that treated, inexpensive effluent (whose quality 
could be even improved if desalinated drinking water was used and recycled) 
could be used as water substitute. This alleviated conflict of interests in water 
resources and avoided the need for painful cuts in water allocations. 
Cost of desalination decreased dramatically from about $2.50 per cubic meter 
in the 1970s to only $0.53 in 2003 (Becker et aI., 2010; Greenlee et aI., 
2009). This key technical achievement triggered a major shift in water 
paradigm, policy and politics. Garb and Lee (forthcoming) suggest that once 
decision-makers realised that desalination could free Israel from the 
constraints of natural water supply and ever-lasting crises, they shifted their 
weight on promoting desalination instead of resisting it. As a result, 
desalination targets sky-rocketed: at the time of writing the long-term 
national plan (in preparation), is to increase desalination annual capacity 
target to 1.5 billion MCM by 2040 (Interview, MZ). 
There is therefore an important reason why it was desalination technology 
that contributed to a major policy shift, which will also inevitably result in 
constrains of the planning system have considerably slowed down the first bidding process. 
In a BOO procedure. the private initiator comes with his own designated site for the facility, 
instead of a pre-located public land. However, according to one of the interviewees in this 
thesis, who participated the design process of the bids, the BOO has no advantage in that 
respect. The initiator has to go through the same planning committees' approval process 
anyway (NK, interview, 2010). The BOO approach was therefore left for only small sites 
with a maximum capacity of 50 MCM/y. 
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environmental and social changes: it was able to give each of the key 
involved actors the thing they needed to realize their interests with no or only 
minor compromise. In the next section I will elaborate, and give concrete 
examples, to the ways different interests were satisfied and policy goals 
realigned. 
4.6. "Displacement" as a mechanism of technologically-induced 
policy regime change 
4.6.1. How technology causes policy regime change and further 
implications 
While several political and other factors contributed to incremental changes 
in the Israeli water regime, the role of technology was key, demanding more 
theoretical attention than currently awarded in the policy dynamic literature. 
Desalination provides an example of the potential agency of technological 
innovations. In what follows, I will explain how technology can exert its 
agency and how desalination was able to transform a locked-in regime. It will 
be shown how desalination functioned as a "solution" to persistent water 
problems through displacing externalities, costs, tensions and hard choices in 
a way which aligned with the interests of key actors and embedded 
institutional structures. 
Although problem displacement cannot always be attributed to deliberate 
intentions of any actor, my case study suggests that displacement can be 
regarded as a mechanism that reorganizes the outputs of a new regime. In this 
case example, advances in desalination technology allowed an appearance of 
water abundance to emerge as a new water paradigm, replacing the old 
paradigm of water scarcity and repetitive crises, which reinforced a locked-in 
regime. By offering "limitless product whose price and quantity produced are 
governed by market forces" (Garb and Lee, forthcoming), environmental 
externalities, economic costs and hard political choices were first masked and 
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later displaced. In what follows, I will discuss different forms of involved 
displacements in greater detail. 
4.6.2. Cases of displacement 
Environmental problem and risks di.\plu£·ement. The most obvious 
displacement involved was that of problems across environmental media. 
Environmental risks related to water resources were displaced by 
transfom1ing them to other risks requiring attention of planners and 
policymakers alike, related, for example, to "the scarcity of available coastal 
zones, energy use and climate change" (Interview, MP). On the manifestation 
of the water problem as a problem of available land, one of the interviewees 
noted that 
The locating team of the first desalination plant in Ashkelon had so much 
difficulty to find a place for it, and this is not the centre of the country we are 
talking about (Interview, Ministry of Water and Energy). 
Additionally, there is no scientific agreement, for instance, on long-term 
effects of brine and salt discharges from desalination facilities to the marine 
environment, and once drinking water problem is solved, sea water is at risk: 
We went to the Water Authority and said: 'ladies and gentlemen, until today 
there was only one very limited research that has been performed during one 
limited season and a small budget, something like 80,000 shekels. And after 
all you are the body that provides the water, that produces it, you are with the 
responsibility to make sure to rule-out future harm'. But no one took a 
decision to force the Water Authority to carry out a monitoring study 
(Interview, eNGO). 
While environmental extemalities and future implications of desalination are 
sometimes brought up by scientists and environmental groups, other forms of 
displacement remam less apparent. Yet they do exist m the 
political/technical, managerial, economic and geopolitical realms as I discuss 
below. 
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Displacement of./illldalllelltal politiml choice ... to technical detai/s. Perhaps 
the greatest tension in the Israeli watcr rcgime has been in the political realm. 
Authority and responsibility over water has been shared by at least five 
ministries. which has resultcd in confrontations over water allocations, 
quality and pricing (Fischhcndler and Heikkila, 20 I 0). The water allocation 
process was considered lacking democratic representation of affected groups 
and long-teml. strategic thinking (Fischhendler, 2008). Specifically, as 
Menahem's (200 I) research has shown, a strong agricultural lobby reinforced 
a prioritisation of the agricultural sector in water production, allocation and 
pricing. It was therefore a political impasse, first and foremost, which 
postponed desalination by over a decade (Feitelson, 2005; Parliamentary 
Investigation Committee. 20 I 0). The mainstreaming of desalination became 
feasible only when innovative development brought about a paradigm shift. 
The new paradigm is centred on the appearance of abundance, rather than 
entranced scarcity. By creating the impression of water abundance at the 
acceptable level of costs, the technology has gained support from a broad 
range of political actors such as environmentalists, Ministers of finance and 
Water and Energy, heads of municipalities, the water management authority, 
and even the members of the agricultural policy network. Each actor has its 
own view of potential uses of additional water. A veteran Israeli 
environmental scientist, for example, considered that 
In some circles there was an almost blind faith that scientific and 
technological progress was unlimited in its ability and that it was only a 
matter of a few more years until thcre would be a dramatic breakthrough in 
desalination technology and the goal of cheap desalination would be a reality. 
Thus some agricultural and water planners believed that there would 
eventually be almost unlimited water supplies available for the vast expansion 
of agriculture in Israel. (Shuval 1999, p.8) 
However, it took several years before the awareness of the potential of 
desalination became ingrained and was able to offer what policymakers 
conceived as a competitive cost compared to natural water pumping. 
Once this occurred, the technology unravelled the equilibrium of vested 
interests in water management. Yet, the new wider coalition favouring 
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desalination did not resolve all political tensions. Rather, these were shifted 
to technical ddails, displaced across sectors and environmental media and 
reframed as someone else's problems. For example, decision makers might no 
longer face the uncertainty of rain, nitrate and pollutant concentrations in 
aquifers, or the declining water level in the Sea of Galilee, because these 
uncertainties have been displaced. Instead, there are new technical questions: 
who will win the tenders and operate the plants, what would be a sufficient 
depth for the brine discharge pipes from the plants, or where natural gas 
powering the plants would come from. 
Thus, the responsibility, power and decision-making capacities related to 
these technical issues have been displaced from politicians to hydro-
bureaucrats and water professionals. In other words, the hard choices over the 
management of scarce water resources are displaced. But political decisions 
of course do not disappear: they just rematerialize in other settings. When 
water professionals are asked why the future water supply has been pegged 
on desalination, they express a wish not to have to depend on other countries 
as sources for water, food or energy because 
It is very easy to build a coalition against us (the State ofIsrael) ... and this can 
happen in minutcs and thc watcr source will disappear, and this is why we 
cannot trust such sourccs ... (Interview, Water Authority) 
This is clearly a political concern. Yet, there was no need for any 
governmental policy to address the concern since water professionals are 
aware that there is politics in everything. The perception of key-actors in the 
Israeli Water Authority is that 
Isracl is a highly political country, which nceds to be left with cnough water 
so that politics can play its role (Interview, Water Authority). 
Desalination has allowed the politics of power relations between ministries 
and political negotiation to be modified as a politic of technical details, where 
water and planning professionals negotiate the needed amounts of desalinated 
water, the location of the plants, and the source of energy for these plants. 
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But, as Nelkin (1979, in Murphy, 2007) has pointed out, the use of 
technology to solve problems could sometimes evoke objection aimed less 
against of science and more of the usc or scientific rationality and technical 
expertise to indeed mask political choices. 
Displacement of uncertainties in water quantity and quality. First, in the 
agricultural and water sectors it was realised that treated, inexpensive 
effluent, whose quality would actually be improved by inputs of desalinated 
drinking water , could be used as an irrigation water substitute. This 
alleviated contlict of interests in water resources and avoided the need for 
painful cuts in water allocations, albeit with an economic dislocation of costs, 
as further discussed below. Second, the choice of desalination displaced 
concern from water quantity to water quality and risks for human health. In a 
desalination process, the water is filtered through membranes, removing salts 
and impurities. In order to make desalinated water suitable for drinking, there 
is a need to supplement the water back with its essential minerals, especially 
magnesium, calcium, iodine and fluoride. Despite recent recommendation 
published in 2009 by the WH02 \ and Israeli water professionals22 , there is a 
growing controversy between the Ministry of Health and the Water Authority 
regarding the need, if at all, to add magnesium to desalinated water, with the 
latter objecting to this act (Parliamentary minutes, the Labour, Welfare and 
Health Committee, 11.1.20 II). This also has an economic displacement 
dimension, since the costs involved are considered significant, estimated in 5-
11 million US dollars per year in current desalination production amounts 
and in 0.5 cents per cubic meter (The Knesset Research and Information 
Centre, 20 II ). 
~I World Health Organization (WHO) (2009). Calcium and Magnesium in Drinking-Water: 
Public Health Significance. 
http://whqlibdoc. who.int'publications<2009!9n924 I 563550 eng.pdf 
22 Dan Even (2012, March 2). Health Ministry: lack of magnesium in the water would cause 
death of hundreds every year. !lauret:: (in Hebrew). 
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Fiscal costs and .mhsidie.\· di.\placemet1t. A fourth major displacement relates 
to the cost of water production. In principle, desalination can ease the 
tensions related to historical subsidisation of water for agricultural uses 
because it creates additional water for domestic use. This leaves more natural 
~ that is "cheaper" - water available to the agricultural sector. Domestic water 
can also be recycled as cheaper water (treated sewage) for agriculture. Thus, 
the cost of water has been displaced to the sewage regime, where pricing and 
ownership of grey and black water will have to be renegotiated and clarified. 
Policies which prioritised agricultural water use in the past will not need to 
change because, as suggested by the former Head of the Water Authority, 
... governmental subsidies would reappear in one way or another (Uri Shani, 
publie talk, 20 I 0). 
Therefore, "cheap water for agriculture" remains an underlying directive of 
any water policy, with the full cost of both desalinated water and sewage 
treatment being gradually displaced onto the general public. Prices of 
domestic affluent treatment for households have already undergone 
accumulative increase of 32% between January 2010 and January 2011 
(Water Authority website, 2012). 
Di.'tplacement of geopolitical strategic and economic tensions. The fifth 
displacement takes place in the geopolitical realm. Actors have also 
embraced desalination on the basis of its promise to solve tensions over water 
resources at the regional scale. Early on, desalination was opposed as 
undermining Israeli claims to water resources such as the Eastern Mountain 
Aquifer underneath the West Bank: 
A major unknown Figure in the future projection of water needs in 2010 is the 
one derived by Israel agreements with the Palestinians, maybe even the 
Syrians. However, the government policy in the water sector could bare an 
effect on the results of such political negotiations. The Palestinians will 
discuss with us, among other issues, their water rights in the Mountain 
Aquifer. In case we push the water sector into the desalination era too soon 
and before the agreements, the Palestinians would argue that Israel controls an 
unlimited amount of water (produced by desalination) and then they, who 
don't have another sources and are economically inferior society, ought to 
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receive a higger share of water rights in the Mountain Aquifer. Similar 
claimes can he made hy the Syrians (Unpublished letter by the Ministry of 
Finance, 1999:3, My translation). 
But later, the official Israeli standpoint changed. Now water abundance is 
seen to allow more flexibility in geopolitical negotiations with the Palestinian 
Authority and neighboring countries (Garb 20 I 0), easing what has been 
tenned the "hydro-hysteria". There is an Israeli support for the construction 
of a desalination plant on the Israeli coast to provide 150 million cubic 
meters of water to the Palestinian population in the West Bank23 , though 
Palestinians expressed reservations about this plan: desalination displaces 
security risks from Israel to Palestinians, making the latter dependent on 
Israel and international donors for water sources as well as in their limited 
ability to pay for desalinated water for domestic and particularly agricultural 
activities (Ghbn, 2010). Having a desalination plant under Israeli control as a 
solution to the Palestinian water scarcity problems also displaces the familiar 
Israeli-Palestinian disagreement on "water rights" onto more technical lines. 
Having plenty of water with no recognition of rights to specific sources for 
either party may move the negotiations forward, but may still be considered 
ideologically problematic and strategically unwise by both sides. 
4. 7. Conclusions 
The hydrological mission of Israel's establishment has largely achieved its 
goal. Today, reasonable quality water is provided to consumers with a 
relative high level of reliability regardless of pervasive drought conditions. 
This was made possible in a relatively short time period, through the projects 
outlined in this chapter, as well as technological innovations, such as drip 
23 Horesh, S. (200R, 30 December). Desalination plant will be built for the Palestinian 
Authority. Glohes. http: .www.globcs.co.iJincwslarticlc.aspx.?didoc I 000412097 (Hebrew). 
Last accessed: 14.4.2011. 
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irrigation, and the local water industry's large investments in R&D of high-
tech water technologies. Another important achievement IS the 
unprecedented percentage of recycled wastewater (75%) in Israel, which 
compares favourably with similar semi-arid countries such as Spain (12%) or 
Australia (9%) (Keremane and Mckay, 2007; Iglesias Esteban and Ortega Dc 
Miguel,200H). 
From an environmental point of View, current water infrastructures, 
regulations and practices require greater attention from politicians, 
policymakers and water managers if these are to become more sustainable. 
For example, 110 MCM of non-reused domestic and industrial effluent are 
still discharged without treatment. Many streams and wells are polluted and 
the aquifers suffer from rapid salinization and seawater intrusion. Streams are 
drying up and aquatic ecosystems are under threat as a result of over-
pumping and "drought-induced water pumping". Finally, the externalities of 
desalination are not fully known and in order to keep the price of water from 
skyrocketing, there is a possibility that the full environmental costs of 
desalinated water (that includes the energy externalities and long-term effects 
on the marine environment) will not be internalised in future water prices. 
Traditional and current institutional structures pose additional challenges. It 
has been argued for instance that there are inadequate mechanisms in place to 
allow for the participation of different stakeholders, particularly the general 
public in decision-making processes (Interview, MP). In addition, as will be 
further argued in chapter 6, the integrated physical infrastructure does not 
necessarily indicate an integrated institutional capacity. In fact, it might be 
that authorities and responsibilities for water resources and management are 
distributed among too many ministries and bodies, who have interests that 
sometimes overlap, and at other times compete. This has posed difficulties in 
the past, for example in the enforcement of the Water Law against polluters 
(Fischhendler and Heikkila, 2010). 
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]n term of sustainability of water resources, in the near future, additional 
attention should be given to demand-side management, to water conservation 
techniques and to innovative best-practices to manage water use at different 
scales beyond the national (such as community management schemes and 
cross border ones). Rain harvesting and grey water installations, to name a 
few, are being advocated by civil-society actors, and should receive a greater 
attention from water managers and legislators as well. Mega intervention 
projects such as the Red-Dead Canal require an in-depth, careful assessment 
that considers previous experiences both in Israel and worldwide. Finally, but 
cruciaIly, a solution to the Palestinians' acute water shortages needs to be 
advanced. Even thou this depends on political will on both sides as well as on 
the international community, it cannot be a substitute for interim, pragmatic 
strategies for aIleviating water scarcity in the region. 
The policy of large-scale desalination, as depicted in this chapter, represents a 
regime shift and sociotechnical transition: policy makers consider 
desalination to solve the problem of water scarcity and unreliability in the 
region. The goals of the new policy, and the nature of policy problems and 
their possible instrumental solutions, as discussed below, were changed after 
a breakthrough in technology. This fits well with Hall's explanation (1993) 
for a paradigm shift. However, desalination technology did not appear 
spontaneously; it relates to existing networks of known technologies and 
large-scale integrative systems of water production and distribution. 
Immaterial structures of technocratic routines and technological optimism are 
already embodied within it. Moreover, desalination fits and reinforces 
traditional view of utilities according to which "bigger is better" when 
economies of scale are present. Desalination is also compatible with the neo-
liberal ideology of privatization. Alternative ways to combat water scarcity, 
such as conservation, domestic water reuse, recycling or collection, and 
cleaning of polluted sources require regulative and physical decentralisation 
and greater public investment of funds. 
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I have therefore suggested in the chapter that technological change can be a 
key driver that shifts policy paradigms, political frictions and consequently 
an entire policy regime. I have also explained how technology exerts its 
agency through the mechanism of displacement, illustrating these claims with 
examples of changes in the Israeli water policy regime. Desalination 
dislocated environmental extemalities across sectors and environmental 
mediums: political choices were displaced as water came to be seen a neutral 
product, governed by scientific, technucratic and the market rationality; 
water-related economic costs and subsidies were displaced by transferring 
them to the sewage subsector and: water quality problems remerged as 
desalinated water may carry a risk to public health. Finally, geopolitical 
tensions over limited water resources have shifted to less visible and 
prominent economic and strategic tensions such as the ability to pay for water 
and whose hand is on the tap. 
Studies reviewed in chapter 2 suggest that in most instances, policy dynamics 
arc explained by power relations and conflicts on redistribution (Dietz et a!. 
2003), rather than pure sustainability concerns (Mccay 2002). As is also 
evident here, the whole process of environmental decision-making is based 
on contest rather than consent mainly because environmental issues are 
inherently political (Dryzek 2005; Mollinga 2008). But, similar to science-
based policy, technological adoption is embedded with political meanings of 
societal order and goals, particularly because it involves the framing of 
specific technology as a solution to a specific policy problem. Thus, a 
technology that is able to manifest itself as a solution, would be able also to 
rise above the political contest and to create a presumable consent and 
cooperation among the participating actors. The next chapter demonstrates 
the other case, where, a political quarrel is created around different 
technological paths, each portrayed as the solution to the problem of scarcity. 
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5. Energy: discourses and policy transitions 
5.1.lntroduction 
"There are concomitant notions of 
responsibility that go along with 
conceptions of choice" (Purcell et aI., 
2000:62). 
In the previous chapter I examined the relations between policy dynamics 
and technological change through the mechanism of displacement in the 
context of Israel's water transition. In this chapter I examine Israel's energy 
regime. Again, policy and technological dynamics are under investigation, 
but this time the mechanism in operation is discourses. The analysis here 
congregates an institutional-based approach to policy dynamics with an 
agent-based approach through the focus on discourses and issue networks. 
Energy regImes all over the world are large-scale socio-technical, 
infrastructural systems, which encompass the provision and use of energy for 
transportation and electricity. While parts of the chain of energy production, 
transportation and distribution have been privatized in different parts of the 
world, over 70% of global oil and gas reserves remain state-owned and 
centrally managed (Shaffer, 2009). But although the state is still centrally 
involved in ownership and regulation and despite the greater awareness of 
politicians and policymakers of the problematic dependency on oil and 
imported fossil fuels, as well as of climate change and other environmental 
problems related to energy use (Unruh, 2000; Bang, 2010), national policies 
and institutional arrangements for energy are considered very hard to change. 
No wonder energy regimes are frequently considered locked-in and path-
dependent (Verbong and Geels, 2007). Initiatives to promote renewable 
energy in EU states for example have not resulted in a significant transition 
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toward sustainability or in the 'greening' of the electricity sector (Verbong 
and Geels, 2007; Kern and Smith, 2008). 
Israel's energy regime is not different and attempts to promote sustainable 
practices have been usually hampered by demand-side management and 
energy sources constrains. However, at large, the conflict between economic 
interests and environmental concerns has been subdued because energy has 
been considered first and foremost as an issue of national security and 
because of the lack of significant domestic energy sources; in Israel, notions 
of 'energy scarcity', "security of supply", "energy island", and "modem 
lifestyle" have centrally shaped the way Israeli policymakers perceive the 
country's energy regime and understand its possible future pathways. 
Given the working assumption of scarcity of domestic energy sources, an 
appearance of energy abundance would therefore strike significant. Studies 
suggest, however, that abundance is not necessarily good or not even the 
antonym of scarcity (Alatout, 2009). There is substantial evidence to support 
this claim. Sachs and Warner (1995) showed that resources-rich economies 
have grown less rapidly than economies not dependent on natural resources -
a phenomenon called the "resource curse". "Dutch disease" is a related and 
well-documented phenomenon: large natural gas discoveries in the 
Netherlands shifted factors of production out from other sectors such as 
agriculture and manufacturing and was followed by an economic crisis 
(Brahmbhatt et al., 2010). Natural resource abundance is also often associated 
with rent-seeking behavior by actors who resist changes to status quo, and 
sometimes also with corruption (e.g. Repetto and Institute, 1986; Carney and 
Farrington, 1998). Moreover, it has been suggested that the greater 
availability of resources could amplify their demand (Meerganz Von 
Medeazza, 2005). However, these findings have not undermined the popular 
belief that "more is better". 
In this chapter I examine Israel's energy regime and a discursive shift from 
scarcity to abundance as a case study of the potential role of discourses in 
socio-technical energy transitions. During the time frame of this study, large 
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discoveries of natural gas in Israel's claimed economIC waters and the 
emergence of three additional technological alternatives to current coal-based 
electricity have given risc to new policy networks, each hold a different 
storyline to promote different alternative. I concentrate on how latent aspects 
and implications of such a discursive shift have influenced the energy regime 
at the national level and examine (I) the sources of this new discourse on 
energy abundance, which is replacing an earlier discourse on energy scarcity, 
and (2) how a change from constructed scarcity of energy resources to their 
abundance potentially reconstructs socio-technical transitions, future 
pathways or technological trajectories and institutional arrangements at large. 
In order to answer the second research question regarding the interplay of 
technology and discourse in transitions, I combine in this chapter insights 
from earlier studies of socio-technical transitions in infrastructure systems 
and discursive institutionalism (see chapter 2). Transition studies have rarely 
studied in depth the role of discourses in transitions24. In what follows, I will 
remind the reader of the material data used here and outline the theoretical 
framework in greater detail. 
5.2. Empirical materials 
The empirical material included policy documents published during the 
recent decade, which depict promising new sources of energy. The major 
type of policy documents investigated was transcriptions of parliamentary 
committees, including, among others, meetings of the Interior and 
Environment Committee, Economic Committee, and Science and 
24 Exceptionally, Smith (2009) has examined the evolvement and institutionalisation of 
"transitions" as a storyline that was adopted by the Dutch government. I am, however, taking 
another approach. in line with Lovell's course of investigation (2008), in which she 
concentrated on the mutual influence of discourses on innovations and policy in the UK's 
housing sector. 
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Technology Committee. Additional types of policy documents included 
ministerial published plans relevant to the issue of energy, such as the 
National Plan for Energy Efficiency, 2010-2020 and Renewable Energy 
Policy, both published by the Ministry of Infrastructures in 2010. The second 
type of data was generated by discursive analysis of transcripted public 
appearances and speeches of governmental policymakers and regulators in 
several conferences and various forums (a full list can be found in the 
methodological chapter). The last type of documents included few dozens of 
newspaper articles that were published in various on-line editions of Israeli 
newspapers. 'Energy' was served as the key-word to identify those articles 
published on the intemet, with no time limitation. Finally, the data was 
complimented by twelve semi-structured interviews with actors representing 
policy-makers (from the Ministry of Environment, The Ministry of Energy & 
Water and the Infrastructure planning division within the National Planning 
Committee), academia and experts, energy-related business organizations, the 
Israeli Electricity Corporation and environmental non-governmental 
organizations (eNGOs). Participants were chosen based on their active and 
public role in the local energy regime. 
5. 3. Institutions, discourses and socio-technical change 
The neo-institutional approach introduced an influential conceptualisation of 
political and policy arenas (Hay and Wincott, 1998). According to neo-
institutionalism, the behaviour of individuals in politics is only in part based 
on individual volition: actors are embedded in the structures, regularities, 
routines and behavioural standards, which also influence their behaviour 
(Peters, 1992). The understanding of institutions as associations, 
interrelationships or "networks of connection", which simultaneously 
generate and constrain actors and actions (North, 1991; Peters and Pierre, 
1998) herald a systematic investigation of dynamics - of both change and 
continuation - as one of the key interests of political science and public 
policy studies. This approach treats institutions as "political actors in their 
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own right" (March and Olsen, 1984:738), "structuring the play of power" 
(Fischer, 2003:29) and delineating the 'working practices' in the policy 
arenas, as well as in other, more general social decision-making processes 
(Peters, 1992; Rydin, 2003). As I discussed in chapter 2, institutional change 
is recently interpreted by critical policy analysts to be the result of ideational 
and discursive communication between actors in the polity (Schmidt, 2010). 
The notion of a transition originates from the Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) and it provides a useful framework for examining institutional 
changes. A transition reflects a structural-institutional dynamic which is 
longer-term and strategic in nature (Rip and Kemp, 1998; Van Oer Brugge et 
aI., 2005). A transition includes a multi-level alteration of (a) physical 
infrastructures and policy procedures at the level of the regime, (b) niche-
technological innovations and (c) economic, political or environmental 
changes at the landscape level (Geels and Schot, 2007). 
Interactions of dynamics at different levels, such as landscape pressure on a 
regime, are directed through "transition pathways" (Foxon et al., 2010), and 
can produce a wide range of outcomes. "Sociotechnical imaginaries", as 
descriptions of attainable futures and prescriptions of futures that states 
believe ought to be attained (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009) playa similar role. 
From a normative point of view, the goal of governance institutions and 
policymaking is to direct transitions toward more sustainable outcomes by 
means of steering and management (Meadowcroft, 2008; Frantzeskaki and 
Loorbach, 20 I 0). 
I have been arguing here that in socio-technical studies, institutions, policies, 
technologies and discourses do not play an exclusive role on their own. 
Rather, they are all perceived to be intertwined components of regimes and 
landscapes (Martens and Rotmans, 2005). For this reason, using discourses to 
explain socio-technical transitions (or highlighting their role in transitions) 
translates to focusing on the ways in which discourses have influenced 
institutional arrangements, altered policies, contributed to the adoption of 
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certain technologies, or on how discourses are likely to bring about these 
impacts in the future (cf. with Lovell, 2008). More generally, there is a need 
to examine the role of paradigms and discourses in shaping and defining the 
range of possible future pathways in a specific transitional process. 
A discursive approach to sociotechnical transitions may alter our 
understanding of both changes and non-changes: that is, incumbent regimes, 
path-dependency and lock-ins in large socio-technical systems. Discourses 
and ideas are powerful constraints of action, framing and setting the limits of 
what can be perceived as possible solutions to societal problems (Arts and 
Buizer, 2009). On the one hand, discourses can explain lock-in alongside 
infrastructural networks and vested interests: they do maintain specific "rules 
of the game". Hajer (1995) has also suggested that discourses are passed 
from one generation of policy makers to the next one. Discourses can thus 
contribute to path dependencies, exclusion of alternatives during strategic 
decision-making processes, and masking of unconventional future pathways, 
because they constrain ways of thinking and acting. But on the other hand, 
discourses can also foster change by realigning actors into discourse 
coalitions or policy networks that "can be used to undermine and disrupt 
existing policy practices, and to generate and legitimize new approaches" 
(Smith and Kern, 2009:4). 
Discursive Institutionalism (01) can thus clearly contribute to the SOCIO-
technical transitions literature by highlighting that institutions are not only 
constraints of action, but also actively constructed by actors (Schmidt, 20 10). 
DI helps to link an agent-centered approach with institutional change, a 
neglected perspective in the transition literature as well as in the wider STS 
literature (Walker and Shove, 2007; Smith et aI., 2003). Although recent 
literature has acknowledged the role of actors and front-runners in 
influencing transition pathways (Verbong and Geels, 2010; Faxon et al., 
2010), most studies have treated structural processes as objective, and have 
missed the potential role of values, tactics of persuasion, and power relations 
in creating and reinforcing transitions. 
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Shove and Walker (2007) have called for an explicit recognition of the 'dark 
side' of the transitions arena, the acknowledgement of the power and political 
dynamics in sociotechnical transitions and specifically in the attempts to steer 
or manage them (see also Jasanoff and Kim, 2009). Since the way in which 
"discursive strategies" are used in the political and policy arenas is 
considered a crucial part of the way in which actors achieve their goals and 
exercise power (Rydin, 2003:53; Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004), DJ may be 
well equipped to reveal those less visible layers of policy dynamics. 
The theoretical framework outlined above is based on the contribution of 
discursive institutionalism to socio-technical transitions literature, and on the 
assumption that certain ideas and forms of speech reflected in discourses 
might encourage or discourage transitions toward sustainability. The growing 
body of this kind of discursive studies highlights the significance of both 
formal (e.g. electoral or regulative systems) and informal institutions (e.g. 
discourses) in managing and governing environmental resources. In this 
chapter I examine Israel's energy regime and the emerging notion of energy 
abundance in Israel as a case study of the potential role of discourses in 
socio-technical transitions. In the next subsection I set the case-specific 
background for the analysis. 
SA. Israel's energy regime: institutional setting and actors 
Although located in the oil-rich Middle East, Israel was considered for long 
to have no fossil fuels (Coxon and Greenfield, 1985; Bahgat, 2010). Attempts 
to find them were made from the early 20th century by Turkish, British and 
Israeli governments and most prominently private investors, but the small 
discoveries were not economically viable to extract. During statehood, 
exploration and production of fossil fuels have been regulated by the 
Ministry of Energy (later the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources) on 
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the basis of the Petroleum Law (1952) inherited from the period of the British 
Mandate. 
The Israeli energy sector has been dependent on imported fuels 111 the 
absence of domestic energy sources. Petroleum (crude oil) and mazut 
(diesel) imported from West Africa and Northern Europe were the primary 
energy sources for electricity generation and industry until the 1970s. The 
Yom Kipur War and the oi I crises of the 1970s and 1980s made coal the 
preferred energy source, partly because it offered security of supply25: Israel 
could import it from friendly sources such as former countries of the Soviet 
Union (e.g. the Republic of Azerbaijan and Russia), as well as from South 
Africa and the United Kingdom. 
Israel has historically considered itself an "energy island" (Shaffer, 2011). 
Israel's geopolitical situation and security considerations have left it isolated 
and led the state to build an independent, integrative and centralised-managed 
electricity grid system. This means that any fault in production or 
transmission can cause serious disturbances, which cannot be remedied by 
importation of electricity from neighbouring countries. Another important 
feature of the Israeli energy regime is rapid growth of energy production and 
consumption due to high population growth and car-dependent, energy-
intensive lifestyles. In 2010, the electricity sector had 5% reserve capacity. 
This small difference between the total generating capacity and actual level 
of electricity generation (see Figure 10) again makes the grid sensitive to 
faults. For comparison, the Netherlands had a reserve margin of 22% in 
25 According to Shaffer (2009) the concept "energy security" includes three components: 
reliability, affordability and environmental sustainability. The term "security of supply" is 
used here rather loosely without getting into its more complicated technical and normative 
meanings or implications. In fact, there is no one accepted definition (see for example Helm, 
2002). 
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domestic generation 111 2002 and the possibil ity to import electricity 
(International Energy Agency, 20(4). 
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Figure 10: Total production (grey columns) and peak demand (light line) (in 
MW) in 1948-2007. Source: lEe statistical report for 2007. 
Electricity generation IS responsible for II % of the pnmary energy 
consumption in Israel - it is the third largest sector in this regard after 
transportation (43%) and industry (35%). The storytelling of electricity 
generation in Israel often begins with the construction, in 1923 (24 years 
before the establishment of the state), of the first two power plants, on the 
banks of the Jordan Valley and a smaller one adjacent to the Yarkon Stream 
(which today flows at the heart of the city of Tel-Aviv). Maybe somewhat 
ironically, there was no conceptual separation at that point between the 
functionality of water and energy resources. On the contrary, the first power 
plants were built by the new Israeli Electricity Corporation (lEC) and 
produced hydroelectric power. Moreover, the British Mandate has gave 
Pinhas Rotenberg, the Zionist lEC's founder, a concession over all surface 
water sources in the country - for the purpose of electricity production - for a 
time period of 70 years. 
It was not long, however, before Rotenberg had realized that in a tensional 
region such as the land of Palestine, reliable energy supply should not be 
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located far from the central urban and industrial activities (along the 
Mediterranean seashore) because the grid cannot pass via hostile territory. In 
addition, shorter lines could save a lot of energy. With major waves of 
immigrants during the 30s and the 40s and rapid growth in commercial, 
industrial and quality of life, demand of energy was exponentially increasing. 
Two main power plants were constructed in Tel-Aviv and Haifa, operating on 
steam. Still, during the next few decades, there was a need to defend the 
power plants from possible attacks from land or air (Naor, 2003). 
Forecasted demand to the period after the establishment of the State had 
required mega investments which the IEC could not raise by its own. In 
1945, after a long negotiation process and in order to avoid a total energy 
crisis, the government bought 95% of the Company's shares and the IEC was 
nationalized. With the legislation of National Companies Law in 1975, the 
IEC had officially gained monopoly restricted by governmental regulation. 
Along with price caps, it is subject to approval of investments in 
infrastructure, the structure and level of employees' wages, and fuels mixture 
and maintenance procedures (Tishler et aI., 2002). Various power-plants 
were additionally built initially generating 20-75 MW and later up to 230 
MW each. Environmental concerns were not late to follow. The first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in Israel, for example, was made 
for a planned coal power plant in the beginning of the 80s. A second large 
coal plant was concurrently advanced, as a result of 7% annual growth in 
demands. 
5.4.1. The lEe in brief: reform and regulations 
The national electricity company currently generates most electricity in the 
country, and it is also responsible for transmission through the national grid 
and distribution to customers. When the 70-years British concession had 
expired, the government put in force a renewed Electricity Law-1996, 
according to which the IEC will be given an operation quota for ten years. A 
complementary decision was taken by the Israeli government in 2003 to 
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initiate a major reform in the national electricity industry. It called for 
deregulation and privatization of both power generation and customer 
services. Transmission and distribution (T &0) services will remain regulated 
but will be available to all T &0 users under mandatory open access. Tishler 
and Woo (2006:349) asserted that "as in the UK case, the Israeli 
government's action was motivated by the notion of using market reform to 
weaken IEC's labour unions and to reduce its labour costs". 
Therefore, the government formed a Public Utilities Authority (PUA) with 
two main goals in mind: to tighten the regulatory supervision and control on 
IEC's tariffs and the quality of its service and to introduce competition in 
electricity production. Although reform efforts have managed to increase the 
market share of privately generated electricity in the grid only marginally 
(currently only 1 % of total production)2\ the 1996 electricity law and later 
reform had opened the market to private producers. This can be expected 
have a major influence on the energy sector in the future. 
5.4.2. Electricity production and consumption 
As for 2010, the IEC's total electricity generation capacity was 12,987 MW 
and 56,147 million kWh were produced, while the peak electricity demand 
was 1O,950MW. Actual consumption in 2010 was equal to 51,979 million 
kWh or 6,322 kWh in average per person (Central Borough of Statistics, 
2011). For comparison with European countries see Figure 11 below. 
26 Ten years after the new Electricity Law was presented to the market (and onward), the 
government chooses to renew the lEe permit annually with almost no changes from its 
original British concession. In Segal, N. & Sherman, A. (2009) Two decades to the reform in 
the electricity sector: a refreshed thinking - first draft Available online: 
www.kibbutz.org.ilihazan/hafrata/noam -3 g 09.doc (Hebrew). 
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Figure 11: Electricity consumption per pe rson (kW per year) 2005/2006 .Date 
source: IEC statistical report for 2007 
Private and public buildings are the largest consumers of electricity, w ith a 
total demand of 22 ,750 MKlh true fo r the year 2008. The industry accounts 
fo r approxi mately ano ther th ird of thi s number (Figure 12). For domestic 
use, e lectricity pri ces in Israel are low, in comparing to European countries 
such as the UK and the Netherlands, but similar to those in the US . Di ffe rent 
prices fo r peak and low demand times (e.g. dayt ime vs. night) ex ist, but 
mainly fo r industri al users. Di ffe rentia l tari ff, in w hich users pay extra 
beyond a certa in amount, is not implemented in order to reduce demand 
(Segal, 201 0). 
industry 
22% 
Figure 12: Annual electricity consumption by users' type in 2008. 
PA=Palestinian Authority. Source: IEC statistical report for 2008 
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Whereas in 1997 the mam sources of energy were coal (73.7%). diesel 
(1.1 %) and mazut (25.2%), in 2008 the mixture had drastically changed as a 
result of a new contract with Egypt to deliver natural gas. In 20 I 0 the share 
of natural gas had been raised to 40% and it is estimated to reach above 50% 
of total energy sources for electricity production (Lavie, 2010). 
5.4.3. Central actors 
A limited number of prominent actors manage Israel's centralised energy 
regime and influence decisions made in it. I hereby focus on the actors 
relevant to the state of agenda-building and policy formulation. These include 
state actors, non-governmental actors, and business/industrial actors but 
exclude the courts (which may playa role at other stages of policy making 
such as enforcement of regulations) and international players such as the 
DECO. 
The IEC is regulated by the Public Utility (Electricity) Authority (PUA) 
within the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources. The Ministry of Energy 
and Water Resources is a key-actor actor in the regime. It is responsible for 
electricity, natural gas, and fuels but also for water, wastewater, mining, 
quarrying and earthquakes. It regulates state-owned enterprises related to 
natural resources such the national water company Mekorot and the Israeli 
Electricity Corporation. It also has authority over research centres and other 
organisations such as Public Utility Authorities for Water and Electricity, and 
the Water Authority. 
With this control over the utilization of natural resources, the Ministry of 
Energy and Water Resources influences environmental policy in Israel 
significantly. All decisions made have a direct impact on water and air 
quality, waste treatment and future reserves of natural resources. However, 
as previous research had indicated, as well as participants in this research, the 
Ministry of Energy and Water Resources have no real control over its 
subordinated institutions. The IEC for example is termed "a company with a 
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govemmental ministry" (Parag, 2005). Participants in this research have 
pointed to its dependency for pre-policy calculations (like scenarios) on the 
lEe, and the lack of skills and expertise of the ministerial professional staff. 
For instance, a former vice-director in the Ministry of Environment has 
noted: 
The Ministry of Energy and Water Resources is totally controlled by the 
Electricity Company. There is no such a thing that the Ministry of Energy and 
Water Resources is in control. No, its decisions are dictated by actors in the 
market (Interview, Ministry of Environment). 
The director of a non-govemmental organization has also noted that: 
The Ministry has no data, no ability to produce any analysis. So they lately 
even come to liS, to write them plans and I'm very happy to promote my plans 
and ideas but this is not the way it should work.. .do I work for them?" 
(Interview, eNGO) 
Few interviewees even added that the IEe determines policy decisions de 
facto. In addition, with the establishment of the new inner-ministerial 
regulative authority (the PUA), the ability of the minister to influence 
decisions regarding electricity prices, has been impaired. With a central role 
of managing Israel's natural resources, the Ministry is therefore under a 
constant political pressure from many directions, both public and private 
interests. 
The Ministry of Finance is another key actor because it is responsible for 
financial restructuring, approves all large public investments and allocates 
funding for them. In the energy sector, it is implementing decisions on energy 
efficiency, driving reforms in the fuel sector, promoting the role of private 
electricity generation under the Electricity Law-1996, and promoting 
renewable energy to meet a 10% target by 2020. As has been pointed earlier, 
one of the major areas of disagreements between the Ministry of Finanee and 
the lEe is the control of its labour union over their own tenure, salaries and 
benefits, which have resulted before in sanctions and strikes (Goldstein, 
2007). 
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Considering that electricity generation facilities and energy use arc a major 
source of risk to the natural environment, human health and the stability of 
the climatic system, a third political actor to do with the energy regime is the 
Ministry of Environment. Before the introduction of natural gas to the sector, 
the power plants in Israel were responsible to 75% of total SOx emission, 
40% of Nox and 37% of PMIO/PM2.5 (IUED website). The Ministry 
establishes and enforces ambient air quality standards under the Hazards 
Prevention Law of 1961, its 1992 amendments and the Clean Air Act of 
2008. The establishment of the Environmental Unit in 1972 and later the 
Ministry of Environment in 1989 was not a response to recognised 
environmental problems - it was rather an outcome of strategic bargaining by 
key coalitions at the time (Tal, 2002). It continues to have limited resources: 
its budget is only about 1 % of government expenditure (Parag, 2005). 
Nevertheless, the ministry has voice in most important forums and can use its 
enforcement powers when required. The minister can also influence the "fuel 
mix" through regulations that require the Israeli Electricity Corporation to 
use more expensive but less polluting fuels. 
With air quality in mind, the Ministry plays a role in the areas of energy 
efficiency, renewable energy and climate change policies, but mainly through 
education, voluntary agreements and political advocacy. When it comes to 
national energy policies, including renewable energy targets, the Ministry of 
Energy and Water Resources is in charge, and not the Ministry of 
Environment. As in the water sector, the distribution of authority and 
responsibilities and lack of inter-ministerial integration leave too much space 
for political intercession on the expense of environmental considerations. 
Similar to the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources, the Ministry of 
Environment is, too, often lacking the knowledge, data and high level of 
expertise to plan large-scale initiatives, to study in-depth the potential of 
more progressive regulations or to stand in front of heavy polluters more 
professionally (Parag, 2005). 
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Environmental NGOs (cNGOs), on the other hand, are a rising star in the 
socio-political sphere of Israel. The Society for the Protection of Nature 
(SPNI), the first environmental NGO, was established already in 1953 and is 
still dominant especially at environmental campaigns and educational 
projects. The Israel Union for Environmental Defence (IUED), which was 
established in 1990, uses legal tools to promote environmental legislation and 
to protect the public interest from environmental hazards, lack of 
environmental enforcement and destructive economic interests. The role of 
eNGOs in Israel is out of the scope here, but just to mention a research made 
by Parag (2005), in which she analysed the complex interaction of networks 
and actors in Israel's industrial emission policy. Her findings indicate multi-
dimensional relations between ENGOs and other actors, even the Ministry of 
Environment. To point only one example: on the one hand, they shared 
information and supported one another in activities that promote social and 
governmental awareness to the problem of air pollution. On the other hand, 
when it came to selecting policy tools, they were in a disagreement; the 
ENGOs required tough legislation, while the Ministry of Environment, as an 
inferior political actor, preferred voluntary treaties as a way to avoid direct 
confrontations with the industry. 
It is widely agreed that in relation to both energy and water issues in Israel, 
social and environmental groups essentially feel excluded from the decision-
making process (Interviews, MP, YCF). The National Planning and Building 
Committee - the uppermost planning authority - as well as subsequent 
planning committees, are the only arena where ENGOs can have an official 
representative. Other than that, in places where more strategic decisions are 
taken, ENGOs can sometimes be present, but have no statutory role. 
Therefore, in a coalesced objection during the last decade to the lEe's plan to 
build two coal-fired units (of 1 260MW) at the Rutenberg "0" power plant in 
Ashkelon, non-governmental organisations could have only conscript the 
more 'traditional' tools, such as protests, petitions and letters of objection. 
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Other non-governmental actors are constituted by private producers of 
electricity (renewables and non-renewables), natural gas companies and some 
major industries such as the Oil Distillation Company. Clearly all have 
different interests in promoting certain regulations and laws or preventing 
them from being endorsed and each has its own level of political power. The 
constellation of actors and policy networks in the energy regime play an 
important role in the case ahead of us. These will be the focus of the next 
subsections. 
S.S.Emerging energy abundance discourse 
The mam assertion IS the following: despite several decades of relative 
stability in terms of energy sources, technologies and actor constellation, the 
energy regime is currently undergoing a rapid socio-technical transition 
driven by (I) government efforts to end the monopoly of the national 
Electricity Corporation and (2) increasing use of natural gas from the 
Mediterranean Sea and natural gas imports from Egypt which changes the 
"fuel mix" substantially. The new non-negligible offshore natural gas 
discoveries have made it a realistic alternative to the current coal-based 
regime. The share of natural gas as a fuel in electricity generation has 
rocketed to 40%, significantly reducing the share of coal. Natural gas, 
together with oil shale, nuclear energy and solar energy, are potentially 
opening up the previously locked-in, isolated and on-the-verge-of-a-crisis 
energy regime and creating an appearance of energy abundance. The four 
alternative sources of energy will be examined below in greater detail. 
The natural gas alternative has been boosted by recent natural gas discoveries 
(the last one named 'Leviathan', whale in Hebrew) by private consortia. With 
estimated gas reserves of 16 trillion cubic feet, Leviathan is the largest 
discovery in deep waters globally in a decade (Aharoni, 2010). It was made 
possible by new technology that can map geological formations under deep 
water and equipment that remains reliable in corrosive environments and 
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extreme pressure and temperature. The discoveries have contributed to a new 
discourse, according to which Israel will be able to not only supply its own 
energy needs, and to enhance its energy independency, but also to become an 
exporter of natural gas. The abundance discourse fosters the creation of a 
policy network composed of diverse actors that favor the transition of the 
energy system from coal to natural gas, which has been so far prevented by 
the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources despite several governmental 
decisions to promote it (State Comptroller Report, 2005). Protagonists of the 
transition, such as current chairman of the Natural Gas Lines Company 
consider that "Israel could become a leading regional gas power" (0. Marani, 
chairman of the Natural Gas Lines Company in the Energy and Business 
Conference, 20 II ), thus actively contributing to social construction of energy 
abundance. But while the transition has now already been set in motion, its 
risks and uncertainties are only beginning to surface (see table 7). 
Oil shale, the second energy alternative, has been used in the Southern region 
of Israel already since the 1980s. Polieymakers considered oil shale 
extraction desirable for the long-term (Coxon and Greenfield, 1985) although 
it was not economically viable and had serious environmental implications 
(see table 7). A private company has been given a license recently for 
exploring oil shale fields in the Adolam region. They are confident that 
experimental drilling will prove the reserves economically worthwhile to 
extract. 
The company envisions "bringing energy relief and independency to Israel by 
means of sustainable and environmentally friendly use of oil shale in its 
territory" (lEI Company Website, 2011). The chief scientist of the Ministry 
of Energy and Water Resources also promoted the project by suggesting that 
the 
Adolam region is an area with amount of oil that is equal to Saudi Arabia's (S. 
Vald, in Parliamentary minutes, 2011 b:28). 
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New technologies may otTer extraction of oil in situ by extreme heating of 
the ground instead of mining and processing the shale. Leading 
environmental NGOs have opposed the project, arguing that it could 
undermine other strategic decisions and obligations made by the government 
regarding climate change, reducing dependency on fossil fuels, and its 
general commitment to sustainable development (Parliamentary minutes, 
2011 b). 
The director general of the Interior Ministry considered already in 1977 that 
nuclear energy will become a major source of energy in Israel within a 
decade (Winn and Peranio, 1980). While this never happened, nuclear energy 
- the third alternative - is again portrayed as necessary and inevitable in Israel 
by a policy network composed of the Ministry of Energy and Water 
Resources and the lEe: 
At the long-term there won't be any other choice but producing electricity 
with nuclear energy, because renewable energy could never supply more than 
third of the needs (Landao, U., Minister of Energy and Water Resources27). 
I return to discuss this emerging discourse on the feasibility of nuclear energy 
in chapter 6. But for nuclear energy to be realised in the Israeli context, in 
both short and long terms, it will also have to overcome numerous 
challenges, as depicted in table 7. 
Renewable energy is the fourth energy alternative promISIng abundance 
because of infinite sources such as the sun and wind. In semi-arid Israel, solar 
(thermal) energy has been used for water heating for some time. The 
Planning and Building Law (regulation no. 1.09, 1970) requires that all 
residential buildings up to nine floors in height must have solar collectors 
installed. But solar photovoltaic (PV) electricity is still produced only in a 
small scale. The current government has not taken major steps to promote 
27 Quoted in Morgenstein (20 I 0, 2 March). Israel Electric Corporation IS making 
arrangements for nuclear energy. nrg. (Hebrew). 
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renewable energy apart II'om some investments in R&D, 111 one PY array 
based on a feed-in-tariff, and providing limited public support for PY 
instalments on private roofs (Parliamentary minutes, 20 II d). The 
government's target is that renewable energy should make up 5% of the total 
energy use by 2015 and 10% by 2020. In comparison, UK renewable energy 
target for 2015 is 15% and that of the Netherlands is 10%. Nevertheless, for 
some actors the abundance of renewable energy is real and promises a 
revolution. For example, Shimon Peres, Israel's President considers that 
From Israel's perspective, it's better to hang on the sun than the oil producing 
countries. The sun is more permanent, objectivc, not a member of the Arab 
League, we have straight connections. We have plenty of it. This is our future, 
the sooner we enter it. (S. Peres, at Dan David award ceremony for AI Gore, 
Tel-Aviv University, 2008). 
These four energy alternatives share in common an alleged potential to secure 
Israel's energy needs for several decades. Yet, this potential is still largely 
rhetoric. Each of the alternatives would need to overcome several challenges 
before becoming successfully mainstreamed. These challenges include 
technological feasibility; scientific uncertainties; profitability; environmental 
risks; public acceptability; international acceptance; geopolitical security; and 
institutional reformulation. Table 7 explains each constraint in more detail 
and provides examples of them. 
To conclude, these technological-based energy alternatives are portrayed as 
ultimate solutions offering inexpensive and secure energy. They are all 
promoted because of their promise of energy abundance, although they 
clearly are not in a position to deliver as indicated in the table. The following 
section examines first whom does this new discourse of energy abundance 
serve? Secondly, it discusses how the abundance discourse is changing the 
"rules of the game"; or, in other words, how does the discursive shift 
restructure current socio-technical transitions, future pathways of the Israeli 
energy regime and institutional arrangements more generally. 
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Constrain Natural-gas (NG) Oil-Shale Nuclear Solar ThermallPV 
Technological Challenges of identifi cation & Unproved technology that has Conditioned in the use of not yet Technologies exist but I 
production in deep-waters never been tested anywhere developed 4th generation reactors effic iency is very low (about 
20%) and storage is 
challenging 
Scientific Uncertainty and disagreements Unknown implications (ground 
over the actual available amounts warming, tox ic emission and N/A N/A 
more) 
Economic Profitable for companies and may Profi tabili ty of fue l produced Solar PV panels can be cost-
lower electricity prices. But prices from oil shale depends on the effect ive only if the price per 
depend on regulatio n and Ministry fluctuating cost of oil barrels kW is set high enough 
of Finance prevented transition to 
NG arguing that coal is still N/A 
cheaper 
Environmental Deep-water drilling affects the No environmental advantages Radioactive waste and pollution Solar and other renewable 
and marine environment. Risk is such as a reduction in GHG of the environment in case of a energies are not wi thout trade-
human health greater when lower strata contain (which can be attributed to NG, hazard. Although GHG emission offs; environ. imp lications 
oi l. Concerns deepened after the nuclear and solar). Direct is low during electri city include loss of open-spaces 
Gulf of Mexico oil spill. On-shore environmental implications production, a life-cycle of a and consequently decrease in 
process ing plants and pipelines include: air, so il , groundwater power-plant includi ng biod iversity, accumulati on of 
pose risk on human and nature pollution; landscape destruction; construction is considered unrecyclable batteries, etc . 
etc energy-intensive 
Social For example, a delay in liquefi ed Petition against the project was As a result of growing public 
natural gas (LNG) supply to Israel submitted to the high court by awareness and capac ity to 
was caused by local residents, local residents and environ. influence policymaking, a 
whom objected to the construction NGOs in an attempt to prevent construction of a nuclear power-
I 
of a processing plant on the base the government from licensing plant will necess itate public 
of NIMBI claim the drills support N/A 
Institutional, Licensing of excavation is made according to the Petroleum Law IEC does not have the know-how, For solar technology to take-
legislative and ( 1952). The law itself is not a constraint; on the contrary, its goal is to materials and operation capacities off there is a need to change 
regulative encourage private exploration of oil and gas. However, institutional for nuclear power-plant, so regulative structures, 
constrain ari ses when the implement 
construction must be outsourced 
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validity of existing laws, regulation of taxation systems are questioned targets, remove bureaucratic 
(more details in the discussion section). Additionally, the law does not impediments and invest in 
contain any environmental requirement from such projects. R&D. Also, targets should be 
set higher 
International Commitments ofGHG reduction Israel might have to bypass the 
or industrial competition in Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 
international markets arc hard to to construct a nuclear power-
N/A realise with oil in Israel's fuel plant. N/A 
mIx 
Geopolitical NG already evoked a maritime Heavy security risks especially In 
border's dispute between Israel case of a terror attack or war 
and Lebanon. Pipeline between 
Egypt and Israel was sabotaged N/A N/A 
Table 7: Summary of constraints to future energy pathways 
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5.6.A discourse in transition: discussion 
The Israeli electricity sector is on the verge of a cnSlS due to groWIng 
demands and delays in the implcmcntation of measures to increase generation 
capacity. Officials warn about an "electricity drought" but these physical and 
discursive scarcities have not induced a movcment toward more sustainable 
encrgy use: domcstic electricity prices remain low compared with western-
European countries (lEe, 2007): electricity rcserves are almost fully utilised 
and construction of new power plants is currently at standstill; there is a lack 
of 10ng-tenl1, strategic planning and national plan for the sector (Interview, 
MP). Also, despite several governmental decisions to promote energy 
efficiency and alternative energy sources, little has actually been done to 
foster them (Parliamentary Minutes, 2009). This raises questions on the 
forces behind and the implications of the newly emerged abundance 
discourse. 
5.6.1. Who and what the discursive shift serves? 
The discursive shift from scarcity to abundance was constructed through the 
promotion, by different policy networks, of four energy futures, each with a 
promise to solve Israel's energy problems. This is generally reflected in the 
words of the chief scientist in the Ministry of Energy and Water: "everything 
is measured by energy ... we need to make available and abundant energy so 
we can have everything else, including water" (Interview, Ministry of Energy 
and Water). The various actors promote the appearance of abundance, based 
on different storylines - organizing narration of the reality that simplify and 
influence environmental policy (Hajer, 1995) - such as national security, 
ecological concern, economic rationale (see Teravainen, 2010), and general 
political strategy. The policy networks that evolved in favor of each energy 
alternative, however, are not driven by one unifying storyline beside the 
perception of abundance. 
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Ecological concern. For environmental groups, abundant natural gas 
provides tailwind for their ten-year struggle against the constmction of 
additional coal power plant. It is also compatible with the discourse on 
climate change and mitigation strategies they are interested in forwarding. 
The Ministry of Environment also finds the discursive shift beneficial. 
Certainly at this point, to hold back the entrance of natural gas would mean to 
devastatingly hinder recent improvements in air quality. With all its 
limitations. natural gas and its products could be used as fuel in public 
transportation in the future, as well as substitute current imported ammonia 
supplies (S. Nezer. Air quality department. the Environment Ministry in 
Jerusalem Conference for Environment and Society, 2011). 
National security. The above quote of Shimon Peres (in previous section) 
suggests a linkage between energy abundance and national security 
discourses (see also Shaffer, 2011). Peres's faith in solar energy is 
underpinned by a meta-narrative of "technological optimism" (Alpert and 
Michaels, 2011) on the one hand, and a deep-rooted cultural framing of Israel 
as a global leader and proponent of innovative technologies on the other (Tal, 
2007; Verbong and Geels, 2010). Policy-makers and experts combine the 
two: 
... only technology will save us. The technology that Israel needs to develop 
will change the world and \cad a change in the struggle against climate change 
(Dr. Y. Berzin, in Conference, 2009b). 
The motivation behind this declaration IS not only to promote Israel's 
international relations, but to emphasize that if the country was sufficiently 
energy independent, the impact and threat of Iran and the other oil-rich 
Muslim countries would be reduced. The head of the Israeli National 
Economic Council expressed this in the following way: 
Compared to other places in the world, the oil shale field in Israel is not big. 
But across the world, oil shale is located in places different from places of oil. 
Our plan is to distribute our energy dependency between states, not 
neccssarily bctween sources ... this is winning. This is why it is so important 
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that the oil-shale production technology will be tested (E. Kandel, Head of 
National Economic CounciL in Parliamentary Protocol, 20 II a:3). 
Po/itkal strategy and ecollomic rationale. In the political sphere, decision-
makers could use the perception of abundance to justify their "business as 
usual" approach to energy policy. Regardless of the environmental benefits 
of a transition to natural gas, solar energy or even nuclear-based electricity 
generation - especially in terms of reducing air pollution and greenhouse gas 
emission, policymakers employ the sense of abundance to avoid energy 
efficiency and demand reduction pathways, which according to a critical 
environmental activist in the field of energy, are considered to subsume much 
less political prestige (Interview, YCF). 
With respect to natural gas and oil shale discoveries multiple actors and 
political, environmental and economic interests were involved in their 
construction as abundant. For example, Abundance gives political leverage to 
opponents of electricity price increases because domestic availability of fossil 
fuel may entail lower costs than imported coal and oil (MPs in Parliamentary 
Minutes, 201Ic). Private gas companies have in tum been able to increase the 
value of their shares by presenting optimistic expectations about their 
discoveries. They also portrayed abundance of natural gas as a precious gift 
to the country and themselves as its generous benefactors: 
This is a day of celebration for the entire State of Israel (Y. Tshuva, owner of 
'x the gas company Dclek Group Ltd.)- . 
This supported their efforts to maintain a positive image among the general 
public. Another example for an economic interest in abundance can be found 
in the following, presented by a director of a company developing methanol-
based fuel for vehicles: 
2M Morgenstain, R. (2009, 18 January). Every Israeli citizen should be happy from the 
discoveries of natural gas because he will feci it in his pocket. nrg.(Hcbrew). 
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One can produce methanol from anything that omits CO2,,, lEe's power-
plants for electricity production from coal or from gas could producc 
methanol. Dump-sites can. The oil shale, that we all hope that would soon be 
used, can producc methanol (Emesh Technologies, in Parliamentary Protocol, 
2011a: II). 
Here, the discourse supports an incumbent technology, yet to be developed. 
This kind of co-evolution of discourses and technological innovations 
(Lovell, 2007) can lead to a change of locked-in regimes and initiate and 
promote sociotechnical transitions (Raven and Verbong, 2007), yet not 
automatically toward greener future. 
Finally, in the case of nuclear energy, the most suggestive actors in the policy 
network today include the Israeli electric company and the Minister of 
Energy and Water, which already announced his personal commitment to 
promote it (see chapter 6) and has offered a new scholarship scheme for 
students to study energy-related engineering and particularly nuclear 
engineering (Ministry of Energy and Water website, 2011). The times in 
which various stakeholders doubting the new paradigm of abundance are 
when they wish to highlight the disadvantages of their less favorite 
alternative. For example, when the CEO of the IEC has spoken about nuclear 
energy, he noted that the natural gas revolution, which brought the Israeli 
electricity sector to depend on 40% natural gas in the blinking of an eye, is a 
... danger to the reliability of supply. In contrast, nuclear energy successfully 
combines all the positive elements in term of price, GHG emission reduction, 
reliability, etc. (A. Lesker, IEC, in Israeli Association of Ecology and 
Environment Conference, 20 I 0). 
Other actors in the polity use the sense of abundance created specifically by 
nuclear energy at the stage when there is still no need to actually cope with 
its implications; the Ministry of Environment official considered in that 
respect, for example, that 
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... sustainability is all nice and good, but we consume energy, and it is 
impossible to say 'no' to everything (Y. Inbar, Ministry of Environment 
general-director, in Nuclear energy conference, 2009). 
5.6.2. Implications of the discourse of abundance 
Despite the unifying discourse used by the different policy networks to 
promote particular energy alternatives, the discourse of abundance is not a 
panacea for resolving conflicts between actors but rather a source of further 
tensions. For example. with respect to natural gas, policymakers and 
regulators in the Ministry of Environment argues that without appropriate 
legislation. drilling of natural gas can pose severe risk to marine and coastal 
environments and should therefore be treated with extreme caution. 
Similarly, the scarcity of land and constant threat to biodiversity from loss of 
open space pose a challenge to solar energy fields, dividing environmentalists 
to the pro-clean energy and the pro-biodiversity camps (Interview, VB). This 
kind of conflict that stems from contrasting values has been documented 
elsewhere as well (Barry et al., 2008; Jessup, 2010). Conflicting agenda is an 
interesting consequence of the effort of actors to construct a sense of 
abundance, as reflected in this very dynamic discursive shift. 
The discursive shift also implies changes in the roles of key actors, including 
the state. A socio-technical trajectory involving the oil shale alternative is 
represented as being in the "national interest". As Jasanoff and Kim 
(2009: 121) have suggested, this imagery is stabilized by the particular 
political culture in which other pathways are unlikely to develop: 
I am not against the State. If the state needs to produce energy we need to sit 
down and explore the options. But I know how it goes, we all know what 
happens when a pilot project only partially succeeds; I can stand in front of all 
the governmental ministries, I can tell here about all the pressures that the 
ministries have put on me even before the project was examined: evelybody 
are already in favor, before they even checked. (emphasis added, M. Dadon, 
Head of regional council, Adolam region, on the oil-shale project, in 
Parliamentary Minutes 2011 c: 15). 
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In such a political culture that approves short-term management strategies 
and quick "results", the discursive shift to abundance may mask questions 
regarding what is desirable by restricting the nature of possible future 
pathways. Policymakers will probably tend to see only the alternatives that 
can achieve such political conditions. It might also increase uncertainty and 
make future predictions and strategic planning harder, especially when the 
promise of abundance is made under unstable regulatory and institutional 
regImes. 
Restricted pathways and incertitudes inherent in the energy regime are also 
likely to influence interdependent regimes, such as the transportation sector 
and climate change policy. For instance, a transition to a more sustainable 
transportation system is likely to become discounted if Israel's energy sector 
becomes self-sufficient (MP D. Hanin, in Parliamentary Minutes, 2011 b). 
With respect to climate change policy, Israel was categorized as a non-Annex 
I or "developing" country in the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. Fittingly, Israel's policy makers have 
done little to promote the de-carbonization of the energy sector, although 
electricity generation and vehicle use are responsible for 83% of the 
country's CO2 emissions (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008; Alpert and 
Michaels, 2010). 
Although a transition from coal to natural gas in electricity generation would 
reduce the sector's GHG emissions substantially (Mckinsey & Company, 
2009; Alpert and Michaels, 20 I 0), greater availability of energy is less likely 
to encourage a change in perceptions of climate change and in patterns of 
consumption, two central detenninants of effective carbon reduction 
(Michaelis, 2007; Semenza et aI., 2008). Discourse of abundance may not 
only lead to growth in demand but also weaken core social values. For 
example, when reflecting on the discourse on 'hydrogen economy', 
Brossmann (2009) considers that: 
... if it is true that fantasies relating to energy consumption and abundance 
have become publicly standardized community values, they will continue to 
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mediate the experience of individuals until they arc identified and critically 
examined. [f taken to the extreme, values antithetical to consumption and 
abundance, such as conservation and environmental stewardship, could 
becomc socially unacccptable (Brossmann, 2009:5). 
Finally, implications of the discursive shift are manifested as overarching 
institutional changes. This can be understood in light of Phillips et a\.'s 
(2004:635) statement that " ... institutions ... can be understood as products of 
the discursive activity that influences actions". Despite the public opposition 
of the oil shale alternative and concerns over the nuclear one, the most 
extensive controversy was not about energy sources, but about fiscal policy 
regarding revenues and their distribution between the state and private gas 
companies (Bar-Eli, 20 I 0; StoiL 20 II). A committee was appointed by the 
Parliament to re-evaluate the fiscal policies on revenues and taxation. 
Politicians and committee members found themselves under pressure from 
groups that demanded increase in the state's share in the revenue from the 
discoveries. In turn, rent seeking by gas exploration companies was aimed at 
keeping the gas and oil royalties to the State at 12.5 percent and avoiding any 
further taxation. 
The public concern for the exploitation of energy resources such as natural 
gas and oil shale focused on the legal base of licensing, extraction and 
revenue distribution, that is, on the Petroleum Law of 1952. Critics sought to 
highlight the law's archaic nature, which provides free access to exploration 
of energy sources. This could have been fitting for a time when the State's 
energy security was one of its top priorities in the context of multiple threats. 
From an environmental perspective it was argued that giving a drilling 
permission on the basis of the Petroleum Law contradicts the formal 
procedure for large-scale projects, which requires the approval of the 
Planning Committees on the basis of the Planning and Building Law (1965) 
(Parliamentary Minutes, 201Ic). Unlike the Petroleum Law, the Planning and 
Construction Law requires an environmental impact assessment and invites 
public comments on the project. The drillings, however, were not subjected 
to such requirements. 
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Public campaIgn and experts' warnll1gs about the threat of the "Dutch 
disease" have helped to pass in the parliament in April 2011, a new law that 
increases the state's revenue from natural gas and oil production (Book of 
Laws, The State of Israel, 2011). The Minister of Finance has announced that 
the State's revenue from the discoveries will be directed to a designated 
public fund to avoid the Dutch disease or resource curse (Wolfson, 2011). 
These socio-economic concerns thus became integrated into the abundance 
discourse and helped to reduce public opposition to development of new 
energy resources by the relatively moderate changes to the law and revenue 
sharing. 
The public debate about energy alternatives is therefore remarkable 
considering that environmental matters such as climate change and air 
pollution rarely make headlines in the Israeli news. Energy issues are seldom 
framed in terms of social or ecological sustainability. As the Ministry of 
Environment notes, "we cannot yet talk about making sustainable energy 
policy We first need to talk about making energy policy". However, the 
discursive shift may point at the institutionalization of a new public sphere in 
places where it was excluded from/salient about. Traditionally, energy has 
been an issue for experts. Yet, other actors were able to exert some influence 
on decision makers in the debate by reframing energy-related issues as issues 
of social justice and economic equity. 
5.7. Conclusions 
This chapter aimed at showing how discursive institutionalism can reveal and 
highlight the less visible side of socio-technical transitions - that of how 
different ideas and interests of actors simultaneously drive and explain 
transitional processes. That IS, discursive institutionalism can help to 
complement the mostly structural approach of transition studies with an 
agent-based, actor-centred approach. 
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It was suggested in the introduction of this thesis that the discourse of 
abundance is in some ways similar to the more common discourse of scarcity 
in providing socio-political explanations of policy dynamics. International 
relations. glohal markets and national politics have been shaped by ideas of 
energy crisis and "peak oil". Nevertheless, the findings in this chapter 
suggest that the Israeli energy regime is shifting away from the traditional 
scarcity discourse towards a new discourse on energy abundance. 
The new energy abundance discourse was created by storylines, which 
depicted natural gas, oil shale. nuclear energy and solar energy as energy 
alternatives although their mainstreaming still faces formidable uncertainties. 
Some of them are also constrained by current geopolitical order and political 
relations in the region. Others depend on technological innovation and 
efficiency improvements, which in tum depend on reformulation of existing 
policies and regulations. That is, feasibility of all alternatives would require 
the creation of new institutional arrangements, regulative mechanisms and 
the change of existing law governing the energy regime. Yet, the findings 
highlight how discursive constructions, which actors use to promote their 
interests, can play an important role in socio-technical transitions, such as 
those of energy regimes. In the case of Israel's energy regime, the discourse 
of energy abundance can risk a transition toward greater sustainability by 
restricting possible pathways and masking alternative ways to achieve energy 
security. 
I have shown that discursive institutionalism can reveal and highlight the less 
visible side of socio-technical transitions - that of how different ideas and 
interests of actors simultaneously drive and explain transitional processes. 
That is, discursive institutionalism and policy networks analysis can help to 
complement the mostly structural approach of transition studies with an 
agent-based explanation. Since the discourse of abundance produces new 
conflicts (such as within the environmental camp), it is important, however, 
to warn against a linear projection of policy networks, meaning that the fact 
that several actors share similar ideas and interests behind their support in 
\02 
particular alternative does not means we can make any assumptions regarding 
future constellation of actors into a policy network and transition pathways. 
Finally, in this chapter I also highlighted important implications of this 
discursive shi Ii for contemporary socio-technical and institutional settings 
which have to do with conflicting environmental agendas; Israel's energy 
security; the ability to make future sectoral predictions and strategic long-
term planning; Israel's international relations; its climate change policy; 
embedded values related to consumption and sustainability; and the capacity 
of the public to influence policy-making on energy issues. A new 
"hydrocarbon governance" (Perreault and Valdivia, 2010:689) is needed, one 
which clearly maps future pathways and involves a wide range of actors 
while being aware of the problematic nature of a discourse on resources 
abundance. 
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6. The water-energy interface: coupled policy 
transitions 
6.1. Introduction 
"A crisis occurs when an ecosystem 
behaves in a surprising manner or when 
observations of a system are qualitatively 
different from people's expectations of 
that system." (Holling et ai., 2002:415) 
This chapter examines the inter-linkages in the unfolding of water and energy 
policies in Israel over the past several decades, and how these policy 
processes may be oriented towards greater ecological sustainability. The 
sectoral analysis of the water and energy transitions in chapters 4 and 5 has 
pointed to the many spills-over generated by the interplay of policies, 
technologies and discourses. The aim of this chapter is therefore to spell-out 
further inter-sectoral dependencies and their implications for sustainable 
sociotechnical transitions. 
Policy dynamics such as that of water and energy policies have been 
conceptualized by numerous theories in various disciplines such as public 
policy, political sciences and organizational management. As discussed in 
chapter 2, the literature on socio-technical transitions offers a promising 
approach to the refinement of policy dynamics (Huitema and Meijerink, 
2010a, 20 I Ob). Particularly, Transition Management is regarded as a 
promising policy approach and practice that could help to step out from the 
messy policy-making process portrayed by other various theories of agenda-
setting and environmental decision-making. Despite recent criticisms that it 
neglects the influence of power relations, transition management proposes a 
rational, incremental process and offers adaptive, strategic and participatory 
tools. 
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However, research on socio-technical transitions has mostly had "sectoral" 
focus. For instance, studies have examined transitions in national energy 
sectors, such as the switch from coal to natural gas (Rip and Kemp, 1998; 
Monstadt. 2(07) and the transition to hydrogen economy. Van Der Brugge et 
01. (2005), liisschcm()\\er ef 01. (2006) and Pahl-Wostl (2007) have in tum 
focused on transitions in water management. Multi-regime interactions (in a 
single sector) between Dutch electricity and gas regimes were examined by 
Raven and Verbong (2007). Kemp et al. (2006) have suggested that transition 
management will increasingly be applied in the energy, agriculture, mobility 
and biodiversity sectors in the Netherlands. 
This chapter draws on co-evolutionary ideas as a source of insights for a 
more integrated approach and uses it to understand how the transitions of 
Israel's water and energy regimes have been and are intertwined. Socio-
technical transitions are indeed already conceptualized in co-evolutionary 
terms. Scholars have depicted processes of variation, inheritance and 
selection, entangling tcchnical components and social actors or networks (see 
chapter 2). Technology, however, is not exogenously designed, developed or 
replaced in a vacuum of single sector regime. Rather, technology is formed 
within a wider context of the social system that goes beyond its particular 
function, which can be a transformation of energy into electricity or seawater 
into drinking water. Technological solutions in different regimes do not only 
share similar features (size, materials, costs) but can also reinforce and 
legitimize their reciprocal development. 
Integrated transitions management, as a form of cross-regimes perspective, is 
therefore of importance both analytically and instrumentally in environmental 
issues which are often interrelated and interconnected (Gunderson and 
Holling, 2002). That is, a transition in one sphere is likely to be related, 
influencing or influenced by another transition. While Smith et al. (2003: to) 
have already noted that "infrastructures supportive of the incumbent regime 
and the co-evolution of interdependencies with other regimes, can act to lock 
regime development deeper into historical trajectories" and while Shove 
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(2004), Gcels (2007) and Raven and Verbong (2007) examine multi-regime 
interactions, this kind of analysis is still largely missing in the transition 
management literature. The premise of this thesis is that a more integrative 
approach to socio-technical transitions can highlight issues that are essential 
to a more comprehensive understanding of transitions, their implications for 
the environment, and their successful implementation. Likewise, the 
understanding of how co-evolutionary processes can lead to deep economic, 
institutional or technological changes, or alternatively to stabilization and 
stagnation trends (such as locks-in), could be enhanced by looking at coupled 
transitions and exploring the possibilities for more integrative management. 
The interactions of water and energy regimes in Israel forms an interesting 
case study for examining these types of interactions, as both water and 
energy have been scarce resources since the foundation of the State and 
hence have been the focus of a great deal of policy and political attention. 
This chapter describes how the water and energy regimes have largely been 
developed under separate policy processes (see also chapters 4 and 5), so the 
interactions between them have largely been side-effects rather than 
strategically planned, for example as the result of environmental problem 
displacement. Recent plans for the widespread use of energy-intensive 
seawater desalination technology to provide fresh water and discussions 
about the adoption of nuclear power, which requires significant amounts of 
cooling water, highlight the increasing interactions between these two 
regimes. With traditional decision-making and policy implementation that is 
undertaken mainly within sectoral boundaries and lack of in-place integrative 
mechanisms, these physical, geographical, institutional and financial 
interdependencies will not necessarily contribute to long-term ecological 
sustainability. This chapter and chapter 7 that follows suggest a preliminary 
investigation of the potential of "integrated transitions management" to offer 
a more coherent, long-term and sustainable approach, not only for the water 
and energy sectors, but for other environmental-related regimes as well. 
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In what follows, the next section outlines the theoretical framework used to 
support the findings presented in this chapter. The following section focuses 
on the empirical case-study and highlights main trends in water and energy 
management in Israel. Because many of these were covered in previous 
chapters, I will only highlights the elements most relevant to the question of 
how do the interdependencies of socio-technical regimes affect their 
transition. The fourth section examines links between the two SOCIO-
technological regimes, and discusses the prospects and limitations of the 
transition management model to deal and direct these kinds of 
interdependencies. Further investigation of the TM model is undertaken in 
chapter 7. 
6.2. Four-fold framework 
Since governmental entities continue to play an important role in the 
governance and management of natural resources and particularly water 
(Bakker, 2003a; Huitema and Meijerink, 20 lOb), the polity continues to form 
the main arena in which crucial process are decided upon. Four 
complementary conceptual approaches to understanding the policy-making 
process have been proposed and will be further evaluated in this chapter: 
policy dynamics, socio-technical transition, policy integration and co-
evolution. I suggest here that insights from each of these may be combined to 
produce a framework to better understand inter-sectoral dynamics. 
6.2.1. Policy dynamics 
Explanations of policy dynamics often revolve around the appearance of 
problems, or perceived problems to policy-makers as drivers of dynamics. 
When a problem is forced onto the macro-political agenda, or when viable 
solutions are more clearly perceived, the system would enter a state of 
disequilibrium, which bears a high potential for change (Baumgartner et al., 
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2006). Sabatier and Jcnkins-Smith had doubted, however, that mmor 
problems can bc enough to calise a policy change and claimed that dynamics 
are mainly induced by shocks or crises (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). 
These cxtemal events interact with intemal competition between advocacy 
coalitions over different ideas and values (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994). 
The role of problems in driving policy dynamics is also central to the 
'primeval soup' model of the policy process. According to Kingdon (1995), 
certain issues come to the attention of policymakers and are put forward 
through three parallel streams: recognizing problems, generating solutions, 
and deploying political interest. However, for him, problems and solutions as 
carriers of change cannot always be distinguished, as policy entrepreneurs 
tend to construct problems to which solutions were pre-formulated. 
6.2.2. Socio-technical transitions 
Transition, as a long, multi-stage period of structural change from one 
system-state to another (Van Ocr Brugge et af., 2005), embeds not only the 
alteration of policies, but co-evolutionary dynamics of infrastructures, 
regulations, institutions, networks, and users' perceptions and practices 
(Verbong and Geels, 2007). A Socio-technical transition framework adds a 
conceptual link between technology and technological artefacts, and the 
policy/change domains, by focusing on the forces behind innovative 
technologies. The transition management literature understands that, whilst 
previous changes of the system did not necessarily happen in a planned or 
desirable way, in order to achieve environmental sustainability, a deliberate 
steering of change is needed. An important contribution of the transition 
management model is that it argues that analysis of past transitions can be 
used to create typologies and analyse potential future transition pathways 
(Geels and Schot, 2007; Foxon et aI., 2010), in order to inform policies 
aiming to guide future transitions. Transition management therefore aims at a 
long-term desirable social change and development by the use and 
coordination of interactions between social actors, co-evolutionary processes 
and a modulation of collective chosen goals (Hoogma and Kemp, 2002). 
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6.2.3. Policy integration 
A third body of work considers the prospects of policy integration In 
promoting policy coherence, successful implementation, and positive 
outcomes. Policy integration is defined as the attempt of different sections 
within one department or different governmental sectors to create synergies 
between policies and use the same goals to formulate it (Geerlings and Stead, 
2003). Especially. the integration of environmental considerations into 
general policies was emphasised by researchers (Hertin and Berkhout, 2003; 
Lafferty and Hovden. 2003; Nilsson and Eckerberg, 2007). It is widely 
acknowledged that even in the 'crowded policy space', where policies will 
unavoidably interfere with others (Majone, 1989), some sort of national 
cohesion, cooperation and integrative policy-making would lie at the heart of 
any effective policy process. Yet, integration of information, actors, resources 
and goals between different sectors within the polity and organisational 
support that "transcends institutionally-defined policy fields" (Geerlings and 
Stead, 2003: 194) is considered hard to find theoretically and practically, in 
traditional governmental structures (6, 2004). 
6.2.4. Co-evolutionary theory 
Finally, co-evolutionary theorising also helps to shed light on interlinked 
social transformation. The key ideas about the co-evolution of socio-
ecological systems (as developed by Norgaard, 1984) can also be applied to 
co-evolution of interlinked social and technological systems vis-a-vis their 
ecological counterparts. Or, in other words, some of the key ideas of co-
evolutionary thinking can be amalgamated with those of transitions 
management to shed light on parallel transitions. 
6.2.5. Integrated approach 
169 
Most environmental policy-making studies narrowly assume that individual 
policies can be formulated, analysed or reified separately from other policies 
and their possible range of concomitant issues (Peters, 1992), although a few 
studies have debated the need for better environmental policy integration 
(Scrase and Sheate, 2002; Coffey and Major, 2005; Watson et al., 2008). I 
propose that a more comprehensive analysis of policy dynamics (change or 
continuation) needs to recognize the multi-scales, multi-actors, interrelated 
and co-evolutionary relation between and across policy domains, and thus 
needs to take a more integrative perspective. The socio-technical transitions 
approach adds value here by examining how the interactions between social 
and technical clements can promote or hinder wider systems change. 
Examining co-evolution of interacting systems adds to this by investigating 
causal influences from one system to another system's evolutionary 
dynamics (Murmann, 2003). A combination of these approaches, with 
insights from policy dynamics and policy integration, leads to the observation 
that integrated transitions management could have potential to overcome 
short-term thinking in the policy arena as welI as ease controversies between 
different networks of actors. 
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Figure 13: Four-fold framework connects dynamics, transitions, integration 
and co-evolution approaches to policy processes 
The presented theories are complementary to each other and form a quarto-
partite frame, as visualized in Figure 13 above. Reading horizontally, the top-
half of the Figure links 'policy dynamics' and 'policy integration', two 
frameworks for analysing policy, and the bottom-half of the Figure links two 
frameworks for analysing socio-technical change: 'socio-technical 
transitions' and 'co-evolution'. Reading vertically, the left-half of the Figure 
links 'policy dynamics' with 'socio-technical transitions' which occur in a 
single sector, and the right-half of the Figure links 'policy integration' with 
'co-evolution' which occur between sectors and between different systems 
and processes. 
In what follows, I will apply this integrative approach to examine interrelated 
dynamics, with a focus on the meso-level of the regime, in water and energy 
sectors in Israel, drawing on insights from the above theoretical approaches. 
Section 6.3 reminds the reader of the key policy dynamics in water and 
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energy management, and sets out key elements of on-going socio-technical 
transitions. Section 6.4 examines policy dynamics, integration and co-
evolutionary processes between the water and energy regimes and offers 
insights from integrating the four approaches to inform current policy 
dynamics. 
6.3. Water and energy regimes in Israel 
Strategies of natural resource management are constantly changing in Israel. 
Uncertainties and rapid changes that the State has faced in its short period of 
existence have required quick yet robust solutions for preserving and 
exploiting natural assets. The State has had to battle different degrees of 
water and energy scarcities from its formation. In the two previous chapters, I 
described how the Water Law was designed in order to maintain control over 
precious and sometimes disputed sources, and to support the agricultural 
vision of the State's founders and the reinforcement of national sovereignty 
over the environment. The Israeli electricity sector shares similar 
characteristics and is also centrally managed by the Israeli Electricity 
Corporation (Tishler et aI., 2002). In terms of securing resources, and as a 
result of its geopolitical situation, Israel is depicted as an "energy island". Its 
economy depends on imported oil, coal, and natural gas. Recent years have 
witnessed more change, however. I also illustrated how market-oriented 
reforms have influenced policies, regulations, institutional structures, 
technological choices, supply sources and efficiency measures within these 
two sectors. Both water and energy sectors can therefore be considered as 
systems in transition, the long-term consequences of which are as of yet not 
known. 
At the centre of these dynamics is the adoption of seawater desalination 
technology as the leading policy strategy in Israel to deal with what has been 
termed the "water crisis", thus advancing the creation of a new water regime. 
Crucially, however, seawater desalination, even with the best available 
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technology, is an energy-intensive water production mechanism and carbon 
emissions are consequently high, compared with other water supply 
solutions. Desalination, as a magical solution to water scarcity, is therefore a 
prominent example of the water-energy-climate nexus, with its various 
environmental manifestations. The coupled policy dynamics between these' 
sectors, and the extent to which these are leading to co-evolving transitions 
towards or away from sustainability, is therefore at the focus of this chapter. 
6.3.1. Dynamics in water management 
A need to secure fresh water resources to fulfil increasing demands of the 
rapidly developing nation was clear to the founders and first water 
professionals in the pre-state period, and had fed what Molle et al. (2009) 
termed the 'hydraulic mission' and the emergence of 'water bureaucracies'. 
However, what has increasingly emerged as a social construction of water 
scarcity and later of a 'crisis' was the result of the high rate of population 
growth (the number of households in Israel for example increased from 1.2 
million in 1990 to 2.1 million in 2009) and the chase after modem, western 
life-style, as well as a long legacy of neglect, mismanagement and disregard 
of continuous droughts, salinization and pollution of water sources. For 
instance, it was observed that already in the beginning of this century, nearly 
20% of the coastal aquifer could not be utilized due to high salinity caused by 
seasonal over-pumpmg (Zaslavsky, 2000). Moreover, scarcity was 
considered to demand the creation of centralized, national water management 
institutions and technologies, which in tum have allowed the economic 
development of the State (see chapter 4). 
Until recently, the agricultural sector was allocated more than half of total 
fresh water consumption and a strong agricultural lobby was undermining 
any attempts to lower the abstraction rate or to raise water prices (Feitelson, 
2005). Water shortage in one reservoir was offset by a policy of overdraft in 
the other reservoirs, a policy which counted on subsequent wet years 
(Fischhendler and Heikkila, 2010). A series of dry years is not an exceptional 
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occurrence, however. A parliamentary document has recorded a regular 
pattem of signi ficantly drier years than the long-tenn average in 1983-1986, 
1988-19X9 and 199X-2001 (Tal, 2010), as can he seen in Figure 14. 
According to the IW A, measurements also indicate a sharp decline in average 
precipitation in the last few years, as shown in Figure 15, most likely due to 
global climate change (Alpert et 01., 2008). Yet over-pumping has continued 
to lower Israel's water resources below the "red lines,,29. 
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Figure 14: Streamflow Drought Index (SOl) for the Sea of Galilee (Lake 
Kinneret) hydrological basin. Source: A Report on the Annual Rainfall Season 
and its Main Hydrological Characteristics 2011. The Hydrological Service, 
Jerusalem. 
29 The "red-lines" are hydrological indicators of the minimum water levels in the Sea of 
Galilee and Aquifers at which water should no longer be drawn from the lake. The line is 
arbitrary: water experts are in disagreements exactly where the line should be set. Also, it 
was lowered several times in order to continue pumping. There is also a "blaek line" set at 
215 meters below sea levels, below which the lake will suffer irreversible ecological 
damages. 
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Figure 15: Percentage of annual rainfall in comparison with the annual average 
(national) 1985-2010. Source: A Report on the Annual Rainfall Season and its 
Main Hydrological Characteristics 2011. The Hydrological Service, Jerusalem. 
As detailed in chapter 4, to address the severe shortage, the first large scale 
desalination plant (the biggest of its kind in the world) entered service in 
2005 and two others have since been finished. A major impediment to their 
construction was the Ministry of Agriculture and the agricultural lobby. They 
were active opponents of desalination, fearing that the increase in the price of 
water will fall on the farmers (Feitelson, 2005). Ministry of Finance also 
objected to these expensive public projects30 without guarantees of a full cost 
recovery by an increase in the price of water. Meanwhile, a major saving of 
freshwater was made by reuse of domestic sewage by farmers (Mekorot, 
2010). 
Past controversies between ministries over financing and budgeting of water 
projects became irrelevant with the breakthrough in desalination technology. 
At the same time, a special government department for Public-Private 
30 Investigation committee minutes. 2010. For example: S. Simhon, Minister of Agriculture, 
minutes. 2009; Prof. R. Samiet, academic, desalination engineering, minutes, 2008. 
Available on-line at http: dYQn 1.C:O!trt.£QyjJ~brlliI)Il11m:_oLLbtm (Hebrew). Last accessed: 
19.9.2010. 
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Partnerships (PPP) was established. While the institutional apparatus of 
water management is still largely based on a divided tenure between 
municipalities (collection of water bills and wastewater treatment) and the 
state (abstractions, allocations and distribution), desalination plants are 
constructed through BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) and BOO (Build-Own-
Operate) agreements and are forming a new arena for public-private 
partnerships (Deane, 2003). Together with recent initiatives to increase the 
role of business in municipal sewage treatment, desalination plants exemplify 
the partial privatization of water management in Israel. 
A review of parliament's decisions and future plans prepared by the Israeli 
Water Authority (lW A 2009a) on strategic decisions in water management 
indicates that a transition from fresh-water supply to desalinated sea-water 
supply for the urban sector (which in 2010 is the main water consumer) will 
be completed before the year 2020. Long-terms implications of this strategy 
are not clear. There are concerns for the impacts of desalination on marine 
environment, its energy costs and need of space at valuable seashore (Garb, 
2010). Moreover, increased availability of water could amplify demand 
(Meerganz Von Medeazza, 2005). Yet, calls for demand-side management 
remain largely omitted. It seems that "everyone wants more water" and even 
environmentalists hardly challenge this prevailing paradigm: 
I would tell you something to sparkle your thesis; desalination is a necessity 
and it will also be good for the environment (Interview, a leading 
environmentalist). 
6.3.2. Dynamics in energy management 
As I already noted in the previous chapter, with a projected steady growth of 
required generation capacity per annum, a new 500MW plant would be 
required every year. Failure to do so could cause electricity shortages and 
economic losses. The last thing any minister would like to be responsible for 
is an electricity deficit. This concern is reflected in the principles guiding the 
sector's managers: 'robustness', 'non-regret' and 'safety', all aiming at 
176 
seCUrIng supply at any cost (Interview, SV). With a discovery of a large 
reservoir of natural gas in the Israel's Mediterranean territorial waters, some 
actors within the energy regime are currently pushing for the abandonment of 
coal and the transition to the use of natural gas. It was claimed that the lEe 
is not eager to do this because it would lose its monopoly of importing coal, 
would no longer need as many workers on the power-plants as before and 
because it would il1\'ohe a cut in price of electricity for consumers. Most 
importantly, the lEe might have to abandon its plans for a new coal power-
plant, it was promoted intensively for a decade. At the time of writing, it was 
therefore estimated that the fuel mix will not contain more than 40% of 
natural gas (Tal, 2009). 
In the prevIous chapter I have also discussed the emergence of different 
energy alternatives to the current coal-based energy regime. Indeed, one of 
the latest developments in the energy sector is the emergence of discourse on 
nuclear energy. The origins of this discourse can be easily traced. Nuclear 
energy has experienced a revival in the developed world. For example, the 
United Kingdom published a White Paper in January 2008 stressing that the 
continuation of nuclear energy is of public interest as part of the UK's low 
carbon energy mix to help meet carbon reduction targets and to ensure energy 
supplies (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2009). A similar rhetoric is 
used to advocate nuclear energy in Israel: 
Bringing in atomic energy can improve our international position in terms of 
GHG emission and polluters ... the Ministry of Environment would like to 
make a comprehensive assessment of the environmental impacts of atomic 
energy .. .it won't be right to reject it out of hand because of its potential 
environmental impacts (Chief Scientist, The Ministry of Environment. In: 
Feasibility of nuclear energy in Israel conference, 2009) 
The general director of the lEe explained the advantages of nuclear energy: 
We think that nuclear plant is the ultimate solution in the next decade, after 
we solve the political barrier. We, in the IEC insist to be prepared for this 
issue, even if it is progressing at slow pace. And, if we could know today that 
preparation for nuclear will really start in 2014-2015, we could now turn to 
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th~ g()\~nlln~llt alld say callcd th~ planll~d coal power-plant. If w~ want to 
anlid building this PO\\lT-plant. \\~ h,l\e to start working today on nuclear 
~n~rgy at both political and t~chnological levels (A. L~sker, A. General 
director. IE(' at h'asiblilly of Iluclear en~rgy in Israel cunfcr~nc~, 2009). 
Another eff~cti\\: way to mak~ nuclear energy look better is to contrast it 
with renewable energy: 
Incorporating r~n~\\ able ~n~rgy intn the grid is too costly; to transmit from 
the southern region of Israel to th~ northern ... and there is also the premium 
that is \"I:ry e\p~nsi\e ... \\hile nuclear energy is the cheapest means to reduce 
GII(; emissioll. (Elmakiyas. D. Director, Planning, Development & 
Technology L'nit. lEe at feasibility of nuclear energy in Israel conference, 
20(9). 
The Israeli govemment and particularly the Minister of Water and Energy are 
also dominant proponents of nuclear energy and discuss it as an inevitable 
altemativc: the Minister declared his personal commitment to examine the 
potential of nuclear energy fix the Israeli electricity sector during a visit to 
; I France on March 20 10 . 
Interestingly, the recent ncar-catastrophe events 111 Fukushima, Japan, have 
had no significant effect on the official positive attitude toward nuclear 
energy: this can be explained by the belief that future fourth generation 
power-plants can be riskless and by the general "technological optimism" 
approach that is held by many Israeli policy-makers (see for example Tal, 
2008). The growing recognition of the feasibility of civil nuclear energy is 
clear in the light of numerous citations of nuclear energy in local media and 
scientific-puhlic events on this topic, particularly during 2009-2010. 
31 So fer, R. and DareL Y. (20 I 0, ~1arch 7). Israel will announce: we will built nuclear power-
plants. yllL'l. , Imn; .. ~' \~·\\_c).Oct,·(l,lLar!!-:b (l." 3-l0,L·3X5922X,OO.htm\, Last Accessed: 
24.6.2010 (Hebrew). 
17R 
6.4. Discussion: Policy and socio-technical interactions between 
water and energy regimes in Israel 
6.4.1. Policy dynamics and policy integration between water and 
energy regimes 
Transitions of the \\ater and energy sectors in Israel are coupled in several 
ways. The first link hetween water and energy in the Israeli context is 
historical: the integratiw system of water distribution required the 
transportation of water from the Sea of Galilee (as the central reservoir of 
freshwater) in the North to the other parts of the country. When this massive 
project of pumps and pipelines was completed in the end of the 1960s, it 
consumed almost 14 of total electricity energy generation, because its 
operation involves lifting water from 209-213 meters below sea level to an 
elevation of 151 meters ahove sea level. Still today, the water sector is the 
largest industrial consumer of electricity and is responsible for 6% of the total 
energy consumption in the country, with oil distillation and the chemical and 
mining industries the closest behind (Grossman. 2007; Central Boreau of 
Statistics, 2009). 
Desalination is a key example of the connections between the water system 
and the energy system (Schiffler. 2004). The Reverse Osmosis technique, 
which is more energy efticient than older technologies (Semiat, 2008), is still 
an energy-intensive water production solution (King ef 01., 2008), even 
though technological improvements in recent years kept lowing the amount 
of energy needed in the process. Electricity consumption by the water sector 
is expected to be doubled. from 2.8 billion kW in 2006 to approx. 5.7 billion 
kW in 2015 (Figure 16) with tull use of desalination, increasing in the short 
tenn the Israeli water sector's share of total energy consumption by 
approximately 2-4% (Position paper. water and energy team, IW A, 2009b). 
When fuelled by coal-based electricity. carbon emissions of desalination will 
be high. According to Australian calculations each desalination plant of 45 
million cubic meter capacity would generate annual C02 emissions of 
179 
135,000 tonnes, if powered by coal-based electricity on ly (Proust ef a i ., 
2007) . To emphas ise the water-energy nexus, (Meerganz Von Medeazza, 
2008) sugges ts look ing at desa lination technology as a black box: turning 
sa line water into frc hwater invo lves seawater and energy as inputs and 
freshwater, greenhouse gases and concentrated brine as outputs. 
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Figure 16: Current and future projections of total energy use (billion kW per 
year) by the water sector in Israel. Source: Position paper, water and energy 
team, IWA, 2009 (Hebrew). 
De alination has al 0 a spat ial manifestation of the water-energy nexus. 
Water plant tenders include the pem1ission to build a natural gas based power 
plant to generate the about 75 mW required by desalination (at a capacity of 
150 million cubic meter ). It could therefore be expected that new natural gas 
plants would appear along the coast, bes ide the new sources of water. Yet, 
this link i not merely geographical but rather economic because the 
desalination company \ hich have won three out of five tenders (with 
negotiation still continuing on the fourth desa lination plant) has offered the 
lowest price for the production of water, mainly because it also drills natural 
gas that wou ld po er these desa li nation plants (as well as half of the 
IHO 
country's needs). This has already been tagged as the new monopoly, a 
. . I l' prIvate one cross-cuttlllg water ant energy sectors -. 
Another link is institutional. I kre is where policy integration, which aims at 
creating synergies between policies and coordination between different actors 
and departments, is probably most needed to achieve greater implementation 
as well as better outcomes. It may be expected that the physical integration of 
infrastructures. as in the case of desalination, could give rise to high 
capacities of policy integration and inter-sectoral cooperation. This, 
however, was found not to be the case. The analysis of interviews with major 
stakeholders and minutes of governmental departments points to the fact that 
major issues, such as energy considerations. were raised and considered only 
at late stages and after the policy was already formulated. First formal 
discussion on energy requirements for large-scale desalination is found only 
in the National Planning Committee minutes, from the year 20 I O. This can be 
partially explained by the inereased perception of urgency with respect to 
water deficit that masked any other consideration. In addition, there was a 
lack of integrative accounting for future carbon emissions and international 
commitments on their reduction as well as lack of involvement of, and 
coordination between. central stakeholders such as the Israeli Electricity 
Corporation. and the Water Authority OW A. 2009b; Interview, ZL) 
Many western countries are making efforts to reduce carbon emissions as a 
response to growing a\vareness of climate change and to commitments to 
address it (see for example DECC, 2009). The efforts to reduce CO2 
emissions will certainly impact the water sector as well, for example through 
technological improvements in water industries and household retrofitting of 
taps and toilet bowls. In a country such as the UK, where water is considered 
32Bar-EIi. A. (20 I O. 20 January). Israel becomes an energy emirate: who are the winners and 
how much money there IS 111 the reserves'!. The Marker. 
http: .. /www.thcmar~CL~_Q1lU!L.!L~~ts_L~.(~:l~59 (Hebrew). Last accessed: 14.4.2012. 
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"dirt cheap" because "one could not get a cubic meter of dirt delivered to the 
door for the C 3 currently charged for that volume of water" (McDonald, 
2007), climate change should he seen as a driving force for transition. 
However, if at all. climate change seems to drive Israeli transitions only in 
the energy sector, not in the water sector. Unsurprisingly, with a perception 
of severe water deficit. in the eyes of water professionals, reducing carbon 
emission is not a top priority (Kidar et aL 20 I 0). 
Finally, the water-energy nexus could be looked at as large amounts of water 
are needed to produce electricity in power-plants. According to the lEe data, 
the largest coal power plant in Israd uses as much as 330,000 ton seawater in 
one hour. Whilst nuclear power-plants use and consume significantly more 
water per kW than electricity generation powered by fossil fuels, the location 
for a future civil nuclear power plant in Israel was designated already years 
ago in the middle of the desert (Ministy of Interior, 1965). The questions of 
how and from where the water required will be sourced, have not yet 
. ~1 
received much attentIon', despite the evolving discourse around nuclear 
energy. It can be concluded, that the policy dynamics, revolves around the 
unaltered, implicit. core bdief in the need to secure independent and 
unlimited sources of water and energy. 
6.4.2. Socio-technical transitions and co-evolution in the water and 
energy regimes 
I now examine the extent to which socio-technical transitions within, and co-
evolution between, the water and energy regimes are occurring. Firstly, based 
on the analysis made in chapters 4 and 5 it can be determined that both 
regimes demonstrate transitional tendencies, which are manifested in the 
entrance of new actors. new mles, changing relationship of networks, and 
J3 Laster. y, (2009. 17 August), Nuclear power plant in the Negev? And where would the 
water corne from',' Commentary published in The Murker. (Hebrew), 
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institutional reforms. The centrali/ed. \ertically integrated production-supply 
chain (by lEe in electricity and .\ldoro' in water) has been altered, with the 
appearance of partially privati/ed production solutions. Decentralization of 
production hecame increasingly viahle with the growing acceptance of the 
potential of natural gas for electricity production and seawater for drinking 
water. The gO\crnmcntal intcntion. to rcduce the power of the national water 
and energy utilitics and thcir natural monopolies, has been a dominant force 
in each regimc. as wcl1 as cross-regimcs. This, however, may result in the 
creation of a new monopoly. hccausc it had opened the possibility for 
desalination companics to generatc their own electricity, thus strengthening 
their hold O\"l:r both water and cncrgy production. 
Secondly. thc unfolding transitions were largely caused by punctuations, 
rather than incrcmental dc\·e1opments. In the water sector it was the 
breakthrough in dcsalination that triggered a transition. The energy sector 
was punctuatcd by the unexpected discovery of natural gas in the 
Mediterranean, which is questioning the need to build a new coal power 
plant. The new situation. where the Minister of Water and Energy and the 
Israeli Electric Company feel that their intluence on the current transitions is 
weakening, has fed an emerging discourse on nuclear energy. Yet, a cross-
regime perspective reveals that the "vicious supply-demand cycle" (Kallis, 
20 I 0) is also inter-sectoral. This refers to mutual positive feedbacks as efforts 
to expand supply lead to potential for increases in demand and so forth. 
Thirdly, processes of co-evolution have dominated both regimes. In the water 
sector, large hydraulic configurations were supported by narratives of 
development and exogenously detemlined demand. In the energy sector, 
anticipated increase of electricity demand was similarly reinforced by the 
strategy of supply-side management. Once all planned desalination works are 
in place and additional power plants are constructed, it might be harder to 
shift the paradigm; the government, as well as the private investors, would 
have economic and political interests that demand will not fall. This would 
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further hamper niche-innmations in\'Cstments. 111 tor example, renewable 
energy technology. 
6.4.3. Integrated transitions management 
This suggests that combining insights from co-evolution, transitions theory 
and policy integration could gin: rise to virtuous rather than vicious cycles, 
whereby cff0l1S to mo\'e to renewable energy sources and to manage demand, 
for example. reduce the need for expansion of fossil fuel or nuclear power 
supply, thus reducing both ecological and political pressures. Integrated 
transitions management could therefore play a crucial role in re-orienting 
trajectories in the water and energy sectors. Transition arenas, where actors 
can interact. express and exchange their agendas and prospects 
(Meadowcroft, 2005). could be opened, at least in early stages of the process, 
to other networks actors. lIne is where trade-offs and policy spills-over can 
be identified explicitly. A more careful design of the transition arena might 
reduce sectoral leverage, sectoral interests and transaction costs. Integration 
of actors from different sectors would encourage shared goals formulation, 
could have the power to create a paradigm shift and to support a transition 
from supply-side management to demand- side management, for example by 
the method of inter-sectoral scenarios or backcasting (see heuristic stages of 
TM Figure 17). 
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Figure 17: The integrative transition management cycle. My additions (in 
dashed line arrows) to the transition management cycle image in Loorbach 
(2007: 115). 
One possible outcome or what is tem1ed as a transition pathway, from an 
integrative management, could be a dec ision to increase electricity prices for 
consumers, rather than water prices34 ; this mi ght better reflect the true cost of 
desalinated water, This however, requires a cross-sectoral comprehensive 
management. The transition management model has highlighted how 
important it is to encourage industrial sector to continue exp loring potential 
innovations, The added value of integrated transitions management would be 
34 I thank Dr. Sinya Nethanyahu from T AHAL Group water consultant company for 
insightful comments on thi s issue. 
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In specific innovations that may support a resolution of the water-energy 
nexus. for e:\ampk hy ad\'ancing renewable energy technologies for 
desalination. the co-generation of water and energy, extra efficient 
desalination memhranes. cOllpkd centralisation of water and energy 
production and delivering systems. and more. 
6.4.3. l.ITM and discursive institutionalism 
To adopt this approach and achicve greater policy integration, as outlined 
above. would require significant institutional changes, which would likely to 
be resisted by key actors. such as relevant ministries (agriculture, 
infrastructures). water-related business companies and the Israeli Electricity 
Company. that arc ahle to exert power under current institutional 
arrangements. Earlier on I ha\'e argued that discursive institutionalism 
contributes interesting insights regarding to the role of discourses in 
transitions: paradigms shins and constmction of storylines held by policy 
networks, reveal hidden sides and power-relations over the backstage of any 
transition. As much as Shove and Walker (2007) were right in warning 
against the masking of po\\ow-rdations in transition management process, it 
is true that the assumption, about the ability of ITM approach to avoid the ills 
of politics by the creation of shared arenas, should also be treated with 
suspicion. Lawhon and Murphy (2012) accused mainstream transition 
management advocators in assuming, for example, that the 'right' group of 
elite people and the 'right' kind of collaboration, would be able to direct 
transitions toward optimal sustainable outcomes. The ITM approach might, 
however, be able to reduce elitism and technocrat-ism in transition 
management process by avoiding the regular setting of one individual sector, 
in which power-relations are already in their traditional form, and by joining 
together actors which have no established way of making decision. Finally, 
discourses that give risc to institutions, as happened in both the water and 
energy regimes, can be expected to be "coherent, structured and ... supported 
by broader discourses and arc not highly contested by competing discourses" 
(Phillips el al., 2004:645). ITM cannot avoid 'winners' and 'losers', but it 
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should be able to cross-krtilise difkrent discourses promoted by different 
actors that currently haye no channds of communication. 
6.5. Conclusions 
The study of interactions and policy dynamics between the water and energy 
sectors in Israd exemplifies the \alue of integrating the four different 
theoretical approaches. The four-fold model examines how sectoral dynamics 
are couplcd and technological regimes co-evolve. More than a decade after 
the observation that "the state has long sought to manage the environment 
based on the assumption that the 'em'ironment' can be divided into discrete 
entities for management purposes" (Bryant and Wilson, 1998:323), policy 
oriented research. such as transition management. should not underestimate 
the consequences of such an approach. 
The results of this analysis highlight the weaknesses of a single-sector 
approach to transitions. Niche-induced developments, in both the Israeli 
water and energy sector. are driven each by an inherent strategy of supply-
side management. At the meso-level of the regime, abundance of water 
requires the abundance of energy. This supports my theoretical assertion that 
inter-sectoral "systems of production and consumption" (Hofman, 2005) are 
interlinked and intertwined. Ultimately. in an attempt to secure resources, a 
pattern is created wherein technological solutions co-evolve across different 
regimes. It is indeed important not to view integration as a panacea (Coffey 
and Major, 2005; Russel and Turnpenny, 2009). Nevertheless, integrated 
transitions management should be able to offer a more centripetal approach; 
long-term goal formulation in the transition management process should 
aIlow for more comprehensive transition pathways to emerge, and interactive 
arenas may encourage participation of inter-sectoral networks of actors. A 
more careful design of the transition arena might therefore reduce sectoral 
leverages, sectoral interests and transaction costs. Without the appreciation of 
interdependencies in technological regimes, sustainability goals might still be 
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lagging behind. This highlights how examining policy integration can inform 
policy dynamics. and how examining co-evolution between sectors can 
highlight dri\ers or barriers to sectoral socio-technical transitions. 
To conclude. Fischhendler and Heikkila (20 I 0) have argued that the Israeli 
water management institutions are "trapped" and face an embedded difficulty 
to adapt. reform and cope with changing water supply and demand 
conditions. They explained this to be a result of the extensive physical and 
institutional integration within the water system, an explanation which can be 
valid also for the energy sector. Notwithstanding. when looking at the policy 
dynamics. structural changes and choices in both sectors, supply management 
could be explained by the interdependency of the two technological regimes. 
The rise of large scale technological configurations in both sectors is hardly 
accidentaL and cannot be explained solely by the "consumerist syndrome" 
(Bauman. 2005) nor the need to supply ever-lasting growth in demands. 
Rather. this interdependency is embedded in socio-technical systems and 
might be essential to their change. 
7. Managing integrated transitions: a discussion 
7.1. Introduction 
... And I try, oh my god do I try / I try all 
the time, in this institution / And I pray, 
oh my god do I pray I I pray every single 
day I For a revolution (4 Non Blondes) 
The goal of this research was to examine interdependent policy dynamics 
with relation to the challenge of socio-environmental sustainability. The 
particular research questions dealt each with the dynamics between 
technological. discursiw and policy changes and further aspired to explore 
the merits of these relations from inter-sectoral perspective. Obviously, the 
nature of this relationship is neither quantitiable nor linear. It is rather 
interpretative. interactive and adaptive. In applying this theoretical postulate 
to the water-energy nexus in Israel. the intention of this thesis was to offer 
important empirical evidence to support and test academic debates 
surrounding the sources and implications of policy changes and continuation. 
Therefore, the various strands of the analysis in this thesis have taken 
forward the policy dynamic literature, by combining it with sociotechnical 
transitions and policy integration literatures. 
The aim of this chapter is to critically reflect upon the empirical findings 
presented in chapters four. five and six, with an interest to linking my 
research questions with the wider academic debate. This chapter is divided 
into two major parts. The tirst section 7.2 provides a short summary of what 
has been done in the thesis up to this point and the main empirical findings. 
The second part, (sections 7.3 and 7.4) addresses my three research questions 
one by one. 
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7.2. Summary of findings 
To achieve the goal of the thesis. several strands of the literature were 
reviewed including policy dynamics and sociotechnical transitions (as part of 
larger SST framework). Combining these two large and divcrse bodies of 
literature. a theoretical void was identified. It was observed that existing 
approaches to policy dynamics do not sufficiently account for inter-sectoral 
interdependencies. It was furtht:r asserted that the causality force of 
technology is missing in the policy dynamics literature and that in tum, the 
socio-technical literature is lett with a lack of agency oriented analysis. 
Therefore, the theoretical puzzlc this thesis engaged with was how to re-
theorise the interplay of technology, policies and discourses at the level of the 
sociotechnical regime: what arc the implication of this interplay on cross-
regimes dynamics and: what can be accomplished through more integrative 
lookout. In order to achieve this goal I have chosen an interdependent pair of 
problem areas, one in the water sector and the other in the energy regime and 
conducted three separated studies. 
In the beginning of the thesis I pointed at the social construction of both 
scarcity and abundance and therefore on the accompanied postulation that 
these concepts are not purely dichotomous. I continued with the presentation 
of the water-energy interface, which stems primarily from the vulnerability of 
the two resources and the social quest to secure them. This introduction 
served to contextualise the empirical justification for the research and the 
theoretical interest in interdependencies. 
By means of interviews and document analysis, the first study (chapter 4) 
depicted a socio-technical transition in the Israeli water sector. I have claimed 
that this transition succeeded a long period of continuation and path-
dependency of policies. I described the inception and development of a new 
water policy, which advanced the use of desalination technology, thus 
initiating a sociotechnical transition of the regime. The new policy goals seek 
to move away from the traditional pattem of crisis-induced management to 
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having enough high quality water for all purposes at all times. Other features 
of the regime have changed as well - the geography of water shifted and 
water would now be flowing from west to east and from south to north 
(Feite\son and Rosenthal, 2012), economic arrangements promoted 
privatization along the chain of water production and sewage treatment and 
different types of displacements occurred between actors and subsectors in 
the system, pointing at the existence of various types of interdependencies. I 
have concluded that policy dynamics in the water sector followed a 
technological breakthrough in desalination and that the long-term 
implications of such a technology-induced transition may be unsustainable if 
cases of displacement would not be taken into account explicitly. 
Via documents analysis, conference talks and complementary interviews, the 
second case-study concentrated on dynamics in the Israeli energy regime 
(chapter 5). I have found that the transition of the energy regime from coal to 
natural gas (exported from Egypt and discovered in the Mediterranean Sea) 
goes along with a growing notion of energy abundance. This new paradigm is 
fortified by three additional energy alternatives (oil shale, nuclear and solar) 
that have made headlines during the timeframe of the study. The findings in 
this chapter highlight the role of different policy networks in promoting each 
of these alternatives and the power of the discursive shift from scarcity to 
abundance on demarcating and delimiting future energy pathways. 
Overall, in these two chapters I firstly established the assertion that both 
sectors are indeed undergoing a sociotechnical transition, expressed in 
multiple dynamics. While policy goals (which embody certain rules and 
routines and reinforce certain solutions to policy problems) (cf. Wilson, 
2000) did not change, the transition took place at several dimensions: 
technologies and infrastructures (e.g. desalination, deep-see drilling); policy 
ideas and discourses (e.g. from scarcity to abundance in both sectors, nuclear 
energy); and the organization of institutions and actors as well as 
implementation measures (privatization, for example). 
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Secondly, it has been demonstra ted how the transition o f each sector invo lves 
inherent spill s-over to other interdependent regimes, thus establishing a-
priory the 'ex istence' of the presumed interface. In the first case it was the 
environmental prob lem and risks di splacement from the water sector to the 
energy sector and in the second case it was res tricted pathways and 
incertitude, which a lso spill over to other sectors, and if not directly to water -
then indirectl y v ia the cl imate-change regime (see section 5.5.2) . 
Finall y, the fi ndings suggest that technological configuration drives policy 
dynamics in both sectors. This is not the common observation of policy 
change studies, in which emphasis is usually given to policy as a driver to 
technological innovation and change. Advocating a reverse casual relation 
between technology and policy, strengthens the later use of the 
coevolutionary approach to the study of coupled dynamics (see Figure 18 
below). In other words, as I asserted in the end of chapter 6, it is not by 
accident that large sca le technological configurations such as desalination and 
nuclear energy plants are promoted in both sectors s imultaneously. 
C technology 
drives 
policy water )0 
c 
nco-evolution <{l <{l 
drives 
( ) technology ~ policy energy c 
Figure 18: coevolution of dynamics in water and energy regimes 
The findin gs o f chapters four and fi ve have therefore laid the ground for a 
comparative analysis of the water-energy interface. I have achi eved the goal 
of examining cross-sectoral, interdependent policy dynamics with relation to 
question of sustainability by pointing at the connections between the water 
and energy regimes (in the physical, spatial, economic and institutional 
spheres) and at the implications of this interconnectedness on sustainability 
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(inter-sectoral vicious cycle of supply and demand, negative impacts on GHG 
emission, and more) and for transition managers (suggestions to open-up 
transition arenas, consider niche-innovation technologies with potential for 
solving the nexus, reformat transition pathways and specific regulations etc.). 
In regard to the challenge of integration, among other results, findings 
suggest that one type of integrative capacity does not necessarily indicate its 
existence elsewhere. For example, the study in chapter 4 of how 
technological developments in water resource management and other realms 
can engender policy shifts through problem, cost, and tension displacement, 
suggests the need for greater horizontal and vertical policy integration and 
cross-sectoral cohesion. While Israel is practicing the idea of Integrated 
Water Resource Management (lWRM) (see footnote 1) maybe more 
successfully than any other county (Fischhendler, 2008), such cases of 
displacements are indication of the lack of other types of integration, as will 
be further discussed in this chapter. The overall result also suggests the need 
to supplement the transition process with integrative capacities in its 
management process, as a way of better dealing with the water-energy nexus. 
7.3. Addressing research questions i - ii: a discussion 
I summarise and discuss the research results by answering the first two 
research questions one by one in greater detail below. A synthesis would be 
presented the next section afterward (7.4) through looking more in-depth on 
research question number three. 
i. How does technological change affect policy in sociotechnical 
transitions? 
There is a central question in the context of debates about sustainability and 
this is: how technological innovative solutions emerge and become 
sufficiently powerful to challenge or even overthrow a dominant solution (i.e. 
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the prevai ling 'regime' of production and consumption including institutional 
structures and actors constellation), resulting in an overall transition of the 
system (Haxeltine and Seyfang, 2009). This question is dealt with in the SST 
literature and has often met the multi-level explanation, according to which 
interdependencies between internal developments at the levels of a 
technological niche, the regime and landscape conditions, have produced the 
sufficient and necessary conditions for a significant transformation in 
sociotechnical systems in different sectors (agriculture, energy, water, 
transportation, etc.). Looking at the level of the regime, societal constitutes 
such as cultural attributes, policy intervention, artefacts (technological 
hardware and software), scientific knowledge, paradigms, or industrial and 
market-based activities, had proved by most research to determine the 
development and use of niche-induced technologies that are designated to 
fulfil socially determined functions (Smith et at., 2003). A difficulty to 
delineate the borders of each level (niche / regime / landscape), which is 
sometimes pointed by critics, should not deter an attempt to make claims 
about its dynamism (change or continuation). It is useful at times to think 
about a regime as what it is not, mainly because the micro and macro levels 
can be more easily distinguished. 
The motivation of many transitions studies emanates from the interest in 
questions regarding steering and governance of these multi-levels changes. 
The vast investigation of the challenging "governance of sustainable 
technologies" and "technological transitions" (Smith et a/., 2003; Murphy, 
2007; Smith and Stirling, 2010), however, has not provided a comprehensive 
indication to the ways certain technological configurations drive policy 
dynamics. To be more precise, studies often depict policy as a tool to steer 
new technological configurations (by the allocation of resources to 
conducting research; developing public-private funding apparatus; creating 
markets; regulation of specific health and safety related issues; creating 
arenas for public participation and more). These studies rarely portray policy 
as the outcome of incremental or breakthrough improvement in existing or 
new technologies. Rather, policy change has been argued to be the result of 
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the "attempts by different coalitions of actors to set priorities and 
conceptualise the socio-technical system and its concomitant sustainability 
problems in different ways" (Smith and Stirling, 2006: II). In the literature, 
the understanding of policy is essentially of an interactive intervention: 
Existing technology go\'ernance arrangements tcnd to be considcred as 
endogenous tCatures of thc socio-teehnical systems thcmsc\ves. Yet when it 
comes to recommending how sociotechnical change might best be steered in 
more slistainable directions. analysis tends to step outside the systcm to 
objcctify its workings. with gonrnance characterized in terms of 
exogenous 'mechanistic' intenentions. (Smith and Stirling, 2006: I, 
emphasis added) 
In other words. technology IS treated as an autonomous factor and an 
explanatory variable to policy change mainly by SST scholars such as Latour 
(2000), which takes a similar stand to the one Dosi (1982) took in his 
"technology push" approach in relation to economic growth. 
Existing policy dynamics studies should more frequently tum the common 
causality of 'policy' -7 'technology change' upside down by showing the 
ways in which "technology produces policies" to rephrase Pierson's 
(1993:597) statement that "policies produce politics". Chapter 4 was 
therefore driven by the theoretical inquiry about the relationship between 
socio-technical systems and policy dynamics and more precisely, about the 
ways and mechanism by which technologies could have the power to 
fonnulate a significant change in national policy, and consequently in the 
entire local sociotechnical system. 
The results of the analysis of Israel's recently emerging national water policy, 
have pointed out at the ways advances in Reverse Osmosis desalination 
technology have contributed to a major change in the Israeli water system. 
This analysis contributes to the literature by drawing insights from the SST 
and the socio-technological transitions studies as reviewed in chapter 2, to 
show how technology can spur policy change, and suggest the mechanism by 
which it does so. 
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The analysis st~l11ll1~d thml th~ ~l11pirical assumptions (based on prevIous 
research of th~ Isra~1i wat~r r~gil1l~ and my historical review) that past 
technological inlllH'ations. coupled with social. economic and geopolitical 
changes. ha\'~ contribut~d to incr~lllental changes in the regime without 
altering its path-d~pend~ncy management strategy and basic corc-beliefs, 
which in the course of action and in the face of growing demands, were 
translated onto th~ o\'~r-exploitation policy of fresh watcr sources. Similarly, 
networks of actors. in faHllIr of historical choices of spatial distribution of 
infrastructures. sectoral allocations of fresh water and pricing structures, 
contributed to the lock-in of the regime while reinforcing its national and 
centralised character. However. I have suggested how the sheer technological 
breakthroughs that rendered seawater desalination economically feasible 
undennined this long-lasting hydro-ideological support for agriculture; how it 
introduced new ideas about water abundance; and how it engendered changes 
in paradigms. institutional structures and constellation of actors. I have 
empirically demonstrated how desalination technology contributed to this 
shift by destabilizing the existing structure through re-framing and dis-
placing important issues. such as environmental externalities, economic costs 
and hard political choices, to other policy sectors and levels of governance as 
well as reallocated them between politicians, bureaucrats and water 
professionals. In a policy regime where technology drives change, by 
reframing the problem and consequently masking alternatives, the following 
opinion expressed by one of my interviewees is therefore not surprising: 
There is in t~lCt no connection betwecn the problem and the solution ... a 
complete inauthenticity between the prohlem -- i.e. the lack of water because 
current amounts arc not enough to supply all demands - and the solution, 
which is desalination. (Interview, Watcr Company). 
Scholars from different disciplines have made attempts to explain the 
mechanisms that operate behind the process of agenda-building, decision 
taking and policy making, processes which alrcady at their most basic fonn 
aim at altering the current state of affairs. Political scientists have highlighted 
the fundamental mechanism that is based on the interaction between actors, 
either as an individual rational practice or as political bargaining inherently 
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structured hy power-relations, conflicts, interests and social networks. 
Alternatively, gcographcrs and cnvironmental cconomists argue that formal 
and infonnal institutions arc a mechanism by itself, playing a steering role by 
restructuring alTangcmcnts hetween actors - arrangements, which are able to 
reduce problems of ovcruse or misuse of common-pool resources, set 
parameters for emironmental protection most efficiently and payments for 
ecosystem serviccs. Emphasizing thc mechanism of displacement is not to 
deny the importance of any of these processes. In fact, displacement is not a 
stand-by itself mcchanism. Both agent-based and institutional-based 
processes arc playing a kcy-role in realising any regime change. In the case-
study discussed here. an emergence over-time of new issue networks (such as 
an environmental network, see section 4.4) or the new informal 
institutionalisation of neo-liberal social identity and water marketization 
(same section), indeed have prepared the ground for desalination and the 
water regime transition. Yet. by revealing hidden costs (environmental, 
economic) and frictions (managerial, political and geopolitical), displacement 
underpins a regime change when other explanations cannot be used 
exclusively to understand the process at work. 
Policy and technology have otten co-evolved, as argued by transition 
scholars. A closer look at the case of desalination in Israel, however, has 
shown that policy was very much passive and was not recruited to promote 
certain technological solution to the problem of water scarcity, pollution and 
mismanagement. Policy rather reacted inertly to the quite sudden appearance 
of the technology as (economically, technologically) feasible. The fact that 
this technology was known and available for many years (and practiced 
intensively in other countries) begs highlighting precisely its presumably 
"smaIl" technological improvement. The empirical evidence supporting the 
answer to the first research question may now become cJearer; policymakers 
could stop worrying about poli(ymaking, because what was considered for 
many years unrealistic technological use, under long-lasting fiscal 
constraints, became feasible with the mere technological improvement. The 
point here is that the fiscal constraints are embedded with various important 
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challenges - such as energy sources and use, GHG emission, land use, 
marine pollution, escalating demands, increase In prices, political and 
geopolitical strategic manoeuvring and so forth. So only when the fiscal 
constraint of desalination was reduced, this thesis' analysis could have 
revealed their reappearance in other places. 
ii. What is the role of discollr.'Ies in policy dynamics of sociotechnical 
transitions? 
Similar to the paradigm shift from a state of perceived scarcity of water 
resources to the perception of their limitless - the newly emerging discursive 
construction of abundance in Israel's energy regime has been dramatically 
shaping its sociotechnical transition in the last few years. Unlike the case of 
desalination and its promise of abundance, the discursive appearance of 
energy abundance does not settle political friction, but rather aggravates 
tensions around each technological alternative. The constellation of actors 
and policy networks in the energy regime plays an important role in our case-
study. Each issue network promoted a different alternative energy pathway 
that is centred on a different technological configuration holding the promise 
to solve Israel's energy problems. The discursive shift from scarcity to 
abundance aggregated conflicts between energy values (e.g. general values of 
conservation vs. consumption; preservation of open-space vs. climate change 
mitigation in the case of solar; free-market ideology vs. social equity in the 
case of natural gas); it induced inner and inter-ministerial conflicts over the 
control and management of energy resources and; it changed the power 
balance of actors when, for example, the involvement of social or 
environmental organisations In the transition has become more 
institutionalised. 
Since discursive institutionalism accepts the claim that any discourse is an 
"articulation of knowledge and power" (Escobar, 1996:326) and embodies 
explicit and implicit "narratives of authority" (Carver, 2002:52), it thus 
understands discourses as a form of structure setting informal rules for the 
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actors at the polity. It also relates a mere policy change to broader social 
change; policy change can be experienced through processes of shifting 
powers, ideologies or technologies in any given society (that is a community, 
a nation, or at international scale). Nevertheless, along the spectrum of 
agency-institutional explanation to policy changes, the position of discursive 
institutionalism is much less structural because once one assigns discourses 
with power, he or she necessarily brings vividly back agency to the front; 
actors who holds individual, multiple framing, meanings, and interests 
(Schmidt, 2010). In addition, as the analysis in chapter 5 has shown, different 
interests realign individual actors into policy networks that can be used to 
undermine and disrupt existing policy practices, and to generate and 
legitimize new approaches. 
The focus of socio-technical transitions literature is on structural changes 
with predefined objectives. The contribution of the energy regime case-study 
IS the linkage between Discursive Institutionalism with current 
conceptualisation of transitions, which may offer more fluid and agency-
based ideas about discourses and therefore provide a contrast and 
complement. The subtle balance between agent-based, actor-centred and 
institutional approaches to policy dynamics was indeed at the focus of the 
analysis in chapter 5. 
Discursive institutionalism contributes to transitions and TM studies in 
several ways (see also section 6.4.3.1). First, by bringing up to the front also 
the voices of actors who are neither energy experts, nor individuals directly 
involved in technical or economic decision-making (see for example Lawhon 
and Murphy, 2009, who criticized TM advocators for relating only to experts 
and high-profile actors). The discursive approach also reflected a bit of the 
general public's disposition; it pointed to the new institutionalisation of a 
public sphere, one which once formed, could be expected to increase its 
dominance and influence over the course of the transition. 
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Second, DI n:vealcd the subtleness of power-relations and the existence of 
conflicting agendas. even within what presumably is a homogeneous policy 
network, like the environmental policy network. Finally, the empirical 
findings further demonstrate how a discursive institutionalist approach to 
policy change can highlight the potentially problematic aspects of socio-
technical transitions: a socio-technical pathway may only be taken on the 
basis of its promise to provide unlimited supply regardless of its potential 
risks to social and environmental systems. For example, in the case of natural 
gas, it is not clear whether the export of natural gas would even contribute to 
long-term energy security or just fulfil short-teml economic interests of 
business actors or multinational corporations (Shaffer, 2011). This is fortified 
by the resource curse literature, which highlights how difficult it is to 
successfully transform natural wealth into other forms of capital. The 
sustainability of the energy regime transition is therefore in jeopardy mainly 
because of the nature of these new "discursive commitments" to abundance. 
7.4. Addressing research question iii: a synthesis 
After discussing research questions i and ii separately, it is important to 
examine if and how did these answers achieve the goal of the study. By 
examining the role of desalination in water policy dynamics and discourses 
on energy policy, I have contributed theoretical insights regarding to the 
interplay of technology, policy and discourse, as three major constitutes of 
any sociotechnical system. I have aimed at explaining how technology affects 
policy dynamics, by combining different theoretical frameworks. It was 
offered that cases of displacement, allow technology to overcome policy 
path-dependency: after dislocating externalities, potential risks and costs to 
other regimes, the technology then becomes an optimal solution to the policy 
problem. Changes in discourses, resulting from technological advancements, 
were found to have a crucial effect on policy dynamics in a similar way. It 
was found that discursive constructions are strong enough to change policy 
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regimes evcn whcn technological configurations behind these discourse, are 
limited and constrained by multiple variables. 
This analysis has prepared the way to cxamine the third question, which asks 
iii. What does the interdependency of socio-technical regimes mean for 
their transition? How can coupled transitions be directed toward 
greater .'",stainability? 
Looking across the two case-studies may have generated a new theoretical 
contribution regarding the dynamic of transitions. The cases may not 
comparable in all respects (different type and number of technologies at 
question, pace and nature of institutional change, water is consumed directly 
while the consumption of energy is mediated by the use of electricity for 
different purposes) but they do share similar characteristics (almost same 
state actors are involved, share similar policy goals, centralised management, 
etc.), as both clearly represent typical tendencies of large infrastructural 
systems in transition (from public utility-oriented toward 'liberalisation' and 
adoption of new innovative technological configurations). The water sector is 
in transition because the "basic premise of the water geography is altered" 
with fresh water coming from the sea rather the opposite way around 
(Feitelson and Rosenthal, 2012:272). Similarly, the energy sector is in 
transition because new sources promise independent and almost unlimited 
supply. A sectoral analysis of the water and energy policy regimes in 
chapters four and five revealed initially that the perception of abundance is a 
key to the understanding of these separate dynamics. Later it was found to be 
also significant in the co-evolution of the two regimes. Technologies in both 
cases served simultaneously as actants that steer policy and as a discourse 
that embeds individual interests and power-relations. 
The main arguments in socio-technical transition research are drawn from co-
evolution and SST theories (Grin et aI., 2010). Co-evolution 
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conceptualisation of sacio-technical systems IS interested 111 radical 
technological changes more than in incremental improvements in existing 
technological systems and states of path-dependency. Accordingly, key-
selection criteria (regulation, infrastructures or economic structure), selective 
pressures (resources scarcity, natural hazards, war) and feedback 
mechanisms, amalgamate to foster reciprocal abrupt changes in institutions 
and technologies (Kallis and Norgaard, 2010). A neo-institutionalist 
(sociological/organizational) approach, despite its relevance for socio-
technical transitions analysis (because the sociological orientation of TM and 
because certain institutional arrangements could encourage transitions while 
others prevent them) is applied by Geels (2005), for example, mainly in terms 
of the conceptualisation of 'institution', but less in terms of change 
processes or agency. In general, neoinstitutionalism was criticised for its 
failure to address the process of change (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Only a 
few researchers have met this two fold challenge. For example, Paavola 
(2010) has taken a new-institutional approach to the analysis of the co-
evolution of institutions for water pollution control and sanitation 
technologies in the early 20lh century's United State. In another study, Foxon 
(2010) has proposed that the significant roles of particular agents and their 
choices (particularly individual user choice, the development of business 
strategies, and the role of governments) should be incorporated in 
coevolutionary analysis of sociotechnical transitions in order to emphasis 
change rather than locks-in. 
New-institutionalism in tum does not often lend toward making explicit 
normative assertions about technological/institutional change. When the 
neoinstitutional theory asks how social choices are constructed it usually does 
not go on to asking how they ought to be. This is in contrast to Transition 
Management, which is in its essence a perspective, normative model to guide 
transitions and that is based on the presumption that there has to be a way to 
control and direct dynamism in line with some sort of a an overarching socio-
ecological interest, or the public's' good'. 
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Therefore, a cross-sectoral analysis of the water and energy cases points to 
the usefulness of applying this integrative approach (new-institutional, co-
evolutionary) to the study of cross-regime interactions. In order to 
accommodate the multiple forces in coupled transitions a four-fold 
theoretical framework was offered. Change - whether it is of discourses, 
technological artifacts, policy or institutions at the regime level within a 
socio-technical system - is always depended. Even if we would widen our 
analysis to encompass multi-level (niche, regime, landscape) perspectives on 
change, it is not possible to assume or treat it as an absolute, independent 
system. The question therefore concentrates on the implications of these, in 
our case - the geographical, physical, institutional, and economic 
interdependencies, for the process of change or continuation. At the bottom 
line, the empirical results of this thesis suggest that the coupling of the water 
and energy transitions allows the continuation of malpractices such as 
avoidance of problems (in quality and quantity of the resources) and 
reinforces traditional growth paradigms. This might be why several 
interviewees expressed a similar concern, as represented in the following 
quotation: 
Although structural, economic, social and political changes take place, still 
things continue as ... no resources aIIocation .. .I mean, there are things that 
theoretically change but in practice there is some kind of continuation and you 
can see that the policy ... the policy, even if it changes, its essence doesn't 
really change. (Interview, Water Company) 
What are the sources and implication of coupled transitions? And is there 
something that the literature about cross-sectoral policy integration can 
contribute? Despite scientific acknowledgment of complexity and systematic 
linkages between environmental issues, Lafferty and Hovden (2003), as other 
EPI or inner-sectoral integration promoters, have rarely dealt with the 
question of horizontal integration that can account for the increasing collision 
between different environmental-related decisions across sectors. 
Exceptionally, integration between air pollution and land use 111 
transportation planning is by now fairly acknowledged (e.g. Givoni and 
Banister, 2010). Instead, research has been focused mainly on the design of 
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tools to assess environmental regulation and perfornlance in specific 
environmental sectors (Wea\e, 1992 in Toke, 2001). Yet, inherent trade-offs 
are exposed when a solution to one problem creates or fosters new or 
secondary problems, for example with the unforeseen implication of a 
technological developments. To date, also policy design and implementation 
occurs within specific departments. It fails, however to reflect the dynamic 
and interlinked nature of environmental subsystems, such as water, soil and 
air. The need for greater cross-secotral mechanisms, therefore, arises from the 
proliferation of dependencies and environmental trade-offs. An alternative 
approach should be able to ensure the flow of information, that decisions 
become transparent to the relevant policymakers and other stakeholders, and 
should reveal the processes behind the displacement of environmental 
problems from one media, time or place to another. 
According to Stead (2010), the particular goals of inter-sectoral integration 
are: insuring better consistency between policies in different sectors and at 
different levels of governance; preventing duplication; providing conditions 
to achieve government's overall goals by reducing narrow, sectoral interests; 
promoting policy innovation and implementation and; encouraging a 
comprehensive understanding of the effects of policies on other sectors. As 
aforementioned, inter-sectoral integration is expected to involve the exchange 
of information and possibilities of interventions between different sectors; it 
necessitates the definition of the leading and participating authorities and 
their responsibilities; it calls for the definition of a governmental organisation 
to ensure integration and; it might require organisational restructuring, 
including manpower and budgets. The institutional base for inter-sectoral 
policymaking is therefore crucial and the lack of inter-sectoral integration is 
characterised by disconnect between levels of government and scattered 
responsibilities (Givoni and Banister, 20 I 0). As noted in the beginning of 
chapter 2, departmentalism and sectoral rivalry, however, can be a major 
barrier, as is the case in the EU: "Battles for policy 'turf are frequent and 
fierce, as are attempts to build high firewalls around policies in a given sector 
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so that they cannot be altered or undone by actors from other sectors" 
(Peterson, 2004: I) 
In our case, inter-sectoral analysis reveals institutional fragmentation. 
Although in Israel water and energy issues are jointed together under the 
managerial authority of one ministry, no mechanism currently exists for co-
operation, policy integration or cross-cutting policymaking between these 
two sectors: 
Water is an inter-disciplinary issue ... but multi-dimensional planning is very 
rare in the Israeli system. Very weak. And it has several reasons. First, there 
are no professional administrators that can see the entire picture. Second, the 
political structure of the Israeli system of governance, which runs in a 
latifundia-manner, prevents any cross-sectoral planning. Each minister, except 
of the minister of finance, has an exclusive control over his office, sometime 
the prime minister may say a word. The unofficial collation agreement is 
'don't interfere in mine, I won't interfere in yours'. Therefore, a cross-
departmental cooperation is politically very hard to achieve. Third, there is no 
'planning headquarter', except of the ministry of finance, but his perspective 
is limited to economic considerations (Prof. Zaslavsky, former water 
Commissioner, Minutes Investigation Committee, 2009). 
Another example was given by my interviewee in the planning department of 
the Water Authority, who stated that: 
In the planning process we do not discuss energy problems and do not look 
for solution for the energy problem of Israel or energy consumption by the 
water sector, because the technical details arc managed between the Water 
Authority and its utility company (Mekorot) and not the Israeli Electricity 
Corporation (Interview, Israel's Water Authority). 
Stakeholders do not share consent as to what or who has the facilitating 
capacities to compete with the water-energy interface. Interviewees did not 
hide the fact that unofficial tunnels of communication between the lEe and 
the IW A, for example, are absent, and interactions between the networks 
range between non-existence and maybe even a traditional rivalry35. Most of 
the interviewees expressed loyalty to their own institutional affiliation when 
35 Molle et al. (2009) discuss historical rivalries between "pure" hydrological actors and 
actors within the electric network in Mexico, especially around hydroelectric projects. 
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asked who IS integrating water-energy considerations: the planning 
institutions i.e. Ministry of Interior (interview ME), the Ministry of Finance 
(interview MH), governmental decisions (interview RA), a joint ministerial 
committee for climate change (interviews YCF, NG) or the Ministry of Water 
and Energy (interviews AK, SV). The Water Authority, which has been 
working on a long-term plan for the water sector during the time frame of this 
study, considered energy issues in the plan (interviews AP, AG, AT, MZ), 
however, it took place ex-ante to decisions to increase desalination 
significantly. Institutional ambiguity (after Hajer and Versteeg, 2005), and 
unbridgeable gaps between actors that make strategic decisions and the 
executive institutions of these decisions36, have therefore been impediment to 
lessen the impacts of the water-energy nexus, because there is no mechanism 
in place that promotes strategic, comprehensive consideration of the 
implications of this interplay. 
Notwithstanding, the situation may not be much different in other places 
around the world. Indeed, developments in the water-energy interface would 
line-up with the goals of sustainability in no simple way. Policy integration 
still has to overcome not only the complex political, economic and 
environmental interdependencies which displace problems, costs and risks 
from one media and place to others but also its own inherent challenges. 
Certainly, one of the most highlighted challenges of improving integration is 
the costs that are associated with more money, time or human resources spent 
in the policy arena. Transection costs exist when two or more parties make an 
exchange and sectoral bargaining, while different institutional structures 
imply different kinds of costs (Challen, 2000). The more parties involved the 
more complex the process become and the costs can be expected to be higher. 
36 For example, there is no legal requirement to consult the IEC before initiating, planning, 
approving or constructing major industrial consumers of electricity, desalination plants 
included (GG, Attorney, IEC, personal communication, 2010). 
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Within the massive literature on governance, researchers distinguish three 
types of organizing mechanisms to reduce transaction costs - policy 
integration's most highlighted challenge - in the effort for greater 
coordination: competition; hierarchy; and communication (Jessop, 2000). I 
would like to note brietly that research on integration in practice counters the 
effectiveness of either. First, coordination that is based on competition 
assumes that exchange-based markets embed the idea of the invisible hand 
that stirs and guides individuals by means of attributing specific prices to the 
objects of transactions. Integration, however, has to make up for cases of 
market failure and the reality, according to research, is that markets are far 
from delivering optimal arrangements, especially in terms of information 
transparency and accounting for externalities (Givoni and Banister, 2010). 
The second mechanism for coordination is based on hierarchy and is 
generated by centrally organised decision-making processes and management 
structures, wherein all actors and institutions are equally constrained by the 
same rules and subjected to the same sanctions in case of noncompliance. A 
research undertaken by Feitelson and Gamlieli (2010) has shown that this 
does not always prove itself right. They expected that a centralised deeision-
making process in the planning and implementation stages of transportation 
policy in a new Israeli city (Modi'in) would decrease transaction costs of 
integration. They found that beside the Ministry of Housing responsible for 
the entire plan, no other agencies were integrated into the policymaking 
process. This resulted in a poor physical integration of the transportation 
system in the city. The third mechanism is based instead on the self-
organisation of actors, and facilitated by communication. This arena provides 
a platform to solve common problems such as transaction costs through 
networks. Networks - conceptualised as the informal relationships between 
social agents or agencies based on common interests - can, for example, 
facilitate trust and information sharing. Again, according to studies, the 
reality is often that organisational separation leads to lack of interest or 
motivation to share information and to disseminate it (Givoni and Banister, 
2010). 
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To conclude, the literature is quite short in providing any equivocal, simple 
answer as to how to overcome interdependencies along the chain, from 
policy-setting through policy implementation up to system operation. It does, 
however, share a common belief that policy integration has to be a means 
rather than the goal. The various studies imply that in order to overcome the 
governance barrier to integration, there might be a need to create a new level 
of institutions for joint interaction of policy networks specialised in 
integration. In new "modes of governance", hierarchies might need 
restructuring. For inter-sectoral integration to take place, a way to bring 
sectoral considerations into all other sectors that generate demand for its 
good or service - will have to be found. This calls attention back to Young's 
discussion (2002) on po/ycentricity, which affords opportunities for units of 
government to work together toward a particular end, while the individual 
units involved still maintain their own identities, rights, and authorities 
(Elazar, 1987 in Young, 2002:112). Young (2002) sees these institutional 
linkages as being exhibited through interactions and "functional 
interdependencies" between organizational actors at different scales, focusing 
on common substantive problems. As I stressed earlier, it is therefore 
interesting to examine the merits of the Transition Management model - a 
new form of decision-making - in coping with interdependencies, as a mean 
to achieve greater sustainability in managing the interplay of water-energy 
socio-technical systems (see section 6.4.3). I will discuss some of its merits 
below. 
While TM builds on traditional participatory policymaking paradigms (Shove 
and Walker, 2007), it nonetheless allows competition, mutual adaptation and 
influence of actors' interests, rather than full binding coordination. A 
consensus requiring high integrative capacities is expected for only two 
elements in the process: problem definition and strategic goal articulation 
(Loorbach, 2007). Thus, in its four conceptual stages (see section 2.1.3.5), 
TM attractively employs the mechanisms best known for coordination (see 
above): competition coordinates economic decisions based on selective, 
market-induced innovations, which is restricted by protected niches; 
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coordination is furt her achieved by a cen trali sed set of overall goals and 
hierarchal facili tating bodies; and communi cation achieved by the imposition 
of structure by informal inst itutions and networks within the transitiona l 
arenas. More pragmatica ll y, I proposed a sli ght adjustment of the TM model 
(see Figure 17). Each conceptual stage of the TM process can therefore be 
supplemented by conc rete measures that strengthen its integrative role: 
TM Integrated Transitions Examples of ITM concrete measures 
conceptua l Management (ITM) objectives 
staj!cs 
Tra nsition Formulating the possib le arenas, q short term and long-term integrated 
arcnas forums and ac tors for integrated po li cies to achieve greater sustainab ility 
environmental deci s ion-making q shared goa ls formulation 
q power-relations and interests recognition 
(who w ins? who loses?) 
Trans it ion Identi fying the soc ial and q wide stakeholders participation 
agenda and institutional barriers and dri vers q cross-sectora l sp ill s-over and trade-offs 
paths for the reali sati on of integrated identi fication 
environmen tal decision-making q di ffic ulti es and barriers identification (for 
exampl e: "cri sis" management, geopolitica l 
context, ex isting unsustainable po licies) 
T r ansition Spotting opt imal technological q Technologies that better correlate with 
technologics as we ll as behavioura l changes ' integration ' (alternative technologies, eo-
as so lutions when integrati on is generation technologies) 
pursued q Mechanism for innovation 
Institutiona l Considering the potentia l ro le of q faci litators/managers ofTM also act as 
transition Transition Management integrators 
framework in facilita ting further q Institutional setting (forums, actors, 
integration and system responsibilities and authorities) evaluat ion 
innovation q government's role monitoring and learning 
process 
Table 8: The links between concepts of TM, objectives of i ntegrative TM and 
examples of concrete measures. 
Rarely integration is being seriously addressed by practitioners. The reasons 
for that may be partly attributed to the lack of consistent definition or 
measures. Most profoundly, it is often argued that there is a need to avoid a 
message of ' integrating everything into everything' (Scrase and Sheate, 
2002). Not surpris ingly, attempts to increase policy integration encounter 
greater difficulty in current national and international governance structures, 
as will be further elaborated. 
FoIlowing recent developments in the understanding of decision and policy 
making and particularly in relation to the management of resources and 
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nature, national central governments are no longer seen as the sole player in 
processes of policymaking or governing in general. Especially not when the 
severity of socio-ecological problems, such as biodiversity and climate 
change, is worsening and their scale grows, to a large extent due to 
globalization (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Young et al., 2006). The growing 
recognition of the role of non-governmental actors in the ruling and 
policymaking processes (Paavola, 2007) has drawn attention to the 
"governance", which further includes regional and local governments, 
scientific institutions, enterprises and civil actors, as well as international 
arrangements and trading systems (Young, 2002). 
Decentralization of state power, traditional hierarchies, and "the reallocation 
of authority upward, downward, and sideways" (Hooghe and Marks, 2003: 1) 
have led to further academic recognition in the need for multi-level 
governance, or cross-scale analysis in multiple disciplines (Young, 2002; 
Paavola, 2007). The challenge of governing - that is the craft, implementation 
and enforcement of policy, in an increasingly complex world and within 
multiplicity of actors, levels and modes - is indeed a key-interest in 
governance analysis (Stoker, \998). Furthermore, it consequently entails high 
transaction costs, a key challenge to integration. 
An example for the problematic pnce of integration can be found in 
Fischhendler and Heikkila (2010), which asserted that IWRM prevented 
institutional change and reduces adaptation capacities of the Israeli water 
regime. According to their research, the serious efforts to implement 
physical, organizational and innter-sectoral integration have led to 
institutional lock-in and stagnation. Additionally, Coffey and Major (2005) 
have noted that diversity, rather than homogeneity, promotes policy learning 
and therefore integration should be desirable only when it is clearly proved to 
support sustainability goals. Lastly, Scrase and Sheate (2002:288) reminded 
that "it is essential not to view integration unreflectively as a panacea or 
shortcut to sustainable development". 
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The integrated transition management approach was offered as an alternative 
to current routines of decision-making that can benefit from greater 
integration. According to Underdal (1980) to 'integrate' means 
... to unify, to put parts together into a whole. Integrated policy, then, means a 
policy where the constituent clements are brought together and made subjects 
to a single, unifying conception (Underdal, 1980: 195). 
Here lies an important difference between ITM and policy integration. ITM is 
not aiming toward a unified, single policy. It is rather a process of 
collaboration with the aim of dealing with interdependencies. There is a good 
rationalisation of ITM in Heritier's (2002) statement that: 
No single actor, public or private, has sufficient potential for action andlor 
sufficient power to solve problems of interdependence on her own, nor has 
she all the knowledge and information required to solve complex, dynamic, 
and diversified problems (Heritier, 2002: 185). 
And therefore, 
Under conditions of problem interdependence across boundaries, collective 
action to provide common goods has to take place vertically across multiple 
levels of government and horizontally across multiple arenas involving public 
and private corporate actors (Heritier, 2002: 185). 
It can be expected that cross-sectoral integration, once TM is in place, would 
require only little effort and cost, compared with attempts to introduce 
integration in traditional decision-making arenas. Interdependencies of socio-
technical regimes would thus be remediated through a more integrative 
management. 
An additional difference between regular policy integration and ITM lies in 
the levels and scales at which integration is being pursued, as well as the 
types of indicators measuring it. Integration of policy, first, remains at the 
level of policy crafting and implementation. It could take place horizontally, 
between different governmental sectors, in which wide or narrow 
communication with other sectors and the ability to explicitly address trades-
off and spills-over between sectors, are the major indicators of its 
effectiveness. Policy integration can be vertical, to include cooperation with 
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state actors at different levels, inner and inter-ministerial/inner and inter-
department committees, and in which the history of cooperation and the 
levels of openness and trust are important determinants. Third type of policy 
integration would include stakeholders outside the polity, and the 
participation of actors external to civil service bureaucracy: interests groups, 
political parties, non-governmental organisations, local communities, 
industry, business companies and more. The stage of inclusion in the 
decision-making process and its statutory status are crucial to assess its 
integrative capacities. As TM offers an alternative to current policymaking, 
ITM is different from policy integration. First, because it goes much beyond 
the policy arena; trade-offs and cases of "problem displacement" by 
technology can be overseen already at the technological niche level, where its 
coherence is fostered by either governmental policy or entrepreneurs outside 
the government. Second, while policy integration is often seen as a tool for 
improving current policymaking, TM should not be seen as just a tool for 
system improvements (Nil! and Kemp, 2009). Therefore, ITM is not only a 
mechanism for the greening of existing trajectories, but rather should be used 
to create new trajectories, ones whieh account also for interdependencies. Its 
quality refers to performance indicators. Even though sustainability is not 
easy to measure, the results of integration can be evaluated at each stage of 
the transition management cycle (arenas, agendas, experiments and 
monitoring). Coupled transitions could have negative implications for 
sustainability, but alternatively it could also mean that two problems can be 
addressed simultaneously. 
I have already mentioned that similar to the transition management model, 
the ITM model should be treated with caution, and especially with respect to 
its "dark sides" such as the masking power-relations (see section 6.4.3.1). I 
have also discussed the problematic aspects of integration between policy 
agencies in general (this section, above). There is, however, another danger in 
the idea of dealing with coupled transitions through integrated transition 
management; institutionalising practices of integrative management of 
specific sectors that are lacking a strong reflexive process to come along with 
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them may result in the creation of a new locked-in, coupled regime. ITM of 
the energy and water sectors, for example, could create a situation were other 
interfaces arc neglected, such as the water-agriculture of energy-agriculture 
nexuses. New co-evolutionary process can be not only an explanatory 
mechanism behind coupled regime, but theoretically also a side-effect of the 
institutional efforts to deal with coupled transitions. I sum up the main 
insights from this discussion 111 the following chapter. 
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8. Concluding remarks & reflections 
"The gap between academic literature and 
the experience of participants in 
government is nowhere wider than at this 
point" (Allison, 1969:708) 
This chapter aims at making a few concluding comments (8.1). Next, section 
8.2 presents policy recommendations, pin pointing specific policy and 
regulatory tools. Section 8.3 reflects on a few theoretical and empirical 
limitations of the research and 8.4 directs to further research needed in order 
to advance better theoretical understanding and practical implications of co-
evolving sociotechnical regimes. 
8.1.Concluding remarks 
One result of the complexity facing analytical decision-making (Dryzek, 
1987), is that the problem in question and the range of possible solutions, can 
rarely be analysed holistically. This means that a policy regime, often spans 
its own "sectoral" boundaries and encounters horizontal and vertical 
interdependencies (Pierson, 1993; Rayner et aI., 2001; Jochim and May, 
2010). The findings in this thesis support the view that displacements 
engendered by technical solutions, should be made more visible so as to 
avoid a transition from one inferior socio-technical regime to another, and to 
encourage that new regimes are built on genuinely sustainable solutions to 
problems. 
The kinds of displacements I have described in chapters 4, 5 and 6, which 
mask the physical and social side-effects of technology and related policy 
changes, do enable policymakers to overcome tensions that have interlocked 
decision-making processes. Displacement therefore might not be the problem 
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per se but rather an indicator of the unresolved edges of public policies, 
especially but not only, of environmental ones. Indeed, the isolation of 
sectors in policy-making arenas should be questioned, especially when 
borders between policy levels and policy areas are transcended by inter-
sectoral challenges. As part of the aim of this thesis and based on these 
evidences, chapter 6 explored inter-sectoral dynamics, some of which are the 
result of problem displacement from the water sector to the energy sector and 
vice versa. 
The extensive literatures on policy dynamics exemplify altogether why 
integration is nevertheless so hard to achieve in contemporary governing 
structures: while integration may require central steering authority, current 
governance is dccentralised and diffused, composed of multiple policy 
networks or coalitions, with different targets and interests. Governance 
theories present a crucial question as to the continuing capacity of central 
government to steer or control policy developments. Wilkinson (2007) even 
proposed that it might be necessary to consider a return back to a more 
hierarchical, top-down approach in the European Commission in order to 
advance environmental policy integration at the EU level. 
In opposition to sociotechnical transition literature, which emphasises 
transformations, the analysis of entrenched technologies, such as large-scale 
water or energy infrastructure systems, often provides an explanation for the 
stability or stagnation of institutions and policy regimes, rather than for their 
change (c.f. Kay, 2005). The observations of path-dependencies of either 
technologies or institutions therefore underpin the normative view according 
to which sociotechnical transitions could and should be managed in order to 
prevent and overcome undesirable lock-ins (Meadowcroft, 2009). The 
question of how to better manage transition is dealt with by transition 
management studies. The transition management model offers an intriguing 
platform to avoid technological fixation and locks-in and to direct policy 
dynamics and transitions toward better socio-environmental outcome. 
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Technological fixation and lock-in analysis can contribute to an explanation 
of the way a certain technology or a scientific approach has evolved as the 
most l~lVourable option while excluding alternatives from any decision-
making process. Coupled transitions, on the other hand, imply that 
technological fixation in one sector can, to a large extent, be understood in 
light of development in an adjacent sector. Transition Management therefore 
offers important insights into the ways to increase integrative capacities of 
governments. Since the model is still lacking a reference to cross-cutting 
decision-making when it comes to off-setting different environmental 
requirements, in chapters 6 and 7 I relied on previous experience in order to 
suggest a slight adjustment of the model which might increase the potential to 
deal with inter-sectoral interdependencies. 
Additionally, as already has been stated by transition management advocates, 
central governments have a significant role also in guiding transitions, 
steering their stakeholders and managing budgets. Governmental leadership 
in the water-energy nexus is even more needed in the Israeli case, with its, 
literally, very little room for mistakes. However, ambiguity was referred back 
to the integrated institutions where the necessary adjustments were expected 
to be made by informal communication. As discussed throughout the thesis, 
the mere idea of integrating traditionally separate policy sectors and creating 
arenas for dialogue and problem solving has its merits. Nevertheless, its 
challenging implementation also brings to the fore questions about the status, 
accountability and legitimacy of decisions made. A change from hierarchical 
orientation to a more coordinating "governance" oriented forms of steering, 
raise questions about whose capacities to influence are strengthened and 
whose are weakened. 
Finally, since practice of TM is undertaken mainly in the Netherlands and 
most research does not usually go beyond west European countries, some of 
the ideas related to it are considered here and elsewhere at a very much 
theoretical level. Factors such as geopolitical tensions, repeated crises, and 
lack or weak participatory tradition in decision-making might be only a few 
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examples of hindrances to a wider use of the model. Hence, the transition 
model would need to be enhanced by analytical concepts from other policy 
approaches that explicitly incorporate power and political dynamics factors, 
instability of regimes and loose governance networks. 
8.2. Implications for policy 
The policy implications which can be drawn from this thesis are significant, 
exposing not only factors intluencing specific decisions to promote a 
particular socio-technical pathway, but also providing critical insight into the 
processes likely to shape, more generally, natural resource management 
policies, especially those entangled with large infrastructures systems. What 
can be taken from this research with respect to policy is the cal1 for greater 
horizontal and vertical policy cohesion. Indeed, the predominant appearances 
of governance dissonance at the water-energy interface have been an 
underlying hypothesis that motivated this study in the first place, and which 
was reinforced by the findings (mostly evident in chapter 6). Chapter 4 also 
identified lack of policy integration III terms of coherence and 
comprehensiveness, which has been resulting in problems, costs, and tensions 
displacement. 
There seems to be a few central challenges to greater integration in the 
context of the water-energy interface. First and foremost, there is a need to 
integrate supply-demand considerations into the decision-making at different 
levels concerning the production and delivery of the two resources. Second, a 
wide but precise definition of integration is required to ensure policy 
alignment with sustainability goals. Water and energy transitions cannot be 
managed with the preposition that endless demand has to be met. Second, the 
juxtaposition of water and energy sectors should find an expression also at 
the institutional level by mechanism of integration between the managerial 
bodies of the two resources. 
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A number of key policy recommendations emanate from the analysis, which 
address the issue of displacement and policy integration and suggest an 
altemative agenda of action for govemance institutions. The policy process, 
however. may require more than a superficial redirection to avoid an endless 
cycle of environmental problems displacement because political reality 
impinging on resource decision-making has developed in purely sectoral 
stnlcture. 
The first key-implication is the need to implement in Israel's bureaucracy 
some sort of assessment such as Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) or 
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA). Attempts in different countries 
to promote horizontal, vertical and environmental policy integrations are 
sometimes accompanied by Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA). In 
Sweden, for example, based on a "joint drafting nile", any decision must be 
followed by such a report (Nilsson and Eckerberg, 2007). A central purpose 
of it is to facilitate and contemplate on the process of integration of socio-
environmental consideration into sectoral policymaking. Even with its known 
limitations and weaknesses37 , the RIA was found to be an experienced-with 
tool or mechanism currently available to pre-coordinate post-policy 
outcomes. The need for such tools has also been articulated by an OEeD 
report: 
37 The assumption that RIA can promote sustainability of sectoral policies is being 
challenged. Studies in different national contexts have shown that insufficient training, time 
and resources, as well as political priorities and sectoral interests might, in fact, hamper 
attempts to increase levels of integration (Nilsson and Eckerberg, 2007). Additionally, it is 
already evident from RIA's practitioners that not all types of integration can be 
simultaneously achieved nor that one type that exists can necessarily generalize to others (see 
Watson et al., 2008; and also my conclusions in chapter 6). The inference is that ultimately, 
while the RIA is prescriptively important, the procedure by itself has little impact on the 
level of integration and sustainability of policymaking in central governments and a 
questionable influence on existing political structures and processes (Russel and Turnpenny, 
2009). 
A key challenge for regulators is integration of multiple policies that affect 
each other. As the world becomes more complex, regulators should be aware 
not only of their own objectives narrowly detined ... Experience suggests that 
policy trade-on's can be better managed through a more thorough 
understanding of policy links and careful design of interactive regulatory 
pulicies ... (DECO 1997:46) 
This is not to say that every policy that is being crafted should be 
accompanied by a RIA because this would easily lead to waste of human and 
financial resources. Rather, R fA should be applied in long-term policies 
which are recognized as "path taking", that is, policies which include the 
choice of long-term interventional measures and involve large scale 
configurations (technologies or infrastructure). Furthennore, a careful design 
of a RIA would allow the process to be effective and little time-consuming. 
Even the implementation of emergency policy, which is how desalination 
policy was first described by policymakers, can start concurrently with 
identification of possible cases of friction or displacements. Similar to the 
role of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), such an RI assessment 
would not necessarily change or revoke the chosen policy, but it will force 
decision-makers to stop and rethink over the multiple consequences this 
policy might cause along each of the stages of its cycle. It is therefore a 
procedural tool, which could guarantee that certain considerations are not 
ignored: that trades-off between sectors are explicitly addressed in early 
stages; that channels of communication with stakeholders or actors within 
and between each relevant sector are kept open; and that external input is 
considered during decision-making from relevant authorities, scientist, the 
public and other specific stakeholders. 
Second, further institutional changes are required. Maybe unexpectedly, 
better integration could be achieved also by a guided (physical) 
decentralisation of production. Smaller physical and geographical 'units' of 
production and consumption may encourage greater integration of planning, 
funding, and regulations across the currently segmented fields of 
management. Decentralized water technologies and designs include for 
example water-efficient appliances, rooftop rain gardens, and onsite 
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wastt:watt:r treatment and reust:. Decentralized t:11l~rgy system means that 
energy conversion units arc situated close to energy consumers, and large 
units are substituted by smaller ones. It is mostly based on renewable energy 
sources and operates at lower kWh scales both in the presence and absence of 
grid (Kaundinya et aI., 200<,)). While measures as such could have positive 
impacts, this is by no means an exclusive conclusion that the deployment of 
distributed generation is always the best option in terms of external costs and 
sustainability. First because some advantages of distributed system (such as 
gas-tired plants' lower GHG emission), are counterbalanced by, for example, 
higher discharged of other pollutants and second, because decentralised units 
of production may impose difficulties for the enforcement of environmental 
regulations (Interview, RA, in which he referred to small-scale portable 
desalination plants and the Ministry's worry about the difficulty to monitor 
their environmental impact). 
Third, unlike integrative transport system wherein integration is seen as 
promoting a better travel experience for consumers, increased integration in 
the water-energy interface would not have automatically a positive benefit for 
end-users. Therefore, the political motivation to make any changes, whether 
institutional or infrastructural, is less straightforward and incentives are 
probably reduced to either economic efficiency or political capital that can be 
a gain of the institutional and physical systems, and less of the general public. 
Fourth, it is clear that cross-sectoral niches would reqlllre a special 
restructuring, linking R&D companies with a different speciality subject and 
defining a new juxtaposition of the two areas of interests (water and energy 
technologies) for research grants, definition of research fields, training, room 
for experimentation, market introduction, complimentary technologies and 
infrastructures, incentives, regulation, national fiscal policies and so forth. 
New technologies would have to be evaluated according to their ability to 
mitigate this nexus and their alignment with wider sustainability goals. 
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Finally, the water-energy interface is essentially no different from 
interdependency of other regimes. The quest for integration might result in 
the need to ask hard questions also about other coupled regimes and adjacent 
sectors most naturally the agriculture, land-use and climate regimes. Framing 
of issues surrounding sustainable resources management is divided to 
efficiency versus conservation and therefore these two different approaches 
may guide this complexity. The first one assumes that the purpose of policy 
is to improve efficiency of use of natural resources (both physical and 
economic. in light of the assumption that making more from less is 
economically desirable). This is considered by the classical market-based 
approach as the best way (competition) to achieve cross-regime coordination. 
The second approach considers whether the concern of policy should be how 
much the overall amount of use and misuse can be decreased. Accordingly, 
cross-regimes interaction cannot be disconnected from (a) continuous efforts 
to incorporate sustainability concerns into decision-making processes and (b) 
to keep moving away from traditional supply management toward demand-
side management practices. 
8.3. Final reflections and research limitations 
In this section I allow a space for reflection on the research questions and the 
choice of methodology: how adequate it was for answering the questions and 
how useful it was for analyzing the events at focus? My very initial curiosity 
was regarding the reasons and causes that led Israeli policymakers to adopt 
desalination technology at a large scale in response to their growing 
recognition of a "water crisis" and the decision-making processes within the 
polity that have allowed this choice to be materialized. I was also interested 
in the socio-environmental implications of this decision on a future transition 
toward sustainability of the Israel water system. After identifying the energy 
costs of desalination as a focal issue, I turned to the energy sector to find out 
that this sector as well faces significant socio-technological developments. It 
was in fact the coupling of the water and energy regimes that brought to the 
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surface the discursive constructions of abundance in both sectors and the 
transformative, causal powers of technology over policy. I therefore worked 
backwards to fonnulate the two first research questions on the relation 
between technologies and policy change, and the interplay between 
technologies and discourses. Looking back at the research questions, I found 
them to be very broad and explorative in nature. The results are respectively 
general and interpretative. It is possible that with more precise research 
questions and clearly defined aspects of the phenomenon under study, a more 
in-depth analysis could have been reached. However, in the absence of these 
initial general insights, it would have been difficult to identify these aspects 
and thus formulate the right questions a priori. 
As one may expect, my empirical investigation of policy formulation often 
indicated its non-linar evolution and complexity. The interpretive policy 
analysis methodology used here allowed to take a next step to identify the 
actors' multiple understandings of the policy problems and their bias for 
different kinds of action; to examine how these understandings are created, 
promoted, manipulated and repressed as parts of political strategies and 
interactions; to discuss the values, beliefs, and feelings that were expressed 
by the stakeholders in the particular cases under study and; to pinpoint 
potential implications of these multiple interpretations. The interpretive 
approach of this thesis helped, for example, to reveal the role of discursive 
shifts in socio-technical transition processes. An important finding 
highlighted how discursive constructions, which actors use to promote their 
ideas and interests, can play an important role in socio-technical transitions, 
such as those of energy regimes. In the case of Israel's energy regime, the 
discourse of energy abundance can risk a transition toward greater 
sustainability by restricting possible pathways and masking alternative ways 
to achieve energy security. 
The time frame of this study was unique in the sense that in a relatively short 
period of time both water and energy sociotechnical systems in Israel 
experienced dramatic events and shifts. Policy acted and reacted accordingly. 
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Desalination targets constantly rose and dropped by governmental decisions 
while posing continuous uncertainty on the water sector. At the time of 
writing these words, the Egyptian national gas company (EGAS) cancelled 
its agreement with the Israeli-Egyptian business natural gas company (EMG) 
and the energy sector is now experiencing difficulty to meet expected 
demands, especially in the coming summer months. These are only two 
examples of major developments that communicate with discourses and 
paradigms and affect transitional processes in terms of pace and nature. In 
retrospect, one limitation of the analysis in this thesis is therefore the choice 
of studying a policy that is still being fom1Ulated and a transition that is still 
on-going, instead of performing a post- implementation analysis as is being 
undertaken in most transitions studies. Nevertheless, the IPA provided the 
suitable framework exactly for such dynamics. As Wagenaar (2011:429) put 
it, the very essence of IP A is to characterise action in a "world of uncertainty 
that originates in complexity, irrepressible ambiguity and contingency and 
the inevitable conflict and incompatibility that spring forth from pluralistic 
practices and institutional positions". 
Policy outcomes may be understood in various ways and studied at different 
levels. This study did not primarily aim at a conclusive assessment or 
evaluation of the outcomes in relation to specific policy objectives. Neither 
does it claim to disclose the particular causes of the observed outcomes. The 
goal was rather to offer an explanation for what the policy "means" in the 
eyes of different actors and essentially of the researcher. The choice of 
methods made possible the inclusion of actors' interpretations located at 
different administrational levels and in different organisational contexts. 
Although the amount of interviews undertaken was not big, these have made 
possible the analysis of the interactions between this broad variety of actors 
and helped to direct the focus of the analysis. A higher number of participants 
most likely would not have changed the overall picture of actors' 
interpretations although it could have allowed this study to get into variation 
and consistency among members of identified policy networks in greater 
detail. In turn, the analysis of documents and real-time public appearances 
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brought to the surt~lce the actors' different capacities to influence the policy 
process. The large amount and wide range of documents also served as 
empirical information against which the interviews' discursive analysis could 
have been verified. 
Finally. quantified data on the water-energy nexus, including a systematic 
examination of, for example, alternative measures to desalination (how much 
energy is invested in grey-water systems for example) is crucially absent 
from the analysis here. There was no comprehensive study on this subject 
that I could depend on as well. A quite predictable implication of this lacuna 
was revealed in the interviews. Actors, especially in the water sector had 
expressed a sense of support in desalination mainly based on their perception 
of its potential negative impacts, energy costs to be among the chief 
concerns. However, since quantitative data is limited and dispersed each 
actor produced his own numbers and used these to support his claims in 
favour or against this water sector's management policy. From my 
perspective as a researcher a lack of clear data also restricted the ability of 
this thesis to make direct policy recommendations for water and energy 
management regarding what practical measures can be considered more 
sustainable. 
8.4. Future research 
From the 1960s, environmental policy dealt with the side-effects of 
development and human activities and therefore has been producing end-of-
pipe solutions to environmental pollution or degradation. The technocratic 
approach to environmental problems tended to overlook the underlying 
causes and consequently missed strategic options like pollution prevention 
(Weale, 1992 in Toke, 2001). Today's environmental research takes a very 
wide perspective on the effects of humans on nature that targets the sources 
of environmental problems. Transition is one way of conceptual ising the 
human-nature interrelationship in the sense that it recognises a direct causal 
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link between socio-technical changes and environmental change. The 
transition management model is a framework that could serve as an 
alternative to traditional models of decision-making processes in the more 
complex and dynamic problems of our days, because it adds a strong 
nornlative directive. The relevant question here is therefore whether TM 
could form an alternative paradigm to dominant environmental decision-
making frameworks for addressing cross-cutting sustainability challenges 
such as water and energy management. 
Unfortunately. it was impossible to test this question empirically in the Israeli 
setting because the country may not be ready for transition management at 
all. Policy dynamics in the water and energy sectors are too chaotic, 
dominated by vested interests, inherited political stirring, and crises-based 
management. Nevertheless, the picture presented here may not be so different 
from water and energy policies in other countries, which have not diverted 
yet from the "statist developmental-ism" paradigm (Mercer et ai., 2007) and 
therefore the potential of integrated transitions management (ITM) is a 
worthwhile agenda for further research. 
Since much of this research had been focused at the level of the regime, 
additional research might look into particular technological niches which 
target the water energy nexus, and the way to support cross-sectoral 
experiments and innovation in, for example, water treatment technologies 
powered by renewable energy, co-generation of water and energy 
technologies, etc. Similarly, studies should also examine more in-depth the 
landscape conditions related to the nexus; among the most burning topics is 
the concept of technological transfer and the challenges facing poor 
countries in the process of adopting certain technological solution, such as 
desalination. Cases from Southern countries point, for example, on 
alternative ways to technologically deal with water scarcity, for example by 
the adoption of small, domestic desalination systems that can be more easily 
powered by renewables. 
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More theon:tical work and practical trials arc therefore needed to examine the 
capacity of greater integration in the transition management multi-level 
perspective model, its capability to promote sustainable resolution of long-
term environmental challenges, and its applicability in different ecological, 
economical and geo-political contexts. Indeed, additional research outside the 
Netherlands might also reveal the degree to which the model could be applied 
in other politics. Policy integration and linking-up research is needed to 
reduce the risk that new technologies are adopted as a result of their ability to 
displace - rather than to solve - hard problems. 
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Appendix 1: Integration in the literature 
Levels of 
integration 
Coupled soclo-
environmental 
systems (SES) 
Ideas & types of 
integration 
involved 
I Conceptual 
i integration-
! theorizing 
! connections between 
! the systems; I Physical integration 
! - between clements 
Sectors, disciplines 
or frameworks 
Earth sciences and 
social- sciences; 
System theory; 
Complexity theory; 
Co-evolution theory 
i in the systems.. . 
What for? Rational 
for integration 
Promote 
sustainability; 
account for 
interdependencies; 
Promote resilience 
and adaptability; 
Scientific inquiry 
How? mechanisms 
& platforms 
Acknowledge and 
conceptualize the 
interconnectedness 
of socio-
environmental 
systems. and 
interactions 
between waters. 
I I ! ! ! soil. energy. air. 
i! i i biodiversity and the 
When? At which 
stage of 
policvmakine 
Usually not at the 
policy level. Pre-
assumption of 
poIicymaking in 
relation to 
environmental 
issues 
Where? 
Institutions 
involved 
Mallllyacademla. 
Need to be 
acknowledged by 
policymakers 
Examples from 
\ 
literature 
Y OlJng cl al.. :2000 
: iii i global human i 
L--------------------------~----------------------~-------------------------------~------------------------- __________ ~--~~-i.e.t2'-------------- -----;-----------------------------------1---------------------------------.-----------------------------------, I Sustainable ! Conceptual. ! All policy sectors. ! Growing inequalities i Wide range of ! All stages of ! Government at all ! Hopwood ct al.. ! 
i Development (SD) \ procedural and \ Building blocks of \ and environmental ! policy tools: policymaking. From :: levels; Businesses \ 2005 :: 
i ! horizontaL between ! policymaking. i degradation; ! economic valuation problem definition. i and industries; Third ! ! 
( ( the environmentaL (decision-making and I Allowing ( of environmental through the design (sectors i ' 
I i societal and ! strategic or spatial ! development and i systems. public and implementation i organisations; At 
j j economic j planning i economic growth to j participation. to evaluation and j local. regional. 
j j considerations j j continue without j Environmental refinement of j national and 
! i i ! compromising ! Impact Assessment policies. i international levels 
! ! ! ! environmental and ! (EIA); Preference ! i j j j social integrity. j for long-term. j 
t _____________ :~: ________ -1 ____________________ L __________ ---Li~~~~ __________ J __________________________________ l ________________________ J _____________________________ J 
i Environmental i Integration of i All non- ! Promote principles of ! EIA; Strategic ' At all stages. ! Sectorial ministries ! Lafferty and i 
! Policy Integration ! environmental ! environmental i sustainability and i Environmental especially at the stage! and governmental i Hovden. 2003 ! 
! (EPI) ! concerns in non- ! policy domains; ! preventing ! Assessment (SEA); of policy design i departments; i i ! ! environmental ! directives ! environmental side I Regulatory Impact j EU institutions (i.e. i j i ! policies and plans ! ! damages/externalities i Assessment (RIA); j Article 6: i j 
I ! i ! I HIA; Cost-Benefit ! Amsterdam Treaty) ! ! L i --.l _______________ L ) Anal~sis _Jhm ___________________ mm ___ .L ________ ~i ___________________________ .J 
i Integration in ! Substantive; ! Planning; Natural ! Planning has major ! Deliberate ! At all stages ! Relevant ministries; ! Eggengerger. 2000; ! 
i planning and i Methodological; i resource ! impact on human's ! democracy;! i Planning authorities; ! Healey. 1999 i 
I I P d I: I I' .. : AI': : PI . : : i management i roce UTa; i management; ! IVtng environment i ternahves i annmg i i 
i i Institutional; Policy; i Deliberative ! so making integration ! assessment; SEA; ! committees;! ! 
II I Stakeholders; i planning; SD ! a key-principle in ! Public, ! Stakeholders;! ! I ' , , , , , , '--_______ .~integration between ~ _________ ~ising planning .J.E.articipat0~ ____ L ___________________________ LA!.!ocaI.~ional J ______________________ J 
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r----------------------------r--------------------~------------------------------- ......... ---------------------------,..--------------------------------,-----------------------------------.-----------------------------------.-----------------------------------, 
: : conflicting land-uses i i and development i Collaborative: : and national k"cls : : 
\ \ and related issues ! ! approaches is crucial ! planning;: \ \ \ 
: : : : : RIsk assessment; : 
i ! ! ! ! Multi-Criteria: i i 
Ii! ! ! Anal sis; GIS: ! i ~------------------------~----.---------------+-------_______________________ +------------------------------___ + _____ i: _____________________ .: _____________________ ---___________ : ___________________________________ 1 ___ --------- ----------------- ----I 
! Cross-sectoral i HOrIzontal; ! Organizational ! It will be irrational ! Inter-sectoral i At different stages of! (imemmcntal ! Scras.: & Sheate, 
i integrationi i Vertical; i theories; i and hard to i committees; policymaking: the : ministries; i 2002 I ! Institutional; I Public policy; ! implement a new I Special sooncr integration is I Authorities and i 
I I I, " i Linked-up Stakeholders' i Environmcntal- i policy that stands in i coordination body thought of. the sooner: managerial bodies; : i policymakingl integration; : assessment field; I conflict with other ! (i.e. The Strategy trade-offs and future ! mainly national and ! i "Holistic Sectors in all policy ! areas of interests; ! Unit in the cabinet constraints can be i regional levels i 
i Joined-up government" domains ! Promote effective ! office, UK); Cost- detected i ! 
i policymaking ! and constructive ! Benefit Analysis; ! ! 
I : . I : , i cooperatIOn, i RIA : 
, i coordination and i I 
i synergies between ! . 
. . I ministries, i ., 
: : : d &: : : : : 
I
' i i : epartments i : i i : 
______________________ l ______________________ l _________________________ J..E~!i~!~_~ _________________ L---________________________ j __________________________________ L ________________________________ L _______________________________ J 
i Integrated Natural i Technical; i Environment; ! Rationally balance : Joint decision- . Mainly at the stage : Government and, ! Bellamy, 1999; : 
! Resource ! Policy; ! Resource- i the use and i making of experts of physical planning ! non-government : Morisson, 2004; : 
! Management ! Stakeholders; j management; i conversation of j group; GIS as a ! management bodies; i i 
! (INRM) ! Horizontal; : Ecology; i natural resources; ! databank; i Industries;! i 
! ! Vertical; i Planning; Land, i Optimize the use of i Adaptability and ! Communities; At all i i 
! i i forest, water sectors; i all resources for long ! flexibility i levels ! ! 
! i j Holistic systems ! term; Integrating I approaches ll
! ! ! approach- SD i community i i! i iii 'i i i 
: : : : Involvement. : :::
I I I I I f I , 
i technical knowledge, i 
i ! i ! organizational ! !!:
! ! ! :. 1 
: : : : structure, polIcy : ::  h-------- i J _________________ +...<?.!Jjectiv_~ ______ _l-------------L---------------------------------1-------------------------J-------------------_________ -1 
i Integrated chain I Physical; logistic; I Materials and ! Integrating operation, I Life-cycle analysis; : Strategic levels i Industry; Firms; I Seuring, 2004 ! 
I management i Information flow I distribution I materials and I Risk and ! Companies; Supply i j 
i management; I logistics to improve i performance ! chain actors;! i 
II I i Transportation; i efficiency and reduce I analysis; Materials 1 Relevant ministries j j ! i Industrial ecology; I environmental ! flow analysis ! (Trade, Industry, i 1 
I i SD I Impacts; gam ! ! Environment)! I 
i I I competitive i ! i 
, I d I ,,:
: a vantage; ! ! I j 
Examples by 
sectors 
Ideas & types of TSectors, disciplines i What for? Rational How? mechanisms When? At,Which Where? Examples 
integration I or frameworks for integration & platforms stage Institutions 
I 
! 
I 
I 
I 
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involved 
Integrated Water Inner-sectorial but Resource Increasing Multi -Stakeholder Requires National and Biswas. 2004; Pahl-
Resource (lWRM) also inter-sectorial management, sustainabilityof Platfonns (MSP); institutional and rcgional watcr Wostl. 2007 
integration; Water (and related water resources by Strategies and legislative changes management 
Physical; Vertical resources; River integration of actions plans; at policy level al1lhorities; Ri\'l:r 
Institutional; basin! catchment management, uses catchments 
Administrative; management; SO and treatment; authorita:s; Relevant 
balance between ministries; local 
iii i needs and availability i • ! stakeholders 
I I I ' I , : ~ ________________________ L ______________________ l _________________________________ l __ <.?£~~~~!.. _____________________ L _________________________________ J ___________________________________ 1. ________________________________ - ____________________________ . ___ ._ 
! Integrative ! Physical; Technical; ! Transportation; Traditional structure ! EIA; SEA; HIA; 'At all stages of ! EU committees Geerlings and Stead. 
i Transport Policy i Institutional; i Land usc; of government tends ! Ex-post evaluation; polieymaking, ! Governmental 2003; 
! ! Organizational; ! Environmental to limit infonnation ! Statistics database; requires ! ministries Givoll! and Hamster. i i Vertical; Spatial; i planning; flows and impede i Spatial planning; ! Planning 2010 
i i ! Environmental coordinated action ! committees 
! ! ! assessment; SO Necd to integrate air I Private planning 
I , , . d ' . d iii quality & Ian use i compall!cs an 
! I policies to promotc ! : I advisors; Users I , 
! ! ! ! SO ! : ! ! • L ____________________ J. _________ ------.!..- ------ ----------------- _.1. ____________________________ .l ____________________________ ~-----------------------------------!------------------_________________ 1 ___________________________________ ! 
! Integrative Waste ! Physical; Vertical; ! -Resomce - i Pollution & ! Life-cycle analysis; , Strategic targets; ! Government; ! McDougall and ! 
j Management j Horizontal; i management; i deterioration of non- 1 End-of-pipe Policy and 1 Ministry of 1 White, 2001 1 
! I ! Waste; so ! renewables and ! regulations implementation! Environment; Local i i 
! ! ! ! renewables (water, i levels ! government, 
! ! ! I biodiversity etc); ! , ! Business: Public ! ! ! ! Reduce waste;! i ! i I 
I ! ! ! Efficiencv i ! Ii!,________________ ~__________ __.l__________________________ ..L _________ J ___________ L ________________________ J _________________________________ ! ____________________________ ! _______________________________ f 
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Appendix 2: Questions for interviews 
Water. cl1crgr and climate: 
• Within the water sector, in which forums where decisions in regard 
to energy issues are discussed and implemented? Which are the 
stakeholders? 
• What tradcoffs can be expected 111 making decisions in regard to 
water scarcity and its alleviation? 
• Where do you think issues of water and energy interact? Can you 
identify similar interplays between different resources or 
environmental sectors? 
• What mechanisms to deal with those tradeoffs can you detail? Who 
is involved in related decisions? Can these be managed? 
• When was the issue of desalination and related concerns first raised? 
What can you tell me about your involvement? 
• Was the decision to race ahead with desalination involved thinking 
about energy costs? Implications of GHG emission? Other links to 
different environmental issues? 
• What interests are involved 111 thinking over alternatives? 
Renewable energy/location sites? How these are justified? 
• It is likely that carbon tax will be adopted in Israel as a mechanism 
to control GHG emission? And what about off-setting (example of 
Sydney desalination plant) 
Techn%gy and environment: 
• How much do you believe in technological solutions to water 
scarcity problems? And to other environmental problems? 
• What effects can we expect water-related technology will have on 
the social system in the future? 
• What is being done today in order to minimize environmental 
impacts of desalination? Do you think these measures are enough? 
257 
Integrated decision-making and planning: 
• Where and when cross-cutting policies in relation to environmental 
Issues are being made? Where do you think integrative 
considerations should be addressed (in governmental decisions/IW A 
decisions/planning committees/Ministry of Environment policy 
etc. )? 
• Are there any difficulties in that? What do you feel are the barriers 
to cross-cutting policymaking? 
• What institutional arrangements enable coordination and integration 
of the water and the energy sector (or specifically the IW A and the 
Israeli Electric Company)? 
• How does the planning system affect decisions of water 
management and vice versa? 
• What are the spatial implications of the still in planning T AMA 
34/8/2 for desalination plants sites? What are the main issues 
discussed? Who these are addressed? 
International and geopolitics: 
• What is international/Mediterranean forum in which desalination 
and its environmental aspects (long-term impacts on the 
Mediterranean Sea) are discussed? 
• Do Israel's desalination plants stand in international standards? 
• In your opinion, how significant can be an external pressure on 
Israel in terms of its environmental performances? 
• Is it being done differently in other places? 
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Appendix 4: Identified keywords and key-issues (a sample) in 
NVivo 
Key-word/topic sub-topic Sources References 
agriculture --- 3 4 
alternati ve 
importing water I 3 
small or mobile desa lination plant 3 4 
water sens itive planning I 2 
causes for delay 
·.'Ui!CJact and bu~~.~tjr.&·::' 4 9 
·.vl formation and data ba~'c." 4 7 
..... II!_'···· 
profes ionalism (lack of) 1 I 
statutory 3 4 
..•.•.........••. waiting for approval 1 3 
'deci sion-making and .... 
. 
--- 7 14 
• ' LolPedil11ents .. ' .' 
... 
rapid personal rumover 4 5 
...... 
• Aesalination .:· 
.•..••..•. . ..... 
. , 
'aQP. el~~i_~:· ...... I ••••• 7 8 
• :~nd related envi ronmental issueS:' 4 4 
" .,-
polluted water desalination 1 1 
wastewater desalination 2 2 
enforcement --- I I 
exce ive production --- 3 3 
" jiw~lementation (lack qn> --- 6 9 
••••• I , i". II •• ••• 
Incentives 
OECD 1 I 
.... 
':j~ti rutiona l truc t}lCG~:' 7 12 
.................. 
Electrici ty Commiss ion 1 I 
Mekorot Company 2 3 
Ministry of Environment 2 3 
~"M ~I!~stlY of Finan~~, .:::' 5 9 
Ministry of Infrastructures 1 2 
Hydrological Service 1 1 
Water Commission council 2 2 
• "integration :.:. --- 4 7 
1ong-tcrm planning (lack on:, --- 5 7 
" ll' 
municipal "independency --- I I 
pollution 1 1 
oi l 1 I 
water 2 2 
260 
po\Ver, authority and division 
authority (l ack of) 6 10 
divi sion of power and authority 7 15 
• 'privati zation :: --- 4 8 
. .. . ... 
salty brine di scharge --- 2 4 
scientific controversy --- 3 4 
sewa~~ •••• --- 2 2 
~';ocial capi tal ': 
. .' 
public discourse 2 3 
transparency 4 6 
...... 
~·lCf.~~~I.<l~y. . ;. --- 5 5 
uncertainty (coping \Vith) -- - 2 2 
vISIon --- I 1 
\Vater and economy I I 
: water prices": 
'" ,.-
8 9 
water and energy --- 3 4 
water and geopolitics --- 2 4 
',water and politic§:: --- 6 7 
'" .... 
. ' . . '. 6 8 ~ >Y!l.ter cn s ! ~ ••• ---
water for nature --- I 2 
water law - - - I 1 
water 10 e --- I I 
~'A-rate r sav ini~ --- 4 5 
" , 
